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No Longer Exempt: Higher Education’s Entrée into Lobbying 
Matthew J. Camp 
 
 As populist forces stretch apart higher education and government, colleges lobby in 
measurable ways to secure scarce funding and respond to accountability regulations. The non-
profit and corporate lobbying literature provides a basis of comparison to ask if colleges lobby 
like corporations, which have been successful lobbyists under challenging conditions. This study 
shows the connection between federal governmental funding and higher education lobbying by 
drawing on a newly-created database of 2,000 B.A-granting institutions of higher education from 
2004-2014, and explores the rationales and tactics of higher education via interviews with 20 
New York-based lobbyists and legislators and a sampling of 200 news stories from the 50 states. 
I find that for-profit college lobbying is slightly associated with Pell grant dependence and that 
non-profit college lobbying is strongly associated with federal research and development 
dependence. I also find that although lobbyists band together to advocate for large pots of 
funding to help equalize on-campus budgets, colleges break away into increasingly small 
coalitions as funding becomes more specific along the budget process. Colleges lobby in 
response to high-profile accountability measures but do so in ways distinct from corporations. 
The study adds detail to the emerging higher education lobbying literature, opens pathways for 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Just because you do not take an interest in politics doesn't mean politics won't take an 
interest in you.  
-- Pericles (ca. 495 BC - 429 BC) 
 
1.1 A Frayed Relationship 
 
On June 16, 2004, the Washington Post reported that the newly elected president of the 
University of Maryland Student Government Association went on a hunger strike due to the 
rising price of college tuition: 
Aaron Kraus was on the second day of his vigil in front of the Annapolis State House 
yesterday, and already his body was taking on the authentic patina of protest – chin scraggly 
with a new beard, jeans browned by park-bench grime, a slightly overripe odor released by 
the hot spring breeze.   
 
It had been more than 30 hours since his last meal, and the 21-year-old student was 
determined to continue his hunger strike for as long as it took to draw attention to his cause, 
like so many young activists who have stormed the barricades for animal rights or drug-
law changes or an end to war. Except that Kraus was agitating for . . .an override of Gov. 
Robert L. Ehrlich Jr.’s veto of House Bill 1188, a measure to boost state funding of public 
universities while restraining tuition increases. 
 
A year later, University of Wisconsin students held a three-day hunger strike to protest Governor 
Doyle’s budget proposal to increase tuition up to 14 percent over two years. The Capital News of 
Madison shared these student’s perspectives: 
‘It's a question of priorities,’ said Ashok Kumar of Associated Students of Madison. ‘It 
seems big business lobbyists are getting their way with the Legislature.’ Kumar called the 
new tuition increases ‘legalized neo-segregation.’ One of the protesters, Suri Kempe, said 
the tuition increases would mean people would be able to attend the University of 
Wisconsin ‘based on wealth, not merit. This is not acceptable.’ She said the policy of 
raising tuition ‘only feeds a racist system,’ suggesting that the increases would primarily 
affect families of color (Nathans, 2005). 
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Racist policies to steer benefits away from people of color have long been embedded in 
American politics and higher education. Although the post-World War II G.I. Bill expanded 
access to higher education, and caused the face of the typical college student to look less white, 
Anglo, and wealthy, the bill’s embedded segregationism, its state-level management of benefits 
and training, and its racist barriers to loan provisions ensured that whites would be its primary 
beneficiaries (Katznelson and Mettler, 2008). Policies like the G.I. Bill, and American higher 
education as an institution, reflect “the question of priorities” du jure. After the G.I. Bill, another 
wave of legislation under the Civil Rights era, along with student activism, further opened up the 
doors of academia, this time to women and people of color. The diversification of higher 
education was met by racial resentments embedded in populism, fraying a longstanding 
partnership between government and higher education.  
For much of American history, higher education had been seen as a moral good, part of 
the “education gospel” (Grubb & Lazerson, 2009) of “faith in education as moral, personally 
edifying, collectively beneficial, and a worthwhile investment no matter what the cost, either 
individual or societal” (Cottom, 2017). However,  
For two decades, from the end of the 1960’s to the end of the 1980’s, conservative 
Republicans had posed authentically in populist dress by keeping cultural resentments 
uppermost in the public mind. Adhering to a disciplined script, GOP politicians ran against 
a ‘liberal establishment’ composed of federal bureaucrats, the mass media, arrogant 
academics, and other amoral ‘special interests.’ This nexus of power supplanted big 
business and its political cronies as the main threat to the beliefs (and pocketbooks) of the 
hardworking white majority. In a 1980 poll, even two-thirds of union members agreed that 
business was over-regulated (Kazin, 1998: 266). 
 
Historically, universities “got their way” with little, if any lobbying (Gladieux & Wolanin, 
1976), and there is little research on higher education lobbying to point to much of a pattern. Did 
populist resentments against a liberal, diversifying academia change that? Students have a long 
track record of advocating for themselves, but who speaks for American higher education? The 
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government? Students? Universities themselves? If corporations are “getting their way,” what 
have universities been doing to get their way?  
1.2 Getting to 2020 
 
The 1960’s Civil Rights movement spawned federal policies to diversity higher 
education. The Higher Education Act of 1965, work-study aid, the Education Opportunity Grants 
in 1972 –a “G.I. Bill for everybody” “[propelled] the diversification of American higher 
education” (Loss, 2012, 175). Protests at colleges in the 1960’s and 1970’s further changed the 
face of the typical American college student: as white, G.I. Bill-funded, middle class students 
graduated, women and Black Americans advocated for inclusion in higher education (Gladieux 
& Wolanin, 1976; Loss, 2012). Students also protested against American military involvement in 
Southeast Asia, to the chagrin of President Richard Nixon.  
Nixon capitalized upon, and propelled the backlash to campus unrest, with white 
resentments about Black empowerment. His successful 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns 
called for “law and order” and a populist appeal to a white “great silent majority” (Lowndes, 
2016). Colleges, with their longstanding image of being wealthy and exclusive, were suddenly 
now more open to diversity, and became a favorite populist target.  
 President Ronald Reagan butted heads with universities even as governor of California. 
In the 1980’s, Reagan advocated against Civil Rights era “big government” programs like Title 
IV student aid, and favored loans instead of grants, opposed affirmative action in college 
admissions, the latter of which became “a source of extraordinary controversy” among the white 
middle class (Loss, 2012: 224). Presidents, especially Republicans like Reagan and his successor 
George W. Bush, seized upon anti-intellectualism as a populist tool to win elections (Shogun, 
2007). This pulled government and universities apart. 
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Nixon, Reagan, Bush, and others rode a long-running current of anti-intellectualism. 
Survey data from 1972 through 2014, and 2016 shows a strong association between the public’s 
holding of anti-intellectual views and “support for politicians and political movements who made 
the distrust of experts prominent components of their campaigns; including voting for George 
Wallace in 1968, [and] holding positive views [of] and voting for Donald Trump in 2016,” 
(Motta, 2018: 467). American’s confidence in education, as reported in the General Social 
Survey, fell from a high of 49% in 1973 to 25% in 2019 (Smith, et. al, 2011). 
 This erosion of confidence in experts, education, and big governmental programs 
corresponded with a new, positive belief in big business. While Civil Rights-era legislation was 
undermined and deregulation surged in the 1980’s, corporate America got its way, and 
privatization came to reign supreme: belief in free markets “seized the minds of both major 
parties and the average citizen” (Loss, 225). College-going was looked at through the lens of 
markets. State governments in the 1990’s demanded measurable outputs as a result of public 
investment: performance-based measures tied funding to college outcomes on graduation and 
transfer rates, job placement, and student retention (Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, and 
Reddy, 2016). Wisconsin, where Mr. Kumar and Ms. Kempe went to college, implemented 
performance funding in 2014 (Hillman et. al., 2015). 
The populist, anti-intellectual tide drove policies against colleges, that were mostly, but 
not exclusively, authored by Republicans. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich in the mid 
1990’s proposed to turn the Pell grant program (a need-based grant for low income 
undergraduates) into a loan program, limit student aid programs, charge interest on student loans, 
cut funding to the National Institute of Health and the National Science Foundation, and reduce 
indirect costs to universities (Cook, 1998). Since at least 2006, Republican Senator Charles 
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Grassley launched “a slew of inquiries and requests for information” at colleges “about a range 
of topics, including college governance, presidential pay, research entanglements with 
corporations and, most recently, whether they should be spending more from their endowments 
to bolster access to college for needy students” (Lederman, 2008). An endowment tax was signed 
into law under the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. The 2017 law also capped graduate student 
loans, reduced deductions for education expenses and charitable contributions; bill drafters even 
turned their gaze towards graduate students and proposed a tax their stipends (Kreighbaum, 
2018).  
But criticism about higher education is not limited to Republicans. An opinion piece in 
the left-leaning The Nation entitled “Universities Are Becoming Billion-Dollar Hedge Funds 
With Schools Attached” appeared in 2016, criticizing public and private non-profit university 
endowment management (Taylor, 2016), while an opinion piece in the right-leaning Wall Street 
Journal entitled “A Hedge Fund That Has a University” appeared in 2017, in support of the 
endowment tax (Gilbert and Hrdlicka, 2017). Under the Obama administration, the U.S. 
Department of Education proposed rules to tie college funding to affordability, graduation, and 
earnings metrics (Stratford, 2014) with the view of student-as-consumer, and the expectation of a 
return on investment. The label of higher education as corporatist was thus often echoed by the 
public and policymakers.  
The left also aims accountability regulations at colleges and universities, in particular for-
profit colleges. For-profit colleges are often in the news for defrauding students, for saddling 
students with debt, and yielding low graduation rates. For-profit colleges have been reported to 
target and sometimes deceive veterans, treating them as “‘dollar signs in uniform’” (Wong, 
2015). The Obama administration assertively held for-profit colleges to earnings-to-debt ratios to 
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ensure that graduates are “gainfully employed” after graduation, and issued regulations to limit 
up to 90 percent of for-profit college revenues from federal Title IV sources. School privatization 
advocate Betsy DeVos was named U.S. Secretary of Education in 2017 by Donald Trump, who 
from 2005-2010 put his name on a for-profit education company that was accused of defrauding 
students (Cassidy, 2016). In New York in 2019, Democratic Governor Andrew Cuomo 
introduced the For-Profit Accountability Act as a response to Secretary Betsy DeVos’s for-profit 
deregulation of Obama administration rules. Governor Cuomo issued audits regarding sexual 
assault to private non-profit institutions, piggybacking on Obama-era measures. 
For-profit colleges like the University of Phoenix and DeVry University are often 
publicly traded entities, required to return investment to shareholders. For-profit institutions 
lobby like corporations because they are corporations. They may make financial contributions 
directly to political candidates, they may lobby without much restriction, and they may hire 
government relations professionals to “get their way” in the corridors of power. Although the 
press has covered dramatic instances of for-profit colleges taking advantage of students, there is 
not much empirical academic research on how these entities get their way in government. There 
is, however, political science research on interest groups lobbying that might provide some 
signposts for higher education researchers to follow. 
Which brings us to 2020. In 2020, colleges continued to diversify, enrolling more 
international students, sometimes drawing hostile populist responses. As state government 
funding to institutions of higher education withered in the 21st century, colleges enrolled more 
international students to balance their budgets. In multiple instances since 2017, the Trump 
administration attempted to rescind visas of international students and workers, even in July of 
2020 demanding that international university students leave the country unless they enroll in in-
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person classes, fanning a public health dilemma as colleges shifted online due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Colleges rallied to successfully rescind the measure. 
1.2 Overview of this Study 
 
If universities are expected to adhere to standards of corporate America, and yield return 
on states’ and students’ investments, and may actually run their endowments like hedge funds; if 
for-profit colleges are corporations that lobby like corporations; if populist and anti-intellectual 
trends have no sign of going away, as evidenced by Trump’s election and subsequent policies, 
and if Ashok Kumar of the University of Wisconsin is right—that big business lobbyists get their 
way with legislators—then maybe colleges can and should lobby like corporations to also get 
their way. Maybe colleges are no longer above the fray, and today recollect the old lobbyist 
saying “if you’re not at the table, you’re on the menu.” The question of college lobbying is in 
need of research: since Mr. Kumar’s hunger strike 16 years ago, and even in the 20 years before 
that, going back to the Gingrich era described by Cook (1998), not much academic research has 
examined if, how, and why colleges lobby.  
I think that colleges not only lobby, but do so in the corporate image. This is because 
corporations have a long track record of being successful at lobbying, and colleges notice this 
and emulate it. Indeed, Mr. Kumar’s observation is grounded in much research showing how 
effectively corporations lobby. In Chapter 2 of this study, I review the government-higher 
education relationship, and compare university lobbying to corporate lobbying, which may 
provide a model for comparison. This model suggests that corporations lobby for material self-
interest: they register to lobby and spend money doing so in the pursuit of federal funds. I review 
corporate and non-profit literature on lobbying to establish a baseline of comparison; I generate 
metrics of corporate lobbying, finding that larger corporations lobby, and that their lobbying 
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spending is connected to the availability of government resources. This is also true for non-profit 
organizations, suggesting that the model may be applicable to non-profit colleges and 
universities. I also review the extant research on higher education lobbying and explore the 
possibility that the literature is sparse because colleges still do no lobby much. That is, they 
might not need to lobby because a historical, mutually beneficial partnership with government 
still exists. I also explore the possibility that colleges lobby, but in their own distinct way, to 
keep funding flowing but not to rock the boat.  
I then explore a third possibility, over the course of two chapters, that at the federal level, 
colleges lobby like corporations. In Chapter 3, I test two hypotheses regarding the connection 
between federal governmental funding and higher education lobbying suggested by the corporate 
lobbying model. Hypothesis I states that for-profit colleges with more Pell Grant dependence 
will lobby more. This is based on existing research indicating that Pell dollars are so important to 
for-profit colleges that they will lobby for it. Hypothesis II states that non-profit colleges with 
higher federal research and development dependence will lobby more, and is based on research 
pointing to the notion that non-profit colleges lobby in pursuit of this resource.  
Both hypotheses are grounded on three theories: first, the theory of academic capitalism, 
which states that higher education is adopting market-seeking behaviors (Slaughter & Rhoades, 
2002); second, the theory of memetic isomorphism, which suggests that organizations facing 
uncertainty will adopt the behavior of organizations seen as stable and legitimate (see DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Together, these two theories imply that colleges reflect 
the corporate environment and have retooled their internal behavior to become more corporate. 
Third, the theory of resource dependence, which suggests that organizations pursue government 
resources differently, due to their dependence on those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
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Throughout Chapter 3, I analyze data from a new database on higher education lobbying to show 
the importance of these federal funds to the respective types of colleges. I find descriptive and 
multivariate evidence linking lobbying to the dependence of these funds, suggesting that at the 
federal level, colleges lobby like corporations. However, there is more to the story. 
In Chapter 4, I discuss what the quantitative data could not reveal. That is, I provide an 
“inside look” at higher education lobbying. Drawing on 20 interviews, my own 14 years of 
experience as a higher education lobbyist (and additional work in two U.S. Senate offices, in 
state government, and as a lobbyist for the New York Bankers Association), and an analysis of 
200 news articles from across the 50 states, I discuss the process of lobbying—how colleges 
lobby—and the topics besides Pell and federal research and development funding that drive 
lobbying. These topics include the cost of tuition, accountability measures, and other 
newsworthy motivations that, I believe, demand more lobbying of higher education, and help 
explain some of what underlies the lobbying effort detailed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I explore 
the process of lobbying, which is important for interest group scholars to examine in addition to 
the product of lobbying (Leech, 2010). I also attempt to unravel some of the collective action 
paradoxes common to groups that lobby together.  
I offer two additional, exploratory hypotheses in this chapter: Hypothesis 3 states that all 
sector spending and registration is positively correlated with media coverage of accountability 
regulations; Hypothesis 4 states that public, private, and for profits employ similar lobbying 
tactics, with for-profits relying more on direct tactics. In Chapter 4, I find that the story of higher 
education lobbying is more complex than what political science corporate lobbying research 
suggests: I find that although colleges lobby for public goods in increasingly specific coalitions, 
they will lobby together even when they do not differentially receive those goods, due to non-
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material pressures like a desire to “speak with one voice” and the existence of associations. 
While the analysis in Chapter 3 makes strides to isolate the independent effect of college 
characteristics on federal lobbying a la the political science research, in Chapter 4 I argue that the 
interdependence of local, state, and federal funding sources is key to driving college lobbying. 
Thus, I find that college lobbying is more complicated than lobbying for federal dollars. In 
Chapter 5, I reflect on the study—its implications for the fields of higher education research, 
















Chapter 2: A Review of Lobbying Literature 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I review research on interest group lobbying. I first discuss the literature 
on higher education lobbying, which for most of the 20th century could be characterized as a 
partnership between government and colleges until a “breakup” in the late 1960’s. Studies in the 
20th century only point to occasional lobbying by colleges, and despite a difficult cultural and 
political environment that put colleges on the defense, imply that colleges still lobby rarely, if at 
all. 
I then examine the broader interest group lobbying literature, which mostly focuses on 
corporations. This body of research offers patterns of lobbying behavior against which we can 
measure newer research on higher education lobbying. Lobbying data disclosed under the 
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) provides metrics of corporate lobbying. Since colleges 
also report lobbying under the LDA, gaps in the literature can be addressed and we can better 
understand the state of college lobbying in the 21st century. I also review the non-profit lobbying 
literature, which notably excludes higher education, but provides signposts to compare non-profit 
college lobbying. 
I then turn to the most recent higher education lobbying literature. The contemporary 
higher education literature is scattered, broad, and offers starting points for more investigation. It 
indicates that different sectors of colleges—public, private non-profit, and for-profit—lobby 
based on their dependence on government resources. It also suggests the possibility that like 
corporations, colleges lobby in response to regulations, and rely on direct lobbying tactics. But it 
is unclear if the higher education-government breakup is really over, or if colleges do not expend 
much lobbying effort and rather let others do the heavy lifting. 
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At the end of this chapter, I introduce a theoretical framework that posits three 
possibilities to characterize contemporary higher education-government relations. The first is 
that like in the past, colleges do not lobby much or at all because they are still in good, or “good 
enough” favor with government. The second is that colleges lobby, but in their own distinct way. 
The third is that colleges notice the threats and opportunities around them, and lobby—like 
corporations. I then state four hypotheses to investigate the third possibility, which I find most 
plausible.    
2.1 Higher Education-Government Relations in the 20th Century 
 
In this section, I describe a historical partnership between government and colleges, 
underwritten by a public faith in higher education that for most of the 20th century that likely 
preempted the need for colleges to do much lobbying. Government relied on higher education to 
fulfill important national needs in agriculture, war, and citizenship. When colleges did lobby, 
they did so usually in response to threatened funding streams set up by this partnership, and were 
more likely to lobby via associations than at the campus level. However, this relationship 
changed in the 1960’s as tumult came from outside and inside of colleges: government policies 
to fulfill civil rights goals helped diversify college campuses, and Black and women students 
advocated for better representation. Students of many backgrounds protested the country’s 
military involvement in Southeast Asia, and President Richard Nixon stoked populism and anti-
intellectualism through his six years in office. The government-higher education partnership 
pulled apart and frayed in this era, while populism and anti-intellectualism continued to be 
important political forces through the end of the century, putting colleges on the defense. Many 
Americans placed less faith in higher education, and from the 1980s through to today, many 
voters and policymakers trusted the power of markets, competition, and the corporate sector. As 
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trust and faith in higher education eroded, many began to expect colleges to behave more like 
corporations and less like the sanctified institutions of old. The available literature says little on 
how colleges by the end of the 20th century responded to these challenges, leaving it unclear how 
to characterize the frayed era. 
2.1.1 A Partnership 
 
The historical flow of resources from government to higher education rested on a public 
faith in higher education. For much of American history, higher education had been seen as a 
moral good, part of the “education gospel” (Grubb & Lazerson, 2009) of “faith in education as 
moral, personally edifying, collectively beneficial, and a worthwhile investment no matter what 
the cost, either individual or societal” (Cottom, 2017). Universities and their associations in 
Washington, D.C. thus abstained from lobbying due to the traditional assumption of their “self-
evident value of education to society” (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976: 242) and instead emphasized 
education as a national asset and responsibly (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976: 44). As will be 
described in this section, government often gave colleges money to fulfill certain needs: colleges 
were critical for achieving the growing state’s goals in agriculture, war, and a democratic 
citizenry.  
As the government-higher education partnership became more robust, colleges would 
occasionally lobby to protect funding streams. The first recorded instance of colleges “banding 
together” to lobby was to secure funds authorized but not appropriated under the Hatch Act of 
1887, which authorized Congressional funding to state land grant colleges and universities 
(hereafter “land grants”) to establish stations to experiment in agriculture (Congressional Record, 
1987). The Association of American Agricultural Colleges and Experiment Stations (AACES) 
organized in 1887 to lobby for Hatch Act funds and for a second Morrill Act (Cook, 1998); 
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AACES would change later change its name to the Association of Land Grant Colleges and 
Universities (ALGCU) which today continues to lobby for land grant colleges. Land grants lobby 
for increased National Science Foundation (NSF) and National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
budgets, as well as for earmarked funds (until they were banned for non-profit institutions in 
2011) (Marsicano, 2019). During the 1930’s New Deal, President Franklin Roosevelt “tapped the 
land grant university extension system, and its force of three thousand county agricultural agents, 
to implement the Agricultural Adjustment Act,” public works, and work-study (Loss, 2012, 5). 
Roosevelt also famously drew from faculty at elite universities like Columbia and Harvard to 
create a “Brain Trust” to generate and implement ideas to fight the Great Depression. 
The government-higher education partnership was strong in matters of war. Columbia 
University president Nicholas Murray Butler in 1917 offered to temporarily nationalize “the 
entire resources” of Columbia in the event of a wartime emergency; almost 100 universities 
followed suit (Barrow, 1990: 125). The threat of decreasing enrollments due to the American 
government’s involvement in World War I caused colleges to organize and lobby. A federation 
of university associations formed to lobby the U.S. Bureau of Education to attempt to stem the 
flow of students from campuses; this federation would in 1918 become American Council on 
Education (ACE); ACE would also lobby for the federal Bureau of Education to become a 
department (Hawkins, 1992). The government in the 1940’s relied on university scientists to 
develop the atomic bomb: Manhattan Project scientists were from universities including 
Columbia, Harvard, Princeton, University of California and the University of Chicago (Reed, 
2014). Through the Cold War, “a new alliance between science and the state was forged,” with 
universities as major recipients of war-related contracts (Balogh, 2015). The National Defense 
Education Act (NEA) of 1958 “provided grants and loans to students in education and the 
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sciences as a national defense response to Sputnik” (Hannah, 1996) and “financed education for 
specific careers, and with the goal of contributions to global understanding” (Cook, 1998).  
After World War Two, government employed higher education to build a democratic 
citizenry. The state “deployed education to build better soldiers and rewarded veterans with 
generous education benefits in exchange for their wartime sacrifices;” it was a “reciprocal 
conception of educated citizenship” (Loss, 2012, 214). The post-World War II GI bill was the 
centerpiece of this effort, sending millions of dollars to colleges. Colleges, however did not 
lobby for the GI Bill; rather, it was an “unexpected and not wholly welcomed windfall” (Thelin, 
1994) pushed through by President Franklin Roosevelt and the American Legion (Olson, 1973). 
The college-going veteran was popularly called “Joe College.” He was the “quintessential 
adjusted citizen” who personified “white male, middle-class values and institutions” (Loss, 2012: 
219). 
This pattern of advocacy for higher education, undertaken by officials and entities mostly 
outside of higher education, continued through most of the 20th century. A close-knit bipartisan 
group of members of Congress, executive branch officials, and higher education associations was 
responsible for most of the formation of the Higher Education Acts (HEA) from 1960’s to the 
early 1990’s (Hannah, 1996). During the renewal of the Higher Education Act of 1972 the higher 
education associations, formed specifically to represent colleges in Washington, D.C., 
“abdicated” and took their cues from an education subcommittee chair who saw lobbying as 
“unseemly” (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976: 199). Importantly, during the expansion of student aid 
programs in the 1972 HEA renewal, colleges were not organized in a meaningful way. Rather, 
individual colleges were passive, secondary beneficiaries of expanded Pell grants, which were 
designed so students could “port” the funding to the college of their choice (Cook, 1998), not 
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unlike a voucher program. Outside groups like United Negro College Fund lobbied for Pell 
increases for the benefit of students at Historically Black College or Universities (HBCUs) 
(Loss, 2012). In summary, the government’s use of higher education was a buffer “between 
citizens and the state” that created a thick partnership termed a “parastate” (Loss, 2012) that did 
not prompt much higher education lobbying. 
2.1.2 A Fraying Relationship 
 
In this section I explain how higher education-government relations changed in the late 
20th century as Americans shifted their faith away from colleges. The government-higher 
education partnership that was strong through most of the 20th century began to “break up” in the 
late 1960’s (Loss, 2012). The resulting relationship at the end of the 20th century and beginning 
of 21st century was frayed: although some important fibers still connected government to higher 
education, with colleges receiving large amounts of federal research and development dollars 
(Brint, 2019), the more visible edges were frayed as more campus diversity and protests were 
followed by an anti-college backlash that brought to the fore undercurrents of anti-
intellectualism, and later, a belief in markets 0F1, which put colleges on the defense.  
 Universities in the post-World War Two era became more ethnically and economically 
diverse. Most Joe Colleges (the largely white, middle class male) had graduated institutions that 
were white-majority by the mid-1950’s. Government in part responded to the Civil Rights 
movement by funding aid programs at colleges for low-income students. The federal government 
in 1965 used Title IV of the Higher Education Act to “[propel] the diversification of American 
higher education” and included Education Opportunity Grants in 1972 as a “G.I. Bill for 
                                                 
1 Richard Hofstadter’s 1963 Anti-intellectualism in American Life discusses American preference for spiritual 
practices rather than intellectual rigor, and a preference for capitalism’s “mystique of practicality.” 
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everybody” and funded other programs like work-study to aid needy students (Loss, 2012, 175). 
College enrollment in the 1950’s went from 2.3 million to 4 million, in the 1960’s it went from 4 
million to 8.6 million (Loss, 2012: 180). Black college student enrollment tripled from 1968 to 
1978 (Loss, 2012:178). By the 1970’s the majority of female undergraduates received their 
degree at coeducational institutions (Goldin & Katz, 2011). 
 Change at colleges now also came from within:  
the tide of national affairs—the civil rights movement and the racial crisis, the focus on 
poverty and urban strife—affected every sector of the society. Higher education was forced 
to examine its record and conscience in failing to extend opportunities adequately to ethnic 
minorities and the disadvantaged (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976: 18).  
 
Higher education examined its record as administrators at some highly selective institutions 
observing the Southern civil rights movement created affirmative action in admission in the first 
half of the 1960’s; affirmative action became more prevalent in the latter half of the decade with 
social unrest (Stulberg & Chen, 2014). As the number of Black students and women in college 
increased, so did their desire for universities to reflect their interests. Black students affiliated 
with the Black Power movement called for the establishment of Black studies departments (Loss, 
2012: 168). In New York, Black and Puerto Rican students in 1969 protested the need for the 
student body of City College to reflect the composition of public high schools and contributed to 
the open admissions policy (Schmidt, 1999). The feminist movement advanced the establishment 
of women’s studies departments (Loss, 2012: 168). Such student-centered, “rights-based” 
education began to replace the GI Bill’s “reciprocal” relationship that linked education to 
service; college became a place of “identity politics on steroids” (Loss, 2012).  
In the late 1960’s, universities became hotspots for protests of many sorts, particularly 
against America military action in Southeast Asia. Initially, “many of the era’s most combustible 
protests occurred at the nation’s most elite colleges” (Loss, 2012: 180). Students at Columbia 
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University in 1967 and 1968 protested CIA and military recruiting on campus and the 
University’s membership in the federally funded Institute for Defense Analyses (Columbia 
University Libraries, 2018), of which Princeton, the University of Chicago, Caltech, Case, MIT, 
Stanford, Tulane, University of California, Chicago, University of Illinois, the University of 
Michigan, Penn State were members (Greenberg, 1968). Protests became widespread in May of 
1970 after President Nixon announced America’s invasion of Cambodia: that year 9,408 protests  
(Loss, 2012: 218) took place at about 22 percent of colleges (Gladieux and Wolanin, 1976: 24). 
Some were violent. The National Guard was deployed to campuses in 16 states, killing four 
students at Kent State University in Ohio; Mississippi state police killed two students at Jackson 
State College; anti-war activists blew up the Army Mathematics Research Center at the 
University of Wisconsin, killing a researcher and injuring others (Loss, 2012). Images of 
students and young people protesting and occasionally defacing American flags circulated 
widely in the media (Boxerdec, 1995): “[events] such as these convinced many observers that 
higher education had become a breeding ground for political radicalism, not democratic 
citizenship” (Loss, 2012: 217). As a result, “campus unrest contributed to a changing climate of 
opinion about higher education in general that could condition legislative action in the early 
1970s” (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976: 25). That is, the relationship was fraying. 
Some Americans began to lose faith in higher education’s “self-evident value” to society, 
and a backlash began. Notre Dame University president Father Hesburg in 1971 observed: 
After a century when the society at large could not do enough for universities and colleges, 
when these institutions represented the epitome of just about everyone’s hopes, a degree 
being the closest earthly replica of the badge of salvation, suddenly the great American 
public, our patron and faithful supporter, is rather completely disillusioned about the whole 




This may have marked the end of the belief in the education gospel. President Richard Nixon 
capitalized on the backlash to campus strife and white resentments about Black empowerment. 
His successful 1968 and 1972 presidential campaigns called for “law and order” and a populist 
appeal to a “great silent majority,” with staff like Kevin Phillips, and Patrick Buchannan (who 
later became a major populist voice) encouraging Nixon to play to the racial resentments of the 
white working class on which Alabama Governor George Wallace previously campaigned 
(Lowndes, 2016). In general, “[p]opulists see themselves as true democrats, voicing popular 
grievances and opinions systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties and the 
media” (Canovan, 1999). For the Nixon era Republican leaders through to today,  
. . . the definition of ‘the people’ is [narrow and] ethnically restrictive. For most of U.S. 
history, it meant only citizens of European heritage—‘real Americans,’ whose ethnicity 
alone afforded them a claim to share in the country's bounty. Typically, this breed of 
populist alleges that there is a nefarious alliance between evil forces on high and the 
unworthy, dark-skinned poor below—a cabal that imperils the interests and values of the 
patriotic (white) majority in the middle (Kazin, 2016). 
 
Universities—especially their students and their faculty—were sometimes painted as radical and 
in opposition to the values of middle class white Americans. Civil Rights-era policies like 
affirmative action in college admissions became “a source of extraordinary controversy” among 
the white middle class (Loss, 2012: 224). Yet, college advocacy in this era was mostly to 
preserve research funding and institutional aid (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976: 44), with the ACE as 
a leading unifier (Hawkins, 1992; Cook, 1998). Colleges did little to defend themselves as their 
“badge of salvation” lost cache. 
 In this absence of action, colleges and their students became the populist target. The 
theory of social construction of target populations states that there are “cultural characterizations 
or popular images of . . . persons or groups whose behavior and well-being are affected by public 
policy. These characterizations are normative and evaluative, portraying groups in positive or 
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negative terms through symbolic language, metaphors, and stories” (Schneider and Ingram, 
1993:334). The image of the college student became reconfigured in the 1960’s; this theory 
implies that populists would consider increasingly diverse college students, with their student-
centered, rights-based education, as less deserving and more selfish, and thus perceived 
negatively, in contrast to “Joe College” World War II and Korea veterans, who would be 
considered a deserving, high-power group positively perceived. 
 Populism is an evolving concept. American populism shifted from the left to the right in 
the 1940’s (Kazin, 1998). While populism traditionally drew attention to economic inequalities 
(Shogun, 2007) and populist leaders made direct, often emotional appeals “to the people,” 
(Canovan, 1999), populism expanded in recent decades to include anti-elitism, specifically anti-
intellectualism (Shogun, 2007). This played out in the form of distrust of expertise (Canovan, 
1999; Nichols, 2017). Anti-intellectualism was continuously stoked by national politicians after 
the turmoil of the 1960’s. Nixon acted upon this by turning his ire on the scientific community, 
which was largely seated at universities: 
Disturbed by academic scientists’ lack of support for the Vietnam War, President Richard 
Nixon stopped awarding the National Science Medal, ignored his science adviser, 
abolished the Office of Science and Technology, and refused to convene, then terminated, 
the President’s Science Advisory Committee, an active Executive Office body since the 
Eisenhower administration (Loss, 2012: 217). 
 
Additionally, future president Ronald Reagan had a long and contentious relationship with 
higher education: as Governor of California in 1967 he fired University of California President 
Clark Kerr. When he became U.S. president in 1980, Reagan pledged to end “big government” 
and abolish the U.S. Department of Education, causing panic in the higher education community 
(Loss, 2012: 224).  
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Just as Reagan came into office, Isaac Asimov observed that “There is a cult of ignorance 
in the United States . . . a strain of anti-intellectualism has been a constant thread winding its way 
through our political and cultural life.” The latest buzzword in 1980, he said, was “don’t trust the 
experts” (Asimov, 1980). Presidents, especially Republicans like Reagan and George W. Bush, 
seized upon anti-intellectualism as a populist tool to win elections (Shogun, 2007). More 
recently, the anti-intellectual strain continued as Republican presidential candidates in 2008 
argued that Democratic candidate Barack Obama’s previous employment as a law professor was 
a liability (Stripling, 2010) and in 2012 some candidates called colleges ’“indoctrination mills ’
led by liberal professors” (Shear, 2012). These observations are backed up by polling data: 
analysis using survey data from 1972 through 2014, and 2016 found a strong association 
between the public’s holding of anti-intellectual views and “support for politicians and political 
movements who made the distrust of experts prominent components of their campaigns; 
including voting for George Wallace in 1968, [and] holding positive views [of] and voting for 
Donald Trump in 2016,” (Motta, 2018: 467).  
 As the liberal academic elite became populist enemies, a door for corporate America 
opened: 
For two decades, from the end of the 1960’s to the end of the 1980’s, conservative 
Republicans had posed authentically in populist dress by keeping cultural resentments 
uppermost in the public mind. Adhering to a disciplined script, GOP politicians ran against 
a ‘liberal establishment’ composed of federal bureaucrats, the mass media, arrogant 
academics, and other amoral ‘special interests.’ This nexus of power supplanted big 
business and its political cronies as the main threat to the beliefs (and pocketbooks) of the 
hardworking white majority. In a 1980 poll, even two-thirds of union members agreed that 
business was over-regulated (Kazin, 1998: 266). 
 
By the 1980’s, Americans placed faith in corporate America, believing in the power of markets 
and privatization. Belief in free markets “seized the minds of both major parties and the average 
citizen” (Loss, 225). For example, college-going was looked at through the lens of markets. The 
 
22 
view of students as consumers, which was present in the formation of the 1972 Higher Education 
Act amendments (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976), grew as more federal student aid programs took 
the form of loans, rather than grants (Hannah, 1996). Federal legislators approved Title IV 
dollars to be used at for-profit colleges; the percentage of students enrolled at such institutions 
grew from 0.2 percent in 1970 to 9.1 percent in 2008 (Deming et al, 2011). Not much is known 
on how non-profit colleges responded to this growing sector, which ostensibly cut into their 
enrollments. 
Many Republican members appointed to higher education committees in the mid 1990’s 
were “not necessarily sympathetic to academia” (Cook, 1998, p. 57) and proposed policies that 
would encourage, if not force universities to adopt corporate style efficiencies and to “do more 
with less.” They attempted: 
turning the $6-billion Pell Grant program into a loan fund. . .eliminating the three campus-
based student-aid programs, charging interest on federal student loans while borrowers 
were still in school, and . . .imposing a 2-per-cent tax on colleges participating in the 
student-loan program. . .[F]ederal support for research was on the chopping block, with 
both the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation slated for cuts. 
Reductions also were proposed for universities’ reimbursement for the indirect costs of 
federally sponsored research (Hartle, 1998) 
 
Around that same time, Republicans also aimed to curtail affirmative action (Cook, 1998: 61).  
There is some evidence that colleges responded to the threats of this 104th Congress via their 
associations like ACE (Cook, 1998). The only data on college campus-level lobbying effort in 
this era was reported in 1994, when five percent of colleges said they had federal relations staff 
in Washington and 18% of colleges hired external lobbyists at Washington-based firms (Cook, 
1998).  
Federal research and development remained an important strand connecting government 
to higher education for decades, with federal science and engineering research and developments 
nearly tripling from 1980 to 2015; however, this funding encouraged autonomy between the 
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government and universities, and was often intended to support “government-identified national 
priority areas” like the military (Brint, 2019). This strand, however important, was not very 
visible. Perhaps universities learned from the 1960’s protest movement to keep their involvement 
in military research less visible. 
 At the end of the 20th century into the 21st, bipartisan “neoliberal” belief in the market, 
competition, and accountability often left higher education on the defense. Neoliberalism can be 
defined as a broad theory and set of policies that encourage “private enterprise, individual 
responsibility, and competitive markets to spur and coordinate the actions of entrepreneurs” and 
has implications for higher education (Dougherty & Natow, 2019). Neoliberal ideals 
. . . have served to extend the deepening and expansion of the market-mediated and 
competition driven profit venture far beyond the corporate sphere. Disciplinary policy 
tools, such as performance indexes, scoreboards, and the benchmarking of ‘best practices’ 
are the tangible manifestations of the totalizing and all-pervasive forces of competition, 
exposing entire countries, regions, cities, universities, and hospitals, as well as students, 
researchers and workers to continued comparative evaluations, and thus, the need to 
compete (Wigger & Buch-Hansen, 2013). 
 
For example, state governments in the 1990’s demanded measurable outputs as a result of public 
investment: performance based measures tied funding to college outcomes on graduation and 
transfer rates, job placement, and student retention (Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, and 
Reddy, 2016). In the 2010s, President Obama tried to nationalize performance-based funding 
with “competition for grants and federal student aid dollars to encourage experimentation with 
new models of teaching, costs, and educational and employment outcomes for student[s]” 
(Pheatt, 2017). Left-leaning politicians favored accountability at colleges, attaching strings to 
funding, using 
financial aid, as provided in the Higher Education Act and its amendments, to enforce 
affirmative action objectives by threatening to cut off student financial aid at institutions 
that do not comply with federal mandates. One such mandate is Title IX of the 1972 HEA 
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which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and is best known for its provision of 
better athletic opportunities for women students (Cook, 1998). 
 
Colleges were generally the recipients of mandates, but there is a dearth of research on college 
federal lobbying in response to such mandates at the end of the 20th century. One notable 
exception is the lobbying effort against the federally-proposed State Postsecondary Review 
Program (SPRE)2 leading to the Higher Education Act of 1992 (Cook, 1998). The SPRE 
challenge “pushed the [college] presidents into being more informed and involved in federal 
relations than they ever were before” (Cook, 1998). Not much scholarly research, however, 
describes how colleges sustained their federal relations after the passage of SPRE and HEA 
1992.   
 Colleges ’eroded public standing—stoked by populist politicians—and sparse lobbying 
made it that much easier for policymakers to implement measures oppositional to colleges. The  
anti-college backlash of the 1960’s seems to have continued life at the beginning of the 21st 
century, with observers noting the “death of expertise” and active resentment of experts 
(Nichols, 2017). A major study of higher education from 1980 to 2010 noted that in this era, 
“Conservative media personalities and politicians ridiculed political correctness and identity 
politics on campus, and their criticisms contributed to undermining the confidence of Americans 
in their higher education institutions” (Brint, 2019). American’s confidence in education, as 
reported in the General Social Survey, fell from 49% in 1973 to 25% in 2019 (Smith, et. al, 
2019). Although faith in higher education fared better than education in general, from 2010 to 
2017, anti-college sentiment was driven by Republicans, who in 2016 suddenly switched from 
                                                 
2 SPRE was authorized by HEA 1992 and directed states to assign state postsecondary review entities (SPREs) to 
review how institutions of higher education (IHEs) met standards such as student loan default rates in order to 




feeling positive about colleges to feeling negative, possibly driven by the anti-intellectual, 
populist candidacy of Donald Trump. The figure below shows this pattern. 
Figure 1: Americans’ Views on Higher Education, 2010-2017 
          Source: Pew Research Center, 2017 
This figure makes clear that by the late 2010’s, long-running anti-intellectual undercurrents were 
brought into the surface, politicized, and now clearly directed at colleges in particular. 
In the wake of higher education and government’s pulling apart, many Americans by the 
beginning of the 21st century instead placed faith in competitive market forces “to increase 
economic progress and innovation, create wealth, and to reduce poverty” (Wigger & Buch-
Hansen, 2013). In fact, some in federal government expect colleges to behave like businesses. 
Congress in 2017 wrote the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, targeting higher education students and 
institutions for unprecedented new taxes on graduate student stipends and college endowments. 
Some in Congress equated colleges with businesses and challenged their tax-exempt status; for 
example, a university lobbyist was pressured by a legislative aide on the unrelated business 
income (UBI) tax: “The aide argued that the university gym charging entrance fees tax-free as 
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UBI amounted to ‘a threat to local gyms and an unfair advantage’ for the university” (Marsicano, 
2019). By the late 2010s, fewer Americans preached the education gospel; instead of believing in 
higher education’s power of salvation, many expected colleges to cannily compete. The days of 
partnership, when presidents drew from academia to form a “Brain Trust” to shape policy, 
seemed long gone. 
2.1.3 Summary and Unanswered Questions 
 
For most of the 20th century, higher education lobbying may have been unnecessary 
because the public and government trusted higher education, and government relied on higher 
education to fulfill certain needs. This forged a partnership. Colleges occasionally lobbied 
reactively, to maintain funding, and did so through their national associations. The pattern for 
most of the 20th century was for others to make decisions on behalf of higher education. After 
World War II, government expanded access to higher education, and more women and Black 
Americans enrolled. In the 1960’s, more campus diversity and protests were quickly followed by 
an anti-college backlash that brought to the fore American ideals of populism and anti-
intellectualism. By the 1980’s, anti-college sentiment was on the rise along with a robust belief 
in markets, competition, privatization, and accountability that put colleges on the defense. Yet, 
the literature though the end of the 20th century only shows a spotty history of higher education 
lobbying to preserve its stakes—in the 1990’s via associations and a small percentage of 
campuses that hired lobbyists. As 21st century anti-intellectualism and market-oriented policies 
encourage colleges to act more like corporations, researchers can ask how and why college 
responded, and understand the specific role of lobbying. This may address whether the gulf 
between government and higher education widened or if higher education entered the world of 
lobbying to enhance the relationship in this “post-breakup” era. 
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2.2 Corporate Lobbying 
 
In this section I review the more developed literature on lobbying by other organizations, 
especially corporations. The tumultuous late 1960’s was an inflection point for big business, 
which responded to negative public opinion and government action in a different way than 
higher education dealt with its backlash: corporations lobbied with gusto. In contrast to higher 
education, research on corporate lobbying is robust3 and elucidates patterns against which we 
can compare newer, emerging findings on higher education. These patterns are: a tendency for 
organizations that register to lobby to stay registered, and that their registration seems connected 
to governmental spending; lobbying expenditures tend to rise with governmental spending, and 
that expenditure trends indicate a shift from interest group association-level lobbying to 
company-level lobbying; a strong tendency for companies to lobby against regulations, possibly 
including those discussed in the media; and a general tendency for companies to rely on “direct”3F4 
lobbying tactics more than indirect tactics 4F5. Except when otherwise indicated, this section mostly 
focuses on corporate lobbying, not only because that is where the literature is most robust, but 
also because, as we will see, businesses constitute the vast majority of all lobbying activity. 
                                                 
3 As a rough indicator, as of May 2020, search terms and number of articles in a Google Scholar were: “federal 
lobbying” 249,000; “federal corporate lobbying” 152,000; “federal higher education lobbying” 60,600. Several of 
the first 20 of so articles returned in the latter search are reviewed here, but their relevance, and likelihood of being 
peer reviewed, diminishes sharply after that. 
4 The Internal Revenue Service defines direct lobbying as: “attempts to influence a legislative body through 
communication with a member or employee of a legislative body, or with a government official who participates in 
formulating legislation” (IRS, 2017). It also aligns with an oft-cited definition of “inside” lobbying: “the personal 
access and contact with legislators so necessary for maintaining good relations with government” (Kollman, 1998). 
5 Indirect lobbying can be considered any attempt to influence policy without directly contacting legislators. This 
includes and expands upon the IRS’s definition of “grassroots” lobbying: “attempts to influence legislation by 
attempting to affect the opinion of the public with respect to the legislation and encouraging the audience to take 
action with respect to the legislation” (IRS, 2017) and the frequently referred-to definition of “outside” lobbying: 
“both the attempt to communicate public support to policymakers (…signaling…) and the attempt to increase that 
public support among constituents (…conflict expansion)” (Kollman, 1998). Examples of outside tactics include 




2.2.1 Lobbying as the Business Response to Challenge 
 
The political science research makes clear that corporations lobby in response to 
challenge, and in pursuit of federal dollars. The protest movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s 
corresponded with a more regulatory government as the U.S. experienced an “advocacy 
explosion” (Skocpol, 2003: 13, 140). New socially-minded groups emerged to represent the 
rights of women and racial and ethnic minorities, environmental, and consumer causes (Tichenor 
and Harris, 2003: 604). These groups advocated for their causes, and to rein in corporate power. 
For example, “In 1960, there were 255 private antitrust suits filed against corporations, or about 
60 percent of all antitrust action. By 1972, the number of suits filed jumped to 1,299, which 
constituted 94 percent of all antitrust suits filed during that year” (Pfeffer & Salanick, 2003).  
The challenge to corporate power was answered by lobbying: businesses lobbied against 
increased social mandates and environmental regulations and thus became more of a presence in 
Washington, D.C. (Drutman, 2015). There was huge increase in the number of interest groups in 
the late 20th century (Harris and Titchner, 2003: 594). A snapshot shows the lobbying 
composition: around 2000, 35 percent of lobbyists represented trade/corporate/business interests, 
26 percent of lobbyists represented citizen groups, 11 percent professional associations, six 
percent unions, three percent foundations and think tanks6 (Baumgartner et. al., 2009). But 
businesses and trade associations in this era did the vast majority of the lobbying spending (78 
percent of lobbying expenditures in 1996, see Baumgartner & Leech, 2001). 
Business lobbied against regulations, freeing up public dollars for private use. 
Deregulatory efforts in the 1980’s “did not shrink the state” (Feigenbaum, Henig & Hamnett, 
1998) and end “big government” per se: state governments struggled but the federal budget 
                                                 
6 Baumgartner et. al. calculated these figures based on a sampling of reports filed by organizations with the U.S. 
Senate Office of Public Records. 
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consistently grew. Research shows that lobbying grows as the federal budget grows. From 1981 
to 2004, the number of corporate lobbyists doubled as non-defense federal discretionary 
spending grew by 36%7 (Drutman, 2015: 169). This connection supports resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) which implies that organizations pursue government 
resources differently, based on their dependence on those resources. In other words, this theory 
posits that organizations that depend on government funding may lobby for it. 
2.2.2 Lobbying Registrations and Spending 
 
 Political science research consistently studies two related measures of lobbying disclosed 
under federal guidelines—lobbying registrations and expenditures. These measures allow 
researchers to analyze more detailed patterns of lobbying. Registering represents an 
organizational commitment “whether to” lobby while spending represents a more granular “how 
much” organizational effort that seems to respond to available government resources. 
Contemporary lobbying disclosures are guided by two pieces of legislation, described next. The 
laws have had two effects: first, they may have caused many organizations to “lobby in the 
shadows” after 2007. Second, for organizations that do decide to register, their commitment 
tends to stick. 
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA) requires registration for “lobbying 
activities”7F8 above $3,000 per quarter for a contract lobbyist 8F9 and $13,000 (as of 2017) for an in-
                                                 
7 Drutman calculated number of lobbyists “based on lobbyists listed in the Washington Representatives directory for 
companies in the S&P 500 sample.” 
8 The LDA defines lobbying activities as “Lobbying contacts and any efforts in support of such contacts, including 
preparation or planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at the time of its preparation, 
for use in contacts and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.” United States Senate Historic Lobbying 
Disclosure Act Guidance. http://www.senate.gov/legislative/common/briefing/lobby_disc_briefing.htm#4  
9 A lobbyist is defined as “Any individual who (1) is either employed or retained by a client for financial or other 
compensation (2) for services that include more than one lobbying contact; and (3) whose ‘lobbying activities ’
constitute 20 percent or more of his or her services on behalf of that client during any six-month period. 
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house lobbyist. The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA) required 
additional registration by anyone “whose lobbying activities constitute 20 percent or more of his 
or her services on behalf of that client during any six-month period” (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2008). This means that organizations must determine how much time an in-
house lobbyist or contract lobbyist spent lobbying in a given quarter, and then register for every 
quarter that they meet the threshold. Organizations must also determine how much lobbying time 
any given employee spends on lobbying activities every six months; if that employee exceeds the 
20 percent threshold, the organization must register to lobby. These guidelines are shown in the 
table below. 
Table 1: Federal Lobbying Registration Thresholds 
Lobbying spending 
(LDA 1995) 
Reporting required if 
lobbying activities reach: 




Lobbying time  
 (HLOGA 2007) 
 
 By any employee 20% of time/6 months 
Source: U.S. House of Representatives, 2017 
 
Reading and comprehending lobbying disclosure legislation and thresholds alone is no easy task; 
tracking employee time and preparing and submitting the registration documentation requires 
significant resources. For example, an organization may issue an internal quarterly request for 
employees to report how much time they spent on lobbying activities (along with definitions of 
lobbying activities) and then determine if they meet the thresholds, and if so, file a disclosure 
report.  
  Registering—the “whether to” lobby—represents an institutional commitment to 
lobbying and is “sticky.” This is because “lobbying has some level of fixed or overhead costs” 
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(Brasher & Lowery, 2006). Once registered, companies tend to stay registered. Across 1,066 
companies 1981-2004, corporate “lobbying presence” (the number of in-house lobbyists plus 
consultants) “five years in the past does a pretty good job of predicting current company 
lobbying levels” (Drutman, 2015, 209). This is likely because “lobbyists find new issues, 
companies get drawn into new battles, and new coalitions and networks emerge. Managers see 
value in political engagement they did not see before. Lobbying is sticky” (Drutman, 2015, 219). 
Registration is connected to available governmental resources. Initial research shows “a very 
slight positive relationship between the annual change in government [non-defense discretionary 
spending] and the annual change in lobbying [presence], but a significant amount of variability is 
unexplained” (Drutman, 2015: 170). It might be possible that lobbying “follows the money.” 
That is, the historical pattern indicates that as government spending increases, more 
organizations hire lobbyists, who register on behalf of those organizations. And since “lobbying 
is sticky,” those lobbyists defend and preserve those stakes. 
Regarding lobbying expenditures—the “how much” of lobbying—corporate lobbying 
spending increases with increased governmental resources. That is, lobbying spending is not very 
“sticky.” Evidence indicates that companies will also spend more or less depending on the 
availability of government resources: companies with higher levels of government sales and 
contracts had higher levels of lobbying expenditures and political action committee (PAC) 
contributions (Lux, 2011); that is, companies dependent on government resources spend more on 
lobbying. Larger companies spend more on lobbying, and have a stronger positive correlation 
between lobbying expenditures and number of agencies lobbied, than medium and small 
companies (Drutman, 2015: 91). 
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Expenditure data also reveals a recent shift from associational-level lobbying to 
company-level lobbying: “in 1998, the median industry spent 62.5 percent of its lobbying dollar 
through individual company lobbying. By 2012, the median share of lobbying done through 
companies had risen to 71.1 percent” (Drutman, 2015, 112). The pattern seems to be for 
organizations to first rely on their association to lobby for a larger governmental funding “pie” 
and then lobby for a narrow “slice” that applies to the individual organization: “first, companies 
join together in order to get an issue onto an agenda, aware that it often takes a large coalition to 
break the threshold of attention. Then, once the issue gets serious consideration, companies break 
off and advocate for themselves” (Drutman, 2015: 98).  
Some organizations may systematically underreport their lobbying due to these 
increasingly stringent requirements. There is evidence suggesting that HLOGA of 2007 first 
caused lobbyists to avoid registering, taking advantage of the “Daschle loophole10,” which 
implies that registration is unnecessary for those who spend less than 20 percent of their time 
performing lobbying activities for a client over a three month period (LaPira, 2015). Figure 2 
                                                 
10 Named after former Senator Tom Daschle, who after losing his Senate seat in 2004, lobbied for health care 
interests at Alston and Bird but considered this work “policy advising” or “strategic consulting,” and did not register 
until 2014 (Serino, 2014). 
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below shows how lobbying registrations decreased after 2007; expenditures decreased after 
2010.  
Figure 2: Number of Lobbyist and Lobbying Spending, 1998-2013 
Source: LaPira, 2015 
 
The decrease in expenditures came with the 2010 earmark ban for for-profit organizations (in 
2011 earmarks were banned for all other types of organizations) (LaPira, 2015). La Pira’s 
“lobbying in the shadows” argument allows for the possibility that organizations lobby but keep 
their employees below the 20 percent threshold; it is a compelling and promising line of inquiry. 
It is also possible that after the earmark ban, more lobbying took place at federal agencies, but no 
research yet addresses this possibility. 
 There is reason to examine lobbying registrations and expenditures separately and 
together. Most research usually looks at one measure or the other. Notable studies like de 
Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) look at expenditures, while Baumgartner et al (2009) and 
Drutman (2015) look at registrations. Although Drutman discusses both measures, he focuses on 
registrations because he says the two measures correlated at 0.85 and are therefore 
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interchangeable. That may have been true until the end of his study time frame. But, that 
correlation seems to dissolve after HLOGA of 2007, as La Pira’s figure above shows. Examining 
registrations only could also miss out on a possible story about the intensity of lobbying at the 
organizational level over time: not just whether an organization cares enough to lobby, but how 
much does it care? 
2.2.3 Regulations, Lobbying, and the Media 
 
Corporate lobbying spending is linked not only to government spending, but is also in 
response to regulations, including those covered by the media. Both Republican and Democratic 
leaders implement regulations to hold organizations accountable11, eliciting a corporate lobbying 
response. This response often takes the form of blocking proposals (McKay and Yackee, 2015). 
Federal regulations in 2012 cost corporations an estimated $2.03 trillion (Crain & Crain, 2014), 
and a recent survey of 60 corporate lobbyists showed that their top reason to lobby was the 
“Need to protect against changes in government policy (or other government actions) that could 
be harmful” (Drutman, 2015). Concern about regulations and compliance issues was highly 
correlated with lobbying spending across 53 issues and 31 companies in 2007 11F12 (Drutman, 2015: 
74).   
The corporate lobbying response to regulations is illustrated by Microsoft’s situation. The 
Microsoft Corporation spent nothing on lobbying in 1995. Then, when the United States Justice 
Department attempted to break up Microsoft’s monopolization of the software market in the late 
1990s, the company spent $2.12 million by 1998, and $6.38 million in 2000, with additional 
                                                 
11 For example, Republican President Ford in 1974 required new federal regulations to include a cost-benefit 
analysis, which was followed by Democratic President Carter’s additional cost efficiency mandates (Drutman, 2015: 
59). 
12 The correlation was “between each company’s 2007 lobbying expenditures and the value [as reported in a survey] 
that company’s lobbyist placed on different reasons for being active” (Drutman, 2015: 74). 
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millions in campaign contributions (Lowery, 2007). Famously, the tobacco industry lobbied “for 
survival” (Lowery, 2007) for decades against increasingly stringent government regulations, and 
Enron frequently sought to eliminate regulations (Hart, 2004). Thus, it is clear that corporate 
lobbying is often prompted by regulations that could affect an organization’s bottom line. 
Much lobbying takes place in the implementation stage, as federal agencies create rules 
to guide spending and restrictions authorized by legislation. Of more than 600,000 lobbying 
reports filed between 1998 and 2012, about 40% of congressional lobbying activity took place 
after a bill was signed into law (e.g., asking a legislator to nudge an agency); among agency 
lobbying activities, about half took place after a bill became law (e.g., lobbying to get favorable 
regulatory language)13 (You, 2017).  
Lobbying activity increases as governmental attention14 to an issue increases (Leech et al, 
2005). A narrow range of issues drive most of the lobbying: a major study15 of hundreds of 
interest groups across 10 years found that issues like taxation, military, health, environment, and 
transportation are associated with lobbying registrations. Issues may even be more important 
than governmental resources16 in driving lobbying (Leech et al, 2005).  
Governmental attention to issues is connected to the media’s coverage of issues. The 
media’s agenda-setting power is well documented (see Wolfe et al, 2013) and influences 
legislative agendas: there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between news 
                                                 
13 “The LDA requires that names of federal agencies are listed on line 17 of any issue pages in the lobbying 
disclosure form. The specified agency can be Congress or any bureaucratic or regulatory agency. Unlike lobbying 
expenditures, the contacted federal agencies are listed separately under each issue in a report” (You, 2017). 
14 As measured by Congressional hearings. 
15 “Our pooled time-series analysis is thus based on lobby disclosure reports and congressional hearings data from 
1996 to 2000, covering an average of almost 6,000 registration reports in each of eight time-periods across dozens of 
different issue-areas. The short-term variable consists of the number of congressional hearings that took place 
regarding that issue-area during the same six-month period for which lobbying is reported in the disclosure reports. 
The long-term variable reflects a 10-year moving average” (Leech et al, 2005). 
16 Governmental resources in Leech et al’s 2005 study were operationalized as the amount of federal budget 
associated with an issue. 
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agendas and Congressional policy agendas, and “the connection between Congress and the 
media is growing” (Tan and Weaver, 2007). The issues covered by the media tend to be 
relatively stable. In 2009, five issues accounted for nearly 60% of news coverage: “government 
(11.3 percent), economics (11.3 percent), foreign affairs (9.8 percent), health care (9.2 percent), 
business (7.7 percent), and crime (6.2 percent)” (West et al, 2009). Although only about one 
percent “of national news coverage from television, newspapers, news Web sites, and radio dealt 
with education” (West et al, 2009), education is an issue in which media was found to influence 
the policy agenda (Tan and Weaver, 2007). It seems possible that issues, especially regulatory 
issues covered by the media, lead to lobbying as did the attention-getting issues cited by Leech 
et. al. (2005), but more research is necessary. 
2.2.4 Direct Lobbying Tactics 
 
Legal definitions and scholarly research breaks lobbying tactics into two types: direct and 
indirect. The literature suggests that direct tactics are more common to corporations while 
indirect tactics are more common to grassroots organizations. The Internal Revenue Service 
defines direct lobbying as: “attempts to influence a legislative body through communication with 
a member or employee of a legislative body, or with a government official who participates in 
formulating legislation” (IRS, 2017). It also aligns with an oft-cited definition of “inside” 
lobbying: “the personal access and contact with legislators so necessary for maintaining good 
relations with government” (Kollman, 1998). 
 Conversely, indirect lobbying can be considered any attempt to influence policy without 
directly contacting legislators. This includes and expands upon the IRS’s definition of 
“grassroots” lobbying: “attempts to influence legislation by attempting to affect the opinion of 
the public with respect to the legislation and encouraging the audience to take action with respect 
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to the legislation” (IRS, 2017) and the frequently referred-to definition of “outside” lobbying: 
“both the attempt to communicate public support to policymakers (…signaling…) and the 
attempt to increase that public support among constituents (…conflict expansion)” (Kollman, 
1998). Examples of outside tactics include “Talking with the press,” “Mobilizing group  
members,” and “Organizing letter-writing campaigns” (Kollman, 1998). 
Research shows that corporations tend to rely on “direct” lobbying tactics. A review of 
four major studies across nearly 30 years indicates that organizations use direct tactics the most, 
including contacting members of Congress, entering coalitions, and presenting research to 
Congress and staff (Cook, 1998; Drutman, 2015; Kollman, 1998; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986)17. 
Although organizations also rely on indirect tactics, direct tactics are more consistently relied 
upon than outside tactics (Kollman, 1998).  The table below shows a summary of the 
overlapping tactics mentioned by all four studies. 
Table 2: Overlapping “Tried and True” Lobbying Tactics Among Four Surveys Across 
30 years 




























Contacting members of Congress/staff 
directly to present your point of view 98 96 6.1 
 
* 
Entering into coalitions with other 
organizations 90 80 5.5 
** 
Presenting research results or technical 
information 92 68 5.1 
* 
Talking to people from the press & media 86 76 4.4 N/A 
Testifying at hearings 99 70 4.1 * 
Using issue advertising 31 6 2.7 ** 
                                                 
17 Although the four surveys list many other tactics, most are variations of one another (e.g., Drutman’s “Contacting 
Congressional staffers directly to present your point of view” vs. “Contacting members of Congress directly to 
present your point of view”) or were asked specifically to get a sense of a set of tactics (e.g. Kollman’s outside 
lobbying tactics like “Protesting”).  
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* Major higher education lobbying techniques prior to 1995 (per Cook’s review) 
**Additional higher education lobbying techniques in 1995-96 (per Cook’s survey) 
 Sources: Cook, 1998; Drutman, 2015; Kollman, 1998; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986. 
 
Colleges also rely on direct tactics: “[h]igher education representatives typically used the 
same techniques most commonly used by other policy communities to inform public officials 
about their needs and preferences” (Cook, 1998: 145). Indeed, the most comprehensive study of 
higher education lobbying notes that colleges relied on five of the six techniques note above (the 
exception being talking to the press) prior to and including 1995-96 (Cook, 1998). Cook gleaned 
this data from survey responses from 1,554 public and private non-profit colleges presidents. She 
also notes that colleges relied on additional indirect lobbying techniques, like “inspiring letter 
writing campaigns,” “mounting grassroots lobbying,” and “having constituents contact” 
government officials. However, frequency of use or relevance was not quantified, leaving us 
wondering about the relative importance of these indirect tactics to colleges, and presenting a 
research opportunity. 
2.3 Non-Profit Organization Lobbying  
 
Scholars for the past several decades have observed that non-profit organizations seem to 
shy away from lobbying. Logic and some research supports this idea. Non-profits may avoid 
lobbying due to fear of running afoul of lobbying limits and jeopardizing 501(c)(3) status; they 
may fear political punishment, lack capacity to interpret complex IRS rules on lobbying 
definitions and limits (Chaves et. al. 2004). Indeed, a survey of more than 1,700 non-profit 
executives (excluding hospitals and universities18) found that 68 percent believed that their 
                                                 
18 “For technical reasons, hospitals and hospital systems as well as universities were removed from the survey 
database. Principally, they are egregious statistical outliers, and to include them would necessitate presenting 




organizations was not allowed to lobby if it received any government funding (Berry, 2003). 
This may explain why a subsequent study found that “charitable tax status as a 501(c)(3) 
organization. . . is inversely related to lobbying level” and no statistically significant support “for 
the idea that [non-profit] organizations that receive federal grants and contracts lobby more than 
organizations that do not receive such funds” (Leech, 2006). It may be that 501(c)(3) non-profit 
status “buys silence” (Leech, 2006) and so non-profits are “seen, but not heard” (Bass, et. al. 
2007). Notably, the studies on non-profit lobbying reviewed in this section systematically 
exclude higher education, leaving a clearly-cut gap in the literature. 
But these findings do not mean that non-profits never lobby. Case studies of non-profits 
across the country show that more government reliance on non-profits, especially those that can 
mobilize community support, lobby to maintain budgets for fee for service (see review in 
Chaves, 2004). Recently, some religious organizations have lobbied to rescind the Johnson 
Amendment, which would allow all 501(c)(3) organizations to engage in partisan politics (Evers-
Hillstrom, 2018). Large scale studies show the growth of non-profit lobbying. “From 1996 to 
2006,” one study looking at IRS 990 reports found, “the number of 501(c)(3) organizations 
reporting lobbying expenses grew from 2,625 (1.3 percent of all) to 6,502 (2 percent), outpacing 
the growth in the number of new non-profits” (Boris and Maronick, 2012). But as with Berry’s 
2003 study, institutions of higher education were excluded in this study, and it is not clear how 
closely IRS 990 data matches with LDA data. Since these studies are not very recent, it is also 
not clear if non-profits have lobbied less after HLOGA of 2007 and the earmark ban, which 
came into effect for non-profits in 2011. 
Regarding which non-profits lobby, Boris and Maronick (2012) found that “Health, 
education, and human services organizations represent the bulk (73 percent) of reported lobbying 
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expenses.” They note that “Non-profit hospitals are on the defensive, making the case for 
maintaining their charitable status and against charges that they are too commercial.” Another 
large study of 10,581 non-profit organizations in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area from 
2007-2008 found that 67% engaged in the more broadly-defined advocacy. Of these, 12% hired a 
lobbyist and 19% were a PAC or PAC-affiliated (DeVita et. al., 2014). DeVita et al. excluded 
higher education and hospitals “because these organizations tend to be much larger and more 
complex structures than other types of non-profits.” 
2.3.1 Non-Profit Lobbying Spending 
 
Non-profit lobbying spending has been growing; it  
more than doubled (in constant 1996 dollars), from $139.7 million in 1996 to $382.4 
million one decade later. The mean lobbying expenditure in 2006 was $58,807, up from 
$53,245 in 1996. The number of groups spending $100,000 or more on lobbying was nearly 
14 percent in 2006, a 47 percent increase over the roughly 9.5 percent of organizations that 
spent that much in 1998 (Boris and Maronick, 2012). 
 
Again, larger non-profits were more likely to lobby than smaller ones. This growth over time is 
shown in the table below. 




                Source: Boris and Maronick, 2012 
The D.C.-metro area study also showed that larger non-profits advocate more: “Roughly 80% of 
non-profits with expenditures of $1 million or more engage in some type of advocacy. In 
contrast, 56% of small non-profits and 68% of midsized non-profits participate in advocacy” 
(DeVita et. al., 2014). Non-profits rarely advocate alone: 48% advocated “both alone and in a 
coalition, 8% alone only, and 44% in a coalition only” (DeVita et. al., 2014). Although this study 
did not compare how often corporations advocate in coalitions versus how often non-profits 
advocate in coalitions, the sum of 92% of non-profit organizations relying on coalitions is a very 
high figure and could be higher than corporate coalitional reliance. 
2.3.2 Non-profit Lobbying and Government Resource Dependence 
 
 Emerging research suggests that lobbying might be connected to receipt of government 
funds, supporting the notion of resource dependence. A study using data from the 1998 National 
Congregations Study (NCS) of 1,236 religious found that 86 percent of Americans “in 
congregations with government funds are from congregations that engaged in at least one [type 
of political activity], compared with only 60 percent of people in congregations without 
government funds” (Chaves et. al. 2004). A 2004 survey of 119 Michigan non-profit 
organizations found that every additional percentage point increase in the organization’s budget 
that comes from government revenues is associated with a 0.023 increase in a scale of advocacy 
mobilization activities (Leroux and Goerdel, 2009). Berry (2003) argues that “There is little 
question that grant money helps build the infrastructure of non-profits and, in turn, growth in 
staff and infrastructure facilitates political work” and found a significant correlation between 
income from government and the amount of lobbying among conventional non-profits 18F19 (R2 = 
                                                 
19 Conventional non-profits are non H-electing. 
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0.28, p < 0.001). More broadly, a 2007 study of 311 U.S. non-profit organizations found that 
groups more dependent on government funding tend to lobby more20 (Salamon, et. al., 2008). 
Among organizations with an above average share of funding from government, 67% lobbied; 
54% of organizations with a below-average share of government funding lobbied. Table 4 below 
displays the results of this study. 
Table 4: The Relationship between 
Government Funding and Non-profit 
Lobbying Activity 
Share of Funding 
from Government 
% of organizations 
lobbying 
Yes No Total 
Above average 67% 33% 100% 
Below average 54% 46% 100% 
Total 61% 39% 100% 
Source: Salamon et al., 2008 
 
The collection of strong and consistent evidence reviewed in this section suggests that in addition 
to government-sanctioned non-profit status buying silence, the non-profit sector also buys a 
voice to secure governmental funds. 
2.3.3 Summary and Unanswered Questions 
 
The 1960’s protest movement spurred governmental regulations to which corporations 
responded by lobbying for deregulation thorough to today. Lobbying for deregulation gave 
private industry more latitude to operate, and lobbying shifted public dollars to corporations; 
some research shows a general correlation between the growth in government spending and the 
number of corporate lobbyists. Researchers have looked to new lobbying disclosure data to 
reveal patterns in corporate lobbying (see Baumgartner et al 2011; de Figueiredo and Silverman, 
                                                 




2006; Drutman, 2015). For example, there is a slight connection between government spending 
and lobbying registrations, which measure “whether” an organization jumps into lobbying in the 
first place (Drutman, 2015) and a connection between receipt of government funds and lobbying 
expenditures, which measure “how much” effort an organization devotes to lobbying (Drutman, 
2015; Lux, 2011).  
Research on expenditures suggest that organizations recently spent more on lobbying at 
the corporation level rather than the association level, lobbying more to bring home “a slice” of 
the large funding pie, but possibly underreport their lobbying effort. The growing body of 
research generated from Lobbying Disclosure Act data establishes a baseline to compare 
lobbying behavior by other groups and opens up questions about what happened to lobbying 
registrations after the 2007 lobbying disclosure legislation and to lobbying expenditures after the 
2010 earmark ban. 
 It is well established that corporations lobby in response to regulations, and to issues to 
which Congress devotes its attention. This lobbying takes place at the legislative and post-
legislative stages. The media has power in setting governmental agendas, possibly suggesting 
that lobbying occurs in response to accountability regulations issued by Republicans and 
Democrats alike, some of which are discussed in the media, but more research is necessary to 
draw firm conclusions. Lastly, studies spanning 30 years document more corporate reliance on 
direct tactics like sit-down meetings with legislators as opposed to reliance on indirect tactics 
like publishing ads to garner public support, but it is not known which set of tactics non-profit 
organizations and colleges most rely. 
Non-profit organizations lobby, too. Non-profit lobbying registrations and expenditures 
have been growing in the early 21st century, especially among health care and education 
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industries, and the research is clear that non-profit organizations that receive governmental 
funding lobby more than those that do not. However, unanswered questions remain. The non-
profit lobbying literature does not address how non-profits are affected by lobbying 
accountability legislation and the earmark ban, and it leaves out higher education. 
I summarize the research on corporate and non-profit lobbying in the table below, and 
later apply those metrics to higher education lobbying.  
Table 5: Metrics of corporate lobbying 
Metric Findings and sources 
Lobbying 
registrations 
• Sticky over time (Drutman, 2015) 
• Slightly connected to government spending (Drutman, 2015) and might 
follow the availability of governmental funds.  
• May be systematically underreported after 2007 (LaPira, 2015) 
Lobbying 
expenditures 
• Less sticky than registrations (Drutman, 2015) 
• Rises with governmental spending (Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; 
Drutman, 2015; Lux, 2011) 
• Companies more dependent on government resources spent more on 
lobbying (Lux, 2011) 
• Larger companies lobbied more than small and medium sized companies 
(Drutman, 2015). 
• Shows a recent shift from associational to organizational (“pie, then slice”) 
lobbying (Drutman, 2015) 
• Decreased in 2010, after the earmark ban (LaPira, 2015). 




• Corporations lobby against regulations (Drutman, 2015; Hart, 2004; 
Lowery, 2007; You, 2013) 
• Much lobbying occurs after a bill is signed into law, and at the agency 
level (You, 2017). 
• Lobbying activity increases as governmental attention to an issue increases 
(Leech et al, 2005), the media helps set and influence agendas (Tan and 
Weaver, 2007; Wolfe et al, 2013). 
Direct tactics • Corporations use direct tactics more commonly than indirect tactics (Cook, 




Table 6: Metrics of non-profit lobbying 
Metric Findings and sources 
Lobbying 
presence 
• Non-profits may shy away from lobbying (Chaves, 2004; Leech, 2006) 
• Growth in number and percentage of non-profits reporting expenditures 
1996-2006 (Boris & Maronick, 2012) 
• Health and education non-profit lobbying made up 73% of non-profit 
lobbying expenses (Boris & Maronick, 2012). 
Lobbying 
expenditures 
• Non-profit lobbying spending more than doubled 1996-2006 (Boris and 
Maronick, 2012). 
• Larger non-profits lobby more than smaller non-profits (DeVita et al, 
2014). 
• 92% of non-profits advocated as part of coalitions; 8% advocated alone 
(DeVita et al 2014). 
Resource 
dependence 
• Non-profit organizations that receive governmental funding lobby more 
than those that do not (Berry, 2003; Chaves et al, 2004; Leroux and 
Goerdel, 2009; Salamon et al, 2008) 
 
2.4 Contemporary Higher Education Lobbying 
 
I next review the contemporary higher education lobbying literature, finding that the 
research is thin but raises promising questions for more investigation. I cite literature suggesting 
that colleges may lobby in less measurable ways, and like in the past, allow others to advocate on 
their behalf. Then, a handful of studies find that colleges make some efforts to lobby using direct 
tactics, but leave open questions about long term trends and continued dependence on 
associations, and whether much has changed since the 1990’s. Additional, newer research points 
to the fact that different types of colleges lobby differently, based on their stakes in government. 
This latter growing body of research finds that non-profit research oriented schools lobby for 
research and development dollars, and may do so collectively and individually, based on the 
specificity of the stakes. Meanwhile, for-profit colleges lobby for Title IV dollars, and colleges 
of all types lobby in response to accountability measures. Together, these findings raise 
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important questions about the status of contemporary higher education lobbying, collective 
action questions, and the question of whether any kind of partnership with government still 
remains, or whether it resembles that of corporations. Those research questions are presented at 
the end of this section, and followed by a theoretical framework to methodologically explore 
them. 
2.4.1 To Lobby or Not to Lobby? 
 
In 2003, researchers observing the state of higher education and politics noted: “As a 
subject of social scientific inquiry, politics of higher education research remains in a state of 
perpetual infancy, prone to periodic lurches but lacking in sustained and systematic 
conceptualization and analysis” (McLendon and Hearn, 2003). From the 1970’s “post-breakup” 
period of higher education-government relations, through to the early 21st century “frayed” 
relationship, a sparse but strong literature made some important “lurches” to better understand 
college lobbying. Much of that research is reviewed here to shed light on advancements and on 
knowledge gaps. 
As discussed earlier, in the 1970’s, most college lobbying was to preserve research 
funding and institutional aid (Gladieux & Wolanin, 1976: 44). A study in the late-1990’s 
“lurched” the research forward and found that colleges still lobbied to protect research funding 
and lobbied against new mandates, with five percent of colleges in a 1994 survey saying they 
had federal relations staff in Washington and 18% of colleges hiring external lobbyists at 
Washington-based firms (Cook, 1998). In 1997-1999, only Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) data 
showed that 20 percent of nearly 2,400 non-profit colleges lobbied (de Figueiredo and 
Silverman, 2006). These are the key baseline studies noting how many colleges lobby. 
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Into the 21st century, a few studies described the higher education lobbying landscape in 
more detail. The presence of higher education interest groups was positively associated with 
increases in state capital appropriations to colleges and universities in the 50 states from 1998-
2004 (Ness and Tandberg, 2013). Lobbying by 534 two- and four-year public colleges in 15 
states increased more than 80% from 2004-2014 (Brackett, 2016). A study using a panel dataset 
of IPEDS and LDA data from 2005-2014 on 1,185 public and private non-profit institutions 
found that forty-six percent of public colleges and 48% of private colleges filed to lobby 2005-
2014; among these 1,185 colleges, average lobbying spending was $177,000 (Marsicano, 2019). 
From 1998 to 2017, publics spent $676 million, privates spent $607 million and for-profits spent 
$183 million (Marsicano, 2019). For-profits have been spending more in recent years, going 
from $3.3 million in 2009 to $8 million in 2010 (Mettler, 2014: 174). These studies help the 
literature take steps out of “infancy.”  
But is the relative silence about contemporary college lobbying because colleges are 
themselves silent? Perhaps colleges and universities, the majority of which are non-profit, are 
like other non-profits and misunderstand their ability to lobby per Berry’s 2003 finding.   
It may be that the “Bennett Hypothesis,” the idea that colleges keep increasing tuition as 
more government aid comes in, is correct, and that as federal financial aid increases, so does 
tuition (Gillen, 2012)20F21, keeping colleges content with funds and preempting their need to lobby.  
Or maybe colleges benefit from the actions of outside advocates. For example, President 
Obama and a Democratically-led Congress from 2007 to 2010 boosted Pell grant funding, and 
Senator Jim Webb, a veteran, became “a catalyst” for the post 9/11 G.I. Bill of 2008 which 
included generous veteran tuition benefits that ended up in college coffers (Mettler, 2014). 
                                                 
21 The scholarly research on the Bennett Hypothesis is “mixed and contradictory” (Gillen, 2012). 
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Or, maybe colleges do lobby, but tracking their efforts is difficult due to systematic 
underreporting, as seems to be the case in the corporate sector. 
Or, the dearth of data may be because the state of play is similar to findings of Cook and 
De Figueiredo, and a small number of colleges lobby, and the remainder “free ride” on their 
efforts. Olson’s (1965) free riding theory posits that an interest group member will not join in a 
large group seeking collective goods because the cost of doing so is not worth the benefit, which 
is equally distributed among members, or the cost might even get smaller as the group gets 
larger. Olson states that the way to get members to act is through coercion or the provision of a 
benefit only to those that participate. Paradoxically, smaller groups are theorized to be more 
effective because it is easier for a group member to calculate return on investment. 
In the succeeding sections, I consider Olson’s theory, along with the possibility that 
colleges, like corporations, strategically band together to lobby for a collective “pie,” and then 
shift to organizational level lobbying for an individual “slice.” 
2.4.2 Research and Development as a Collective-Private Good 
 
The common thread sown through most studies on higher education lobbying is the 
observation that colleges lobby for federal research and development funds. Research and 
development from federal government are essential to non-profit college and university 
operations. From 2010 to 2014 federal research and development accounted for the majority 
(56%) of all higher education research and development expenditures; the remaining funds were 
from federal stimulus (3%) state and local government (6%) internal institutional funds (21%) 
business (5%) non-profit (6%), and other (2%) sources (Britt, 2015). From 2005 to 2014, 
research institutions and those with a medical program were more likely to file a lobbying report; 
the former accounting for about half registrations and 3/4 of expenditures (Marsicano, 2019). 
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Doctoral-level institutions accounted for a quarter of all institutions in one sample, but were 
responsible for about half of lobbying registrations (Marsicano, 2019). Larger non-profit colleges 
were more likely to lobby than smaller colleges, based on enrollment (Marsicano, 2019). 
Considering Olson’s paradox, it seems possible that colleges band together to first lobby for a 
commonly-shared collective good, like a large federal research budget, with some colleges free-
riding. Then, a campus may break off to lobby for a more private good, like funding for a 
specific project on campus. This could be considered “pie, then slice” lobbying in the corporate 
image, and initial research suggests that it is a pattern. For example, in the late 1990s, “a small 
number of [public and private non-profit] top-tier institutions” lobbied for science policy “such 
as increased budgets for the National Institutes of Health or more flexible rules governing human 
subjects” (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006)22. So, the remainder may have been free riding. 
But would the lobbying buck stop there? That is, an individual college stop lobbying because a 
large group of colleges received funding? It is unlikely, as there is a pattern for private goods to 
become “increasing[ly] important as a proposed alternative moves through the policy process” 
(Godwin et al 2013, p.69).  
For higher education, the policy process is one where private goods might be accessed 
with more campus-level individualized lobbying. This can happen in two ways, the first of which 
is when a bill becomes a law. To secure increasingly private benefits, it may be possible that 
colleges, like corporations, lobby legislation ex post, as shown by You (2017). Colleges also may 
lobby administrative agencies, as agency lobbying is important to lobbying organizations writ 
large (You, 2017). The second way is when colleges lobby through the process of 
“lettermarking,” in “which legislators send letters to federal agencies to which they have 
                                                 
22 For universities with members of Congress on a appropriations committee, a 10 percent increase in lobbying 
yielded an additional 2.8 percent or 3.5 percent increase in earmarks (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006).  
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appropriated funds in an attempt to send agency funding to projects in their districts,” 
(Marsicano, 2019). Indeed, interviews with college lobbyists in 2017-2018 suggest that “the once 
unified higher education lobbying community is beginning to show stress fractures that could 
lead to more individualized lobbying in future years” (Mariscano, 2019, p.96), with public 
university lobbyists saying that they hired outside lobbyists to advocate for agency programmatic 
requests ’“in addition to [asking for] overall support for the National Science Foundation, the 
National Institutes of Health’” (Marsicano, 2019).  
 Second, colleges lobby to pursue earmarks, which are campus-level private goods, 
usually with a research and development purpose. Earmarks propelled college lobbying for 
decades. The vast majority of the 20 percent of nearly 2,400 non-profit institutions that lobbied 
in 1997-1999 did so in the pursuit of earmarked funds (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006). But 
what about after the 2010/2011 earmark ban? There is no evidence that lobbying expenditures 
decreased after the earmark ban among AAU members 2007-2014; in fact, expenditures for in-
house lobbyist increased (Marsicano, 2019). This suggests that colleges lobbied 
individualistically, the way corporations have been lobbying.  
Notably, 2010 was the same year when federal stimulus money began to level out, so 
new research would need to consider college lobbying before and after that year, and how it is 
tied to availability of research and development funds. The present study makes this 
consideration. The figure below shows federal research and development funding support to 




Figure 3: Federal Support for University Research and Development by Agency (in 2018 
dollars) 
Source: AAAS, 2018 
 
The strong but sparse literature reviewed so far gives baseline data on the connection 
between college lobbying and federal research and development, suggesting that colleges 
emulate the “pie, then slice” corporate lobbying paradigm. However, besides Marsicano’s (2019) 
expenditure findings, the research does little to distinguish lobbying within and across the public, 
private, and for-profit sectors. Cook (1998) found that private colleges (especially medium and 
large ones) were more likely than public colleges to hire outside lobbyists, and private college 
presidents had slightly higher federal relations expertise than public college presidents. This 
leaves open the question of how different types of colleges seek different types of governmental 
resources—a question this study aims to answer. 
2.4.3 Student Aid as a Collective-Private Good 
 
 This section reviews existing research on how colleges lobby for Pell grants. Student aid, 
which all colleges receive regardless of whether they perform research, seems to be another 
 
52 
collective good, but there is not enough literature to know who is riding on whose coattails. All 
college may free ride on the advocacy by associations. For-profit colleges may free ride on 
lobbying by public and private colleges or vice-versa, or all three sectors may free ride upon the 
lobbying of their students. The unique characteristics of Pell, as compared to research and 
development funding, may explain this difficulty of understanding. What is clear is that Pell is 
another common thread sown through the higher education lobbying literature, and the literature 
sets the groundwork for systematic investigation. 
 As mentioned earlier, colleges historically lobbied for student aid via their associations 
(Cook, 1998). This still seems to be the case, as dozens of associations like the National 
Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators continue to lobby for student aid, though 
there is more news than research on these efforts. For example, in 2011, the Washington Post 
reported that college presidents and students participated in a “lobby day” on Capitol Hill in 
2011 to “save Pell” in an effort organized by the non-profit organization Education Trust 
(Johnson, 2011). A total of 74 associations joined this effort with a petition that received about 
37,000 signatures (Nelson, 2011). This effort underscores Pell’s value as a collective good to 
higher education. 
  It is clear that for-profit colleges are much more dependent on Pell grants than are non-
profit colleges, so it seems reasonable that for-profits would lobby for Pell. For-profits are so 
dependent on federal Title IV dollars that the federal government limits such schools to use a 
maximum of 90 percent of Title IV dollars for their revenues (the so-called “90:10” rule). For 
instance, in 2007-2008, 23 percent of for-profit received “between 80 percent and 90 percent of 
their revenue from federal financial aid. . . This [dependence] rose to 35 percent [of all for-
profits] in 2009-10 and 38 percent in 2011-12” (Kelchen, 2017).  
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 There are two ways of looking at for-profit lobbying for Pell. On the one hand, there is 
initial evidence that correlates the increase in Pell grant availability with the rise of for-profit 
lobbying (to relax rules to keep more Title IV federal aid dollars flowing). For-profit colleges 
collectively boosted their campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures, the latter rising 
from $3.3 million in 2009 to $8 million in 2010 (Mettler, 2014: 174) years when Pell availability 
increased the most rapidly in the program’s history, as shown in the figure below.  
 
Figure 4: Pell Grant Program Historical Data, 1973-2015 
Source: U.S. Department of Education, 2018 
 
A multivariate analysis could determine the direct connection between for-profit lobbying 
expenditures and Pell receipts. It may be possible that non-profit colleges free-rode on for-
profits’ lobbying effort. 
On the other hand, since Pell grants are allotted to students based on need, and students 
can port the funding to any college they choose, Pell could be considered a collective good that 
benefits all students and all colleges equally; thus, it seems theoretically possible that for-profit 
colleges would not expend much effort lobbying for Pell, and decide instead chose to increase 
their enrollments. Indeed, “Fall enrollment in for-profit degree-granting institutions grew by 
more than 100-fold from 18,333 in 1970 to 1.85 million in 2009. During that same time period, 
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total fall enrollment in all degree-granting institutions increased 2.4-fold from 8.58 million in 
1970 to 20.43 million in 2009” (Deming et. al. 2012). Pell receipts would rise correspondingly 
with enrollments, but it does not seem likely that the millions in lobbying expenditures by profit-
incentivized institutions were spent if there were no return on investment. A multivariate study 
would help determine the association between Pell grant availability and for-profit lobbying, 
controlling for enrollment, over time. 
 Together, there is some evidence that non-profit colleges, for-profit colleges, and college 
students all lobby for Pell, but it is not clear how colleges differentially lobby for this collective 
good. Multivariate research could attempt to isolate independent effects of things like sector, 
size, and budgets over time that were found to be important in research and development 
lobbying literature, and the broader non-profit literature. This might help unravel the collective 
action paradox, and allow comparison of college lobbying to corporate lobbying. 
2.4.4 Collective Action Due to Non-Material Reasons 
 
The examples above discuss why and how colleges may lobby for materials benefits like 
funding, but colleges may collectively act for additional reasons, which I next review. 
As Olson (1965) notes, groups may be maintained due to coercion. In surveying why 
college presidents joined and stayed in higher education associations, Cook (1998) found that 
“peer pressure keeps institutions in the associations,” association board members wanted to 
“avoid the stigma of withdrawal,” and “presidents may feel that nonparticipation would be a 
public sign of institutional fragility.” 
Colleges may band together for “solidary” or “purposeful” benefits that James Q. Wilson 
adds to Olson’s material considerations. Solidary benefits are intangible and include “the 
pleasures of friendship and companionship, the self-esteem and prestige attached to being 
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respected by others, the thrills and ego-trips concomitant to rubbing elbows with the powerful 
and emerging victorious from the political fray. . .” (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986: 129). This may 
be a phenomenon applicable to the higher education community, in which research-heavy 
colleges experimented in low-cost, high-enrollment Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs) to 
seek prestige and economically compete, with larger colleges more likely to adopt MOOCs, 
(Pheatt, 2017). Indeed one college president said in an interview that “the glamor schools tend to 
be taken as the model” in defining association lobbying agendas (Cook, 1998: 92).” 
Wilson’s purposeful incentive “is the belief in the goals of the organization and the sense 
of satisfaction that derives from contributing to a cause in which one believe” and  
animate not only those who support organizations with altruistic purposes — for example, 
charities and advocacy groups — but also those who support private interest groups, not 
out of a desire to take advantage of the selective benefits available to members, but out of 
a sense of responsibility for assuming a fair share of the collective burden in furthering the 
cause (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986: 129). 
 
It seems possible that colleges, most of which are public-serving, mission driven institutions, 
may band together to lobby, and not free ride, out of a desire to be in the game of politics or out 
of a sense of fairness. Indeed, Cook notes that colleges desire to speak with “one voice,” a goal 
of its own (Cook, 1998, p. 117).  
Whether due to material, solidary, or purposeful motivations, colleges likely lobby to 
expand the size of the federal research and development and Pell grant collective pie. Future 
research can shed light on what they do next. Do they add additional lobbying effort to secure 
private benefits for individual campuses? 
2.4.5 Accountability Regulations and Lobbying 
 
All types of colleges seem to lobby against accountability measures. In the 21st century, 
Democratic and Republican politicians converged on a belief that “good schools [are] ones that 
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have efficiently used their resources to yield improved student academic achievement as 
measured by test scores” (Cuban, 2004) and apply this philosophy to higher education. For 
instance, beginning in the 1990’s and continuing beyond the Great Recession, state governments 
aimed to hold colleges accountable by linking funding to college outcomes on graduation and 
transfer rates, job placement, and student retention (Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, and 
Reddy, 2016). More recently, the Postsecondary Institutional Ratings System (PIRS) proposal of 
2013 would have rated colleges based on affordability metrics, a measure the media reported that 
colleges from every sector lobbied against (Stratford, 2014). One observer central to this debate 
observed: 
‘The higher ed lobby doesn’t want any accountability—they want money, and they want 
money without limitations, without restrictions, without accountability to anybody outside 
the academy,’ said David Bergeron, who served as Obama’s acting assistant secretary for 
postsecondary education before joining the Center for American Progress, a Democratic 
think tank that’s close to the administration (MacGillis, 2012). 
 
However, no quantitative data directly connects how many colleges lobbied in response to 
regulations or what they spent doing so. 
In 2010s, Title IX of the Higher Education Act, which bans gender discrimination at 
colleges that receive federal funds, has been implemented to hold colleges accountable to address 
sexual harassment complaints. Student complaints spiked in 2011 after a ’“Dear Colleague ’
letter from the Obama administration’s Education Department. . . urged colleges to investigate 
and resolve student reports of sexual misconduct. . .the civil-rights office reviewed more than 
387 individual complaints of sexual violence filed between 2011 and 2016” (Lipka, 2015). Many 
of these complaints were highlighted in the media. Attesting to the importance of regulations to 
colleges, higher education interest groups have been found to exercise power in technical 
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bureaucratic matters (Natow, 2015)23 seeming to align with Leech’s 2006 finding that non-profit 
lobbying takes place at federal agencies. 
 The for-profit college sector in particular most likely lobbies in response to accountability 
regulations. For-profit colleges in the 21st century fought rules that would pose threats to their 
business model; the rules required that the colleges meet “gainful employment” regulations for 
colleges, relating to student debt and income. In 2010, for-profit colleges flooded the U.S. 
Department of Education with 83,000 public comments in opposition to the rules, met with 
White House officials, and placed ads in newspapers in a concerted lobbying campaign (Mettler, 
2014). It is likely that the jump from $3.3 million in for-profit lobbying expenditures in 2009 to 
$8 million in 2010 fueled many of these activities, as well as lobbying in response to the related 
“90:10” rule.  
These rules were implemented in part as a response to dramatic accounts of students 
being bilked by for-profit colleges. For example, as Assistant Director, Office of Servicemember 
Affairs, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Hollister Petraeus testified before Congress, and 
wrote and op/ed in the New York Times saying that “military personnel and their families are 
finding themselves under siege from for-profit colleges”; the PBS show “Frontline” highlighted 
how a for-profit college recruiter enrolled Marines with serious brain injuries (Petraeus, 2011). 
Soon after in 2012, the Democratically-led Senate education committee released a report after 
two years of investigation that found “overwhelming documentation of exorbitant tuition, 
aggressive recruiting practices, abysmal student outcomes, taxpayer dollars spent on marketing 
and pocketed as profit, and regulatory evasion and manipulation” (Lewin, 2012). Then, 
                                                 




Department of Education in October of 2014 released new rules requiring for-profit colleges to 
ensure that their graduates are gainfully employed24.  
2.4.6 Direct Tactics 
 
As noted earlier, corporations tend to rely on direct tactics more than indirect tactics. 
Some recent research finds that colleges lobby with direct tactics: building on Cook’s 1998 study 
noting college use of direct tactics, a 2005 study showed that colleges rely on “in-house” college 
lobbyists (college employees paid to lobby) to lobby directly25 (Ferrin, 2005). Although the most 
frequently used tactic by the 105 lobbyists in this survey was the direct tactic of “personal 
communication with legislators,” the third-most reported tactics was the indirect tactic of 
“contact by influential constituent” (Ferrin, 2005: 188), suggesting that colleges consider indirect 
tactics very important, and that they may do things differently from corporations.   
2.4.7 Summary and Unanswered Question 
 
 The dearth of literature on higher education literature may be because colleges still get 
what they want without lobbying. Harkening to the 20th century’s “parastate,” contemporary 
college presidents may quietly lend their expertise and leverage their community impact to gain 
access to policymakers. Or, as in the past, others (like U.S. presidents and veterans groups) may 
do the legwork for colleges. Although some research finds that colleges lobby—for earmarks, for 
research, against accountability regulations, and with direct tactics—very few of these studies 
track higher education registration, expenditures, and tactics over time, leaving us wondering if 
colleges still lobby the way they did in the 1990’s, primarily through their associations rather 
                                                 
24 Gainful employment rules are often proposed and challenged; under the 2014 the rules, colleges could not allow 
graduates’ student loan debt payments to exceed 12% of their income and 30% of their discretionary income. 
Further, programs whose graduates exceed these levels will have to warn students and risk becoming ineligible for 
aid (Field, 2014). 
25 My last two government relations jobs were newly-created positions, at a large private university and a mid-sized 
private graduate college of education, which suggests to me that the in-house lobbyist trend is growing. 
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than at the campus level, or maybe “lobby in the shadows,” systematically underreporting their 
lobbying registrations and expenditures. It might also be possible that only a handful of colleges 
actually lobby, while the remainder free ride upon those efforts. 
Emerging evidence indicates that the different college sectors lobby differently, usually 
based on their resource dependence. For example, there seems to be a connection between 
lobbying and college dependence on federal research dollars: colleges band together to lobby for 
large federal research budgets, and then break away to secure agency and earmark funding at the 
college level, resources on which colleges are dependent at the campus level. Less is known 
about this process in the 21st century, when federal funding for research was level except for a 
huge spike after the Great Recession. Was this funding boost simply a matter of government 
using colleges to help stimulate the economy? Did public and private university lobbying follow 
the availability of money in a “pie, then slice” manner? Did they do so in a different manner 
given their sectoral difference? 
Student aid is another collective good for which colleges lobby. It is clear that all sectors 
care about, and lobby for, aid like Pell grants. It is also evident that for-profit schools rely on 
federal student aid dollars, but there is not much data on how they lobby to secure Pell grants. It 
may be that they simply increase their enrollments to boost budgets. It may also be that non-
profit colleges free ride on the lobbying of for-profits, and that all types of schools free ride upon 
student or outside organization lobbying.  
Colleges lobby for other reasons besides securing funding. Although they may band 
together to lobby for increased federal funding pots, they may not free ride due to solidary or 
purposive motivations. Additionally, all types of colleges have been the target of government 
accountability regulations. Anecdotal evidence indicates that colleges lobby in response to high-
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profile accountability measures—for-profit colleges in particular seem to respond to gainful 
employment regulations.  
Lastly, it seems that colleges rely on direct tactics and indirect tactics, but the dearth of 
research means that it is unclear which set of tactics are more important to colleges. This 
question is important to answer because it will allow us compare higher education lobbying to 
corporate lobbying, the latter of which appears to depend more heavily on direct tactics. 
A systematic, longitudinal investigation into higher education registrations, expenditures, 
and tactics across public, private, and for-profit sectors would help answer these questions and 
start to paint a more complete picture of the contemporary higher education lobbying landscape. 
A summary of this section’s findings on contemporary higher education lobbying is in Table 7 
below. 
Table 7: Summary of contemporary higher education lobbying 
Finding Summary and sources 
Colleges may not actively 
lobby 
• Recent studies describe college lobbying: about half of public 
and private colleges lobbied 2005-2014 (Marsicano, 2019) and 
for-profits colleges boosted their spending in recent years 
(Mettler, 2014). 
• But vestiges of the parastate may remain, with college 
presidents lending their mystique (McMillen, 2010) and 
leveraging expertise (Adler, 2007) to influence policy. 
• Tuition flows to colleges (Gillen, 2012) possibly preempting 
the need for colleges to lobby. 
• U.S. Presidents and veterans lobby for G.I. Bill funding 
(Mettler, 2014) possibly preempting the need for colleges to 
lobby. 
• The dearth of evidence on college lobbying may be because 




Importance of research & 
development to non-profit 
colleges 
• Research institutions were more likely to file a lobbying report 
and accounted for ¾ of lobbying expenditures (Marsicano, 
2019). 
• Public college lobbying expenditures increased more than 80% 
from 2004-2014, with research-oriented schools spending 
about 10 times more than community colleges (Brackett, 
2016). 
• Top-tier non-profit colleges lobbied to increase the research 
and development “pie” (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006) 
• About 20 percent of all non-profits lobbied in 1997-1999 (de 
Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006) 
Research and development 
as a collective-private good 
• Some public universities lobbied for agency programmatic 
requests (Marsicano, 2019). 
• The vast majority of colleges that lobbied in 1997-1999 did so 
for earmarks (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006) 
• AAU members did not decrease their lobbying after the 2011 
earmark ban (Marsicano, 2019). 
Student aid as a collective-
private good 
• For-profits heavily depend on Pell grants (Kelchen, 2017). 
• For-profit colleges spent $3.3 million lobbying in 2009 and $8 




• Popular among policymakers (Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, 
Pheatt, and Reddy, 2016), (Stratford, 2014). 
• Important across all sectors of colleges (Stratford, 2014) 
eliciting a lobbying response (MacGillis, 2012). 
• Lobbying takes place in the regulatory process among non-
profits (Leech, 2006), higher education generally (Natow, 
2015) and by for-profit colleges (Mettler, 2014). 
Reliance on direct tactics • College lobbyists rely on direct tactics and indirect tactics 
(Cook, 1998; Ferrin, 2005). 
 
 
Investigation into college lobbying behavior in the 21st century would not only update the 
literature to fill these gaps, but would be interesting because of the fluctuations in available 
government resources (pre- and post-Great Recession), the growing role of the for-profit sector, 
and the rising reaction to accountability measures issued from both sides of the aisle. Such an 
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investigation would also compare college lobbying to corporate lobbying, situating higher 
education lobbying within the broader, more developed interest group literature. It would also 
provide a baseline of research to examine the lobbying by many other non-profit organizations 
that are prohibited from making campaign contributions, but vie to have their voice heard in 
Washington, D.C., and state capitals. 
2.5 Research Questions 
 
The research on the history of higher education-government relations suggests that 
Americans towards the end of the 20th century lost faith in the “education gospel” and stopped 
trusting academics. The protest movement of the late 1960’s, quickly succeeded by the populist 
movement that extends through to today, perpetuated the frayed higher education-government 
relationship.  From the 1980’s through to today, leaders and everyday Americans looked to 
capitalism’s privatization, markets, and competition to steer social, economic, and educational 
life, while political polarization erodes faith in higher education, suggesting a frayed 
government-higher education relationship. Do colleges still sit back and let others do their 
bidding, or have they learned to lobby to protect their stakes? And if so, how do they do it? 
Initial research on college lobbying in response to mid-1990’s funding cuts shows that 
colleges do in fact lobby, but we do not know much more than that. However, newer lobbying 
registration and expenditure data is now available, presenting researchers with lots of data to 
situate contemporary higher education-government relations within the broader interest group 
literature—to apply the metrics of corporate lobbying to higher education. Specific questions 
about higher education lobbying arise:  
1. What are the characteristics of American colleges that lobby? 
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2. How have lobbying registration laws and the earmark ban affected college lobbying 
in recent years? 
3. Are for-profit colleges that are more dependent on Pell Grants more likely to lobby 
and spend more money doing so? 
4. Are non-profit colleges that are more dependent on research and development more 
likely to lobby and spend more money doing so? 
5. Why would an individual college lobby if others are taking action? 
6. How do external pressures like media attention affect lobbying? 
7. Which tactics do colleges use to lobby? 
Investigation into these questions may help us answer a bigger, eighth question: Do colleges 
lobby like corporations?  
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
 
To investigate these research questions, I apply what is known about interest group 
lobbying to what is known about contemporary college lobbying, and offer three possibilities:   
 Possibility 1: Colleges do not lobby much or at all because they are still in good favor 
with government. 
In this scenario, like in the pre-frayed era, colleges rest easy as government funds flow 
their way. Government still looks to higher education to fulfill important national goals, such as 
military research and development as observed by Brint (2019). In other words, strong tendrils 
connect government to higher education. This scenario would be possible if government and 
interest groups lobby on behalf of colleges, as found in earlier studies (see Cook, 1998; Gladieux 
& Wolanin, 1976; Hannah, 1996).   
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However, I do not find this possibility very plausible. Although the case of the post 9/11 
G.I. Bill indirectly benefitted colleges, it was spearheaded by a Senator who was a veteran, and 
supported by outside groups like the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America (Mettler, 2014) 
with the intention of benefiting students. Likewise, I think that the Pell and federal research and 
development boost under the 2009/2010 stimulus was just like the original G.I. Bill: an 
“unexpected windfall” for colleges. The federal research and development dollars Brint (2019) 
speaks of were often prescribed by the federal government: how can we consider this a 
partnerships if it is a one-way street? 
More broadly, there is no sign of populism and anti-intellectualism fading away. I think 
that higher education may have ran out of defenders, and may have to stand up for itself by 
lobbying. The literature review mentioned presidential candidates in 2012 leveraging anti-
college rhetoric, and this trend continues to today. In 2016 Americans elected to president 
Donald Trump, who ran a populist campaign, and from 2005-2010, a for-profit education that 
was accused of defrauding students (Cassidy, 2016). Trump then appointed school privatization 
advocate Betsy DeVos to be U.S. Education Secretary. Although Congress still funds NIH, NSF, 
and other agencies that provide research funding to colleges, anti-science sentiment, including 
climate change denial, is not only common in populist-conservative circles but has ’“become yet 
another of the long list of litmus test issues that determine whether or not you’re a good 
Republican’” a campaign staffer of Presidential candidate Marco Rubio said in 2017 (Davenport 
& Lipton, 2017).  
Anti-college sentiment came into action in 2017 when House Republicans proposed a tax 
on graduate student stipends, a cap on their student loans, and a tax on college endowments. 
Graduate students protested (Sullivan & Arnold, 2017) while higher education associations 
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lobbied “intensely” against the legislation (Kreighbaum, 2018). However, the endowment tax, a 
“1.4 percent excise tax on net investment income at private colleges and universities with at least 
500 tuition-paying students and assets of at least $500,000 per student” (Seltzer, 2019) passed 
into law, perhaps attesting to bi-partisan sentiment against colleges, at least very wealthy ones. 
The left in the in the 2010’s was often skeptical about aspects of education. For example, 
Democratic President Obama’s Under Secretary for Education Ted Mitchell called for 
innovation in and disruption of higher education (Pheatt, 2017), “more and better alternatives to 
traditional institutions” (Lederman, 2016). Education Secretary Arne Duncan called education 
schools “cash cows” for universities (Medina, 2009). New York Democratic Governor Andrew 
Cuomo called the k-12 public school system a “monopoly” in need of busting and more 
competition (Strauss, 2014). Especially since these ideas and policies affected college bottom 
lines, it seems unlikely that colleges today lay low to sustain attacks and keep on business as 
usual.    
Lastly, although the Bennett Hypothesis implies that colleges maintain themselves via 
public dollars, possibly preempting the need for colleges to lobby, the above-described events 
neither paint a picture of colleges resting easy nor one where government funds easily flow their 
way. Nor do there seem to be instances of officials or interest groups outside of higher education 
leaping to its defense.   
Possibility 2: Colleges lobby, but in their own distinct way.   
This is the inertia argument. In this scenario, colleges lobby quietly, leveraging remaining 
public faith in their expertise and relying on indirect tactics. They sometimes lobby via in sit-
down meetings with college presidents who bring gravitas (e.g. Adler, 2007) and rely on their 
associations—and not really on in-house lobbyists or consultants—to lobby. In a sense, it is 
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status quo since Cook (1998) found that five percent of colleges had federal relations staff in 
Washington and 18% of colleges hired lobbying consultants. In this scenario, even in the post-
earmark era, colleges just focus on increasing the size of “the pie,” vying to expand federal 
funding to departments like NIH and NSF as they did in the past (see Cook, 1998; de Figueiredo 
and Silverman, 2006). This would keep dollars flowing to college and keep them happy 
“enough” to meet their budgets without overextending themselves and getting into the lobbying 
game.   
I do not think that this possibility is very likely. Rather, it seems possible that colleges 
have slowly woken up and smelled the threats and opportunities, and that the number of in-house 
lobbyists cited by Cook (1998) and Ferrin (2005) has grown as has their corresponding lobbying 
spending. Lobbying Disclosure Act data would allow us to investigate lobbying registration and 
expenditure trends, and how they connect to receipt of funds. Lastly, it has been nearly 50 years 
since corporate America has been lobbying to push back against regulations; if higher education 
is increasingly regulated, maybe it does the same, and does so in the same way.  
Possibility 3. Colleges lobby like corporations.  
 If this scenario is plausible, then the metrics of corporate lobbying will be relevant and 
applicable to contemporary college lobbying.  
In this scenario, as populism and anti-intellectualism continues, colleges are under fire, 
notice the negative press, and have woken up. Their response is to lobby more like corporations, 
which have been effective in defending themselves. This idea is based on the theory of memetic 
isomorphism, which suggests that organizations facing uncertainty adopt the behavior of 
organizations seen as stable and legitimate (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). Facing challenges and an uncertain future, colleges look to lobbyists that are successful, 
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and especially those that are successful in parlaying governmental threats and finding new 
opportunities; namely, corporate lobbyists. The broader interest group literature shows that in the 
face of outside challenge in the 1960’s and 1970’s—from social activist groups and the 
regulations they promoted —corporate America improved its standing (Drutman, 2015). It seems 
that lobbying helped corporations have a seat at the policymaking table and secure more public 
resources, so perhaps colleges today not only lobby, but do so in the corporate image. Non-profit 
colleges might not even have to look far, with for-profit colleges already lobbying in the midst, 
noticing that for-profits that are taking away their market share.  
As an example of possible memetic isomorphism, the recent corporate shift from 
associational to organizational lobbying (Drutman, 2015) may mean that more colleges rely on 
in-house and contract lobbyists, so their five percent and 18 percent respective registration rates 
found by Cook (1998) are much higher. Campus-level college lobbying is measurable with new 
data provided by Lobbying Disclosure Act reports, which I intend to test. If colleges are 
emulating corporations, they may also more heavily rely on direct lobbying tactics. The above-
reviewed metrics of corporate lobbying summarized in Table 5 allows us to compare higher 
education lobbying to corporate lobbying. We should thus be able to attempt to answer the 
research questions and the possibility that colleges lobby like corporations.  
Next, the theory of academic capitalism suggests that universities boost managerial 
capacity to respond to not only governmental threats but to also seek new external resources 
(Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004). I think that colleges reflect the corporate environment and retool 
their operations, hiring lobbyists to avoid threats and seek new markets. 
Lastly, the theory of resource dependence implies that organizations pursue government 
resources differently, based on their dependence on those resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). 
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To the extent that colleges are dependent on certain federal funds, colleges will lobby to pursue 
those funds. This appears to be the case for corporations, and non-profit organizations, so it 
seems plausible that it will be the case for higher education. 
 To empirically examine Possibility 3 and answer the research questions, I apply the 
metrics of corporate lobbying to the higher education literature and present four hypotheses:  
 H1. For-profit colleges with higher Pell Grant dependence will lobby more. 
 This hypothesis is related to Research Question 3, which asks “Are for-profit colleges 
that are more dependent on Pell Grants more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so?” 
This argument is based on the findings in the corporate lobbying literature that a) corporate 
registrations are slightly connected to government spending (Drutman, 2015) and b) corporate 
expenditures rise with more governmental spending (Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Drutman, 
2015; Lux, 2011). That is, for-profit colleges are resource-dependent on Pell grants, and lobby 
for it. It is also based on the finding in the higher education lobbying literature that for-profit 
college lobbying expenditures seem to increase with more availability of Pell grants (Mettler, 
2014).   
Since the corporate lobbying metrics have not yet been empirically applied to the for-
profit lobbying sector, I simply posit a positive association between for-profit lobbying 
registrations and expenditures and Pell availability and do not venture to guess if one is stickier 
than the other. 




This hypothesis is related to Research Question 4, “Are non-profit colleges that are more 
dependent on research and development more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so?” 
This argument is based on the findings in the corporate lobbying literature that 
a) corporate registrations are slightly connected to government spending (Drutman, 2015) and b) 
corporate expenditures increase with more governmental spending (Figueiredo and Silverman, 
2006; Drutman, 2015; Lux, 2011). It is also based on the strong evidence in the non-profit 
lobbying literature showing that non-profit organizations that receive governmental funding 
lobby more than those that do not (Berry, 2003; Chaves et al, 2004; Leroux and Goerdel, 2009; 
Salamon et al, 2008). 
It is also based on the finding in the higher education lobbying literature that non-profit 
colleges spent money on lobbying in pursuit of research and development dollars (see Brackett, 
2016; de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Marsicano, 2019). The research does not seem to 
distinguish the lobbying behavior by private and public non-profit institutions on the federal 
level. This is likely in part because the higher education lobbying research is underdeveloped and 
also because federal funding is sector-agnostic: Pell grants are ported by the student, and public 
and private colleges are treated equally for research funds. So, although in the next chapter I will 
descriptively explore the connection between lobbying and federal research and development 
dependence differentially among public and private colleges, for the purposes of this hypothesis, 
in the multivariate analysis I will group together public and private colleges.  
Analogously to Hypothesis II, I posit a positive association between public and private 
lobbying registrations and expenditures and research and development availability and do not 
venture to guess if one is stickier than the other.  




This exploratory hypothesis is related to Research Question 6, “How do external 
pressures like media attention affect lobbying?” It is based on findings in the corporate lobbying 
literature that corporations lobby against regulations (Drutman, 2015; Hart, 2004; Lowery, 2007; 
You, 2017) that lobbying activity increases as governmental attention to an issue increases 
(Leech et al, 2005), that the media helps set and influence agendas (Tan and Weaver, 2007; 
Wolfe et al, 2013) and leading to the possibility that regulations are among those issues covered 
by the media, drawing a lobbying response. 
This argument is also based on the finding in the news that regulations are important 
across all sectors of colleges (Stratford, 2014) and elicit a lobbying response (MacGillis, 2012). 
It is also based on the finding that lobbying takes place in the regulatory process among non-
profits (Leech, 2006), higher education generally (Natow, 2015) and by for-profit colleges 
(Mettler, 2014). Lastly, it is based on the possibility that regulations, like gainful employment 
(Mettler, 2014) appear in the news, eliciting a lobbying response from for-profit colleges, and 
regulations like Title IX sexual harassment (Lipka, 2015) reach the news and draw a lobbying 
response from non-profit colleges. At a minimum, it seems that media coverage of regulations is 
a credible indicator of regulatory pressure. 
H4. Public, private, and for profits employ similar lobbying tactics, with for-profits 
relying more on direct tactics. 
This exploratory hypothesis is related to Research Question 7 “Which tactics do colleges 
use to lobby?” and is based on findings in the corporate lobbying literature that corporations 
seem to rely more on direct rather than indirect tactics (Cook, 1998; Drutman, 2015; Kollman, 
1998; Schlozman & Tierney, 1986). Although college lobbyists rely on direct tactics and indirect 
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tactics (Cook, 1998; Ferrin, 2005), the argument is based on the logic that for-profit colleges, as 
corporations, will generally rely more on direct tactics than their non-profit counterparts. The 
table below shows how research questions match up with hypotheses. 
Table 8: Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Research Question Hypothesis 
1. What are the characteristics of American colleges that lobby?  
2. How have lobbying registration laws and the earmark ban 
affected college lobbying in recent years? 
 
3. Are for-profit colleges that are more dependent on Pell 
Grants more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so? 
Hypothesis I: For-profit colleges with 
higher Pell Grant dependence will 
lobby more. 
4. Are non-profit colleges that are more dependent on research 
and development more likely to lobby and spend more 
money doing so? 
Hypothesis II: Non-profit colleges with 
higher federal research and 
development dependence will lobby 
more. 
5. Why would an individual college lobby if others are taking 
action? 
 
6. How do external pressures like media attention affect 
lobbying? 
Hypothesis III: All sector spending and 
registration is positively correlated 
with media coverage of accountability 
regulations 
7. Which tactics do colleges use to lobby? Hypothesis IV: Public, private, and for 
profits employ similar lobbying tactics, 
with for-profits relying more on direct 
tactics 







Chapter 3: A Quantitative Look at the Prevalence and Intensity of  
Higher Education Lobbying 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I present a quantitative look at the prevalence and intensity of higher 
education lobbying at the federal level. Chapter 2 left us with a framework to compare higher 
education lobbying to corporate lobbying, initial research to build from, and unanswered 
questions to explore. The goal of this chapter is to explore four of the research questions (RQs) 
derived in Chapter 2: RQ1) What are the characteristics of American colleges that lobby? RQ2) 
How have lobbying registration laws and the earmark ban affected college lobbying in recent 
years? RQ3) Are for-profit colleges that are more dependent on Pell Grants more likely to lobby 
and spend more money doing so? RQ4) Are non-profit colleges that are more dependent on 
research and development more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so?  
Knowing more about these questions will help answer the central research question: do 
colleges lobby like corporations? To explore these questions, I rely on quantitative methods. I 
leverage a new database I created, the American Higher Education Lobbying Database, with data 
on higher education lobbying. I use the database to generate new findings about colleges that 
lobby, and the connection between lobbying and its ostensible results at the federal level: Pell 
grants and federal research and development dollars.  
The flow of the chapter is as follows. I describe the data components of the American 
Higher Education Lobbying Database, unit of analysis, time frame, database creation process, 
college characteristics, and analytic technique. I provide descriptive results for characteristics of 
all colleges and universities in the sample; characteristics of colleges that lobby; an overview of 
lobbying registration and expenditure trends; and highlight examples of high Pell- and federal 
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research and development-dependent institutions. These descriptive findings begin to address the 
first two research questions.  
 I then test Hypothesis I—that for-profit colleges with higher Pell Grant dependence will 
lobby more—with a descriptive and multivariate analysis. I provide a summary of findings 
regarding for-profit colleges and how those findings address Research Question 3.  
Lastly, I examine Hypothesis II—that non-profit colleges with higher federal research 
and development dependence will lobby more—with a similar descriptive and multivariate 
analysis, and summarize findings regarding non-profit colleges and how those findings address 
Research Question 4.  
Together, the results of within this chapter should make new contributions to the growing 
research on higher education lobbying and generate new questions to continue the conversation 
on this important topic. 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 About the American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
I created the American Higher Education Lobbying Database, a panel dataset covering 11 
years (2004-2014, inclusive), by merging data about B.A. granting institutions from three federal 
datasets and into a single database. The three datasets are:  
1) The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) a set of surveys 
conducted annually by the Institute for Education Sciences of the United States Department of 
Education. IPEDS contains information about every college and university in the country, such 
as location, sector, enrollment, and finances, and Pell Grants received. Pell Grants have been 
shown to be an important motivation to lobby (see Mettler, 2014). Emerging research on higher 
education lobbying draws from IPEDS college characteristics data (see Marsicano, 2019). 
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 2) The Higher Education Research and Development (HERD) Survey, conducted 
annually by the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) National Center for Science and 
Engineering Statistics (NCSES). This survey summarizes federal research and development 
funds directed at American colleges and universities, which have been shown to be a motivation 
for college lobbying (see de Figueriredo & Silverman, 2006). 
 3) The U.S. Senate Office of Public Records lobbying disclosure database, as formatted 
by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). This database contains direct lobbying expenditure 
by organizations registered to lobby under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA), including 
colleges. LDA data only tracks IRS-defined “direct” lobbying activity (like legislative lobbying 
by in-house lobbyists or consultants).  
This original database captures approximately 2,000 colleges in each of the 11 years from 
2004-2014, inclusive; the colleges are bachelor-granting institutions that participate in federal 
Title IV student aid funding, and are in the public, private non-profit and for-profit sectors. The 
sample was culled down from the raw IPEDS dataset, which surveys about 7,300 schools in a 
typical year. To meet selection criteria, colleges must 1) operate in at least one of the 50 states or 
Washington, D.C. 2) participate in federal Title IV funding 3) offer programs in four years or 
more 4) not be theological seminaries and other specialized faith-related institutions 5) not be 
military institutions.  
The approximate percentage of institutions excluded in a typical year based on each of 
these criteria were: 1) do not operate in at least one of the 50 states or Washington, D.C.: 2%; 2) 
do not participate in federal Title IV funding: 3%; 3) do not offer programs in four years or 
more: 60%; (see Table A1 in Appendix A for a breakdown); 4) are theological seminaries and 
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other specialized faith-related institutions: 4%26; 5) are military institutions: 0.01%. The 
remaining approximately 2,000 B.A.-granting colleges resemble those that are typically 
examined in recent research.  
3.2.2 Unit of Analysis  
In this chapter, I analyze lobbying at B.A.-granting colleges, primary to build upon extant 
literature. In examining B.A.- granting colleges, this study is not only in harmony other recent 
systematic analyses of higher education (see Brackett, 2016; Deming, 2011; Marsicano, 2019) 
but also aligns with other recent studies on college lobbying, which have found that B.A.-
granting institutions are very active in lobbying for federal Title IV student aid dollars (see 
Mettler, 2014) and lobby for research dollars (see de Figueiredo, 2006).  
3.2.3 Time Frame  
The study covers the years 2004 to 2014. I chose this time frame for several reasons. 
First, the literature on higher education lobbying brings us to about this time. Studies that  
empirically investigate higher education lobbying trends use survey data (e.g., Cook, 1998) and 
Lobbying Disclosure Act (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006) that bring us to about 1999 except 
for a couple of recent dissertations (e.g. Brackett, 2016; Marsicano, 2019). More recent studies 
tend to be theoretical and anecdotal: Mettler (2014) and Cottom (2017) examine for-profit 
college lobbying efforts, and Nichols (2017) discusses declining public faith in higher education. 
Second, the 2004-2014 time frame saw significant changes in the economy, such as the Great 
Recession of 2008-2009, the subsequent federal stimulus with Pell and federal research and 
development boosts, and changes to the higher education industry, such as the explosion of the 
                                                 
26 Note that the approximately 4% of institutions that identify as theological do so via the Carnegie classification; 
Carnegie also has an “item not available” classification, which allows many theological institutions to be included 
my database. The primary and most effective filter for my database is whether or not an institution is Title IV 
eligible, since that allows for Pell receipts. 
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for-profit sector. Third, it was a time noted for much federal government action, including a 
focus on sexual assault reporting (Lipka, 2015) accountability measures like the U.S. Department 
of Education’s “gainful employment” regulations in 2010-2013 for for-profit colleges relating to 
student debt and income, and the Postsecondary Institutional Ratings System (PIRS) proposal of 
2013 to rate colleges based on affordability metrics (see Stratford, 2014). Fourth, major higher 
education federal legislation was passed during this era:  
2007: College Cost Containment and Access Act raised Pell funding levels 
2008: Higher Education Act reauthorized, raising Pell and education benefits for veterans 
2008: Post 9/11 GI Bill, providing more education benefits for veterans 
2009: Federal Stimulus, increased Pell funding 
2010: Student Aid and Fiscal Responsibility Act shifted loans to the Direct Loan 
 program. 
Fifth, the time frame captures significant partisan changes in the White House and in Congress, 
but ends before Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential election victory.27 Sixth, the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDs, discussed in more detail below) data became 
consistently available and reliable after 2004. Seventh, my own career as a higher education 
lobbyist began in 2006, giving me much familiarity of the topics and debates within this era. 
3.2.4 Data Aggregation Process 
Each college appears in the database like its own mini-dataset. The table below shows 
how a typical college (based on median enrollment) appears in the database. 
 
                                                 
27 The time frame ends at this time because I began assembling the database in 2015, when the most recent available 
data was from 2014. 
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Table 9: Snapshot of the median database college based on enrollment 
 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
Characteristics like Sector, HBCU, and Hospital are covariates for the multivariate analysis. 
Very rarely, some characteristics change (e.g, a college may add or drop a medical program). In 
Appendix A I address how I manage these instances for consistency and data cleanup.  
 This data displayed in the table above is disaggregated by year. However, not every 
college appears every year, and not every college lobbies every year28. Further, not every college 
is a “standalone” institution like Chicago State University and may be a university system like 
the City University of New York (CUNY) with multiple constituent campuses. As most 
university systems report lobbying data on behalf of the entire system, it becomes difficult to do 
an “apples to apples” comparison of college lobbying at the campus level. Therefore, in much of 
the ensuing analysis, I aggregate 1) university constituent campuses to one system level 
observation and 2) aggregate all institutions by year, so there is one row of data per institution. 




                                                 
28 In fact, some colleges appear and disappear within the 11-year database time frame. See Appendix for data on 
those colleges that were “born” or “died.” 
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Table 10: How data shows up in disaggregated and aggregated databases 
 How data shows up in disaggregated 
database 
 
Campus level data (imputed lobbying 
expenditure amount, Pell, budgets, 
enrollment, etc) is disaggregated each year 
How data shows up in aggregated 
database 
 
Each unique institution has one data 
point for each type of data (eg 





(a college/university with a single campus, 
like Chicago State University) 
Campus       Year1: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year2: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year3: var1 var2 var3 … 







(a university system with multiple 
campuses, like CUNY) 
 
Campus 1a  Year1: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year2: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year3: var1 var2 var3 … 
Campus 1b Year1: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year2: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year3: var1 var2 var3 … 
Campus 1c  Year1: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year2: var1 var2 var3 … 
                    Year3: var1 var2 var3 … 











The figure below shows how I aggregated institution-level data. The text in bold shows how 





Figure 5: Aggregation of institution-level data into standalone colleges or systems 
Thus, the standalone or system-level institutions (in bold)29 become the units of analysis going 
forward.  
3.2.5 College Characteristics 
Next, I provide a table describing characteristics I use in the descriptive and multivariate 
analyses in this chapter. 
Table 11: Independent Variables 
Variable  Variable code in 
dataset & .do file 
Description Type and range 
Being a 





aau Whether or not a university is a 
member of the American 
Association of Universities.  






                                                 
29 There are 882 institutions within systems and 1,826 stand-alone institutions, for a total of 2,708. This number is 
higher than the 2,522 “All institutions” number in the figure due to instances when some institutions within systems 
“died” over the course of the 11-year data period. See Appendix A for prevalence and characteristics of these 
colleges. Similarly, the sum of percentage of public, private, and for-profit systems is slightly higher than 100% 
because some systems changed from private to for-profit or vice-versa; prevalence and characteristics of these sector 






budget_cpi Total institutional budget. Derived 
from IPEDS variable F1B25 
(“Total all revenues and other 
additions” for public colleges) 
F2D16 (“Total revenues and 
investment return” for private 
colleges), and F3D09 (“Total 
revenues and investment return” 
for for-profit colleges). Adjusted 






carnegie Whether or not an institution grants 
doctoral degrees. Derived from 








fteug Estimated full-time equivalent 
(FTE) undergraduate enrollment at 







forprofit Whether or not an institution is a 
private for-profit college or 
university. Transformation of 







hbcu Whether or not an institution is a 
Historically Black College or 
University (HBCU). IPEDS 
variable HBCU. 
Dummy. 0=is 
not an HBCU 
1=is an HBCU 
Having a 
hospital 
hospital Whether or not an institution has an 
affiliated hospital. IPEDS hospital 
variable. 
Dummy. 0=does 
not have a 




landgrant Whether or not an institution is a 
land-grant institution. IPEDS 
landgrant variable. 
Dummy. 0=is 
not a land grant 
institution . 1= is 





medical Whether or not an institution has a 
medical program. IPEDS medical 
variable. 
Dummy. 0=does 
not have a 
medical 









Percentage of a college’s budget 
that is Pell Grant dollars in a given 
year. IPEDS Pell receipts divided 
by budget variable. 
 
This variable is a variable of 
interest in analysis throughout this 
chapter. I consider it an indicator of 
a college’s budgetary dependence 
on this source of federal dollars. 




Being a public 
institution 
public Whether or not an institution is a 
public college or university. 




Being a private 
institution 
private Whether or not an institution is a 
private, non-profit college or 
university. Transformation of 











Percentage of a college’s budget 
that is research & development 
dollars in a given year. NSF 
research & development variable 
divided by IPEDS budget variable. 
 
This variable is a variable of 
interest in analysis throughout this 
chapter. I consider it an indicator of 
a college’s budgetary dependence 
on this source of federal dollars. 
 
See Appendix for more details on 
the R&D/budget variable. 
 







Table 12: Dependent variables 
Variable name Variable code 
in dataset/.do 
file 
Description Type and range 
Lobbying 
registrations 
crpresponder Whether or not a college registered 
to lobby in a given year, as filed with 
the Senate Office of Public Records, 
and reported by the Center for 
Responsive Politics. 





crpamtcpi Lobbying expenditures made by a 
college in a given year. Adjusted for 
inflation in 2014 dollars. 
Continuous. $0-
$1,785,736 
3.2.6 Overall Analytic Technique  
A central aim of this chapter is to examine how college characteristics relate to lobbying 
efforts. I put special focus on two college characteristics: Pell dependence and federal research 
and development dependence, and how they relate to lobbying registration and expenditures. In 
this chapter, I first provide a broad quantitative overview by describing college characteristics 
via tables and figures with means and percentages for these characteristics to show “what’s in” 
the dataset, to show data over time, and to show different groupings of colleges (e.g. all public 
college systems that lobby). I then examine relationships between the characteristics of interest 
and lobbying and use these data to show trends over time. 
I summarize findings at the end of each section for ease of reference and to later hold my 
newly-generated metrics of higher education lobbying to the existing metrics of corporate, non-
profit, and higher education lobbying. At the end of the chapter, I consider the results in total, 
and what questions remain unanswered. 
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3.3 Descriptive Results  
3.3.1 Characteristics of All Colleges and Universities in Sample 
 The table below compares the characteristics of all colleges, standalone colleges, and 
university systems in the database. There are 130 university systems like CUNY, and they have 
quite different characteristics than the 1,826 standalone institutions like Chicago State 
University.  







N 1,956 1,826 130 
Total 100% 93% 7% 
Public 21% 20% 41% 
Private 70% 72% 38% 
For-Profit 9% 8% 28% 
Land grant 4% 3% 22% 
HBCU 4% 5% 4% 
Doctoral 12% 10% 41% 
AAU 3% 2% 14% 
Hospital 5% 4% 24% 
Medical 8% 6% 28% 
Enrollment (mean) 3,068 2,878 5,751 
Budget (mean in $ millions) $163m $153m $303m 
Pell dependence 6% 6% 9% 
R&D dependence 2% 2% 5% 
Registered to lobby 37% 35% 59% 
Lobbying expenditures (mean) $45,563 $33,842 $210,205 
Lobbying expenditures (median) $         0    $        0 
        $  
39,739 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
Systems were much wealthier and spent more lobbying; they had an average $303 million budget 
and spent an average of $210,205 lobbying and had higher Pell dependence (9%) and federal 
research and development dependence (5%) than standalone institutions. I suspect that Pell 
dependence and federal research and development dependence is higher at systems than 
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standalones because such systems include large university systems like the University of 
Michigan, which perform lots of research, and the University of Phoenix, which enroll larger 
numbers of Pell-eligible students. These massive systems probably leverage their economies of 
scale to lobby the federal government for higher Pell and research and development 
appropriations. Importantly, among all 1,956 institutions in the database, the mean lobbying 
expenditure is $0: lobbying expenditures are far from normally distributed, and so it is likely that 
certain characteristics account for that difference in expenditures, which I explore later in this 
chapter via the multivariate analysis.  
 Research Question 1 asked “What are the characteristics of American colleges that 
lobby?” The next table answers that question.  
Table 14: Characteristics of Colleges and Universities That Lobby and Do Not Lobby, 2004-
2014 
 
       All     Lobby Do not Lobby 
N 1,956 721 1,235 
Total 100% 37% 63% 
Public 21% 34% 13% 
Private 70% 63% 74% 
For-Profit 9% 3% 13% 
Land grant 4% 9% 2% 
HBCU 4% 7% 3% 
Doctoral 12% 29% 2% 
AAU 3% 7% 0% 
Hospital 5% 11% 1% 
Medical 8% 18% 2% 
Enrollment (mean) 3,068 5,652 1,560 
Budget (mean in $ millions) $163m $353m $52m 
Pell dependence 6% 5% 7% 
R&D dependence 2% 4% 0% 
Registered to lobby 37% 100% 0% 
Lobbying expenditures (mean) $45,563  $123,608  $0  
Lobbying expenditures (median) $0  $44,907  $0  
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
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Non-profit colleges comprise 91% of all colleges in the database, and comprise 97% of all 
colleges that lobby. Among the 37% of colleges that ever lobby, about one third were public, two 
thirds were private, and a small percentage were for-profit. Lobbying colleges were much more 
likely to be doctoral institutions, have a hospital, a medical program, and larger enrollments and 
budgets than their non-lobbying counterparts; they had higher federal research and development 
dependence, but surprisingly, slightly lower Pell dependence. This suggests to me the need to 
further break down characteristics like sector to see the connection between Pell, federal research 
and development dependence, and lobbying. 
3.3.2 The Connection Between Pell, Research and Development, and Lobbying 
 In this section I show the connection between Pell dependence and lobbying, as well as 
federal research and development dependence and lobbying. In the process, I answer Research 
Question 2 and lay the groundwork to address Research Questions 3 and 4.  
Research Question 2 asked “How have lobbying registration laws and the earmark ban 
affected college lobbying in recent years?” I first compare corporate and higher education 
lobbying data over time. Figure 6 shows institution of higher education (IHE) lobbying 
expenditures (solid line) by year 2004-2014 and all industry lobbying expenditures (dashed line) 




Figure 6: College & All Industry Lobbying Expenditures, 2004-2014 
Source: Center for Responsive Politics, 2020 
 
On average, colleges (standalones and systems) in aggregate spent $82 million lobbying. The 
solid line indicates that 2008 was the year of highest industry lobbying expenditures, when 
colleges also spent the most--$98 million. Likewise, 2014 was the year of lowest industry 
lobbying expenditures, when colleges spent the least-- $60 million. Higher education 
expenditures appear closely correlated to overall industry expenditures. The dashed line aligns 
with La Pira’s (2015) findings which showed that expenditures continued to increase until 2009, 
then decreased thereafter. College expenditure trends slumped after 2010, suggesting that like 
other organizations, colleges ramped down their lobbying effort after the earmark ban. However, 
combining for-profit and non-profit colleges obscures whether HLOGA and the earmark ban 




I present macro-level trends in for-profit lobbying registrations and expenditures in the 
figure below, by year 2004-2014. 
 
Figure 7: Total Pell Grant availability and for-profit college lobbying, 2004-2014 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, 2018 and American Higher Education  
Lobbying Database 
 
On average, 12% of for-profit standalones and systems ever registered to lobby, spending a 
sector total average of $4.4 million across all years. The average lobbying for-profit college 
spent $20,485 in a given year. HLOGA did not appear to affect lobbying registrations the way it 
might have all other organizations; after the law came into effect, for-profit registrations 
increased. Rather, I surmise that Pell grant availability is a more likely explanation of for-profit 
college lobbying registrations and expenditures, given the rough visual connection the trends 
seem to have to each other.  
I present macro-level trends in disaggregated public college lobbying registrations and 




Figure 8: Total Federal Research and Development Availability and Lobbying Among 
Public Colleges, 2004-2014 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, 2018; American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
The figure shows that on average, 44% of public standalones and systems ever registered to 
lobby, spending a total average of $42 million across all years. The average lobbying public 
college spent $238,713 in a given year. Public college registrations (the dashed line) dipped as 
HLOGA entered the scene in 2007, but lobbying expenditures actually increased after 2007, and 
closely followed availability of federal research and development funds, suggesting that these 
funds are a more likely driver of why public colleges lobby.  
I present macro-level trends in private college lobbying registrations and expenditures in 




Figure 9: Total Federal Research and Development Availability and Lobbying Among 
Private Colleges, 2004-2014 
Sources: U.S. Department of Education, 2018; American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
On average, 21% of private standalones and systems ever registered to lobby, spending a total 
average of $36 million across all years. The average lobbying private college spent $160,554. 
The connection between private college lobbying and the availability of federal research and 
development funds looks possible, but less obvious than with public colleges. Further, the 
HLOGA and earmark ban do not seem to have affected the way private colleges register to lobby 
or spend on lobbying.  
 To summarize these findings in response to Research Question 2: insofar as responding 
to lobbying laws is a metric of corporate lobbying, the laws do not seem to affect how colleges 
lobby; to the extent that resource dependence is a corporate lobbying driver, colleges do seem to 
lobby in response to an available federal resource.  
 Looking more closely at Pell and federal research and development dependence—the two 
main characteristics of interest going forward—at all colleges in the database will set the stage to 
answer Research Question 3 “Are for-profit colleges that are more dependent on Pell Grants 
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more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so?” and Research Question 4 “Are non-profit 
colleges that are more dependent on research and development more likely to lobby and spend 
more money doing so?” 
 The table below shows how Pell dependence and federal research and development 
dependence matter to colleges based on characteristics and whether they are standalones or 
systems. 
Table 15: Pell and Federal Research and Development Dependence across Sector of 
Institution and other Aggregated Characteristics 
 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
With regard to Pell dependence, non-lobbying institutions are more dependent (7%) than 
lobbying institutions (5%). It is clear that Pell matters most to for-profits, especially for-profit 
systems that do not lobby, which have an 19% Pell dependence, and to for-profit standalones that 
lobby, which have a 14% Pell dependence.  
It is also clear that federal research and development dependence is highest at colleges 
that lobby, especially lobbying public university systems, which have a 12% federal research and 
development dependence. Other characteristics like being an AAU member, a being a land grant 
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institution, and having a medical program are associated with high federal research and 
development dependence. 
 How does Pell and federal research and development dependence directly relate to 
lobbying? The scatterplots below show the bivariate relationships between aggregated lobbying 
expenditures and Pell dependence at all colleges (plot 1), standalone colleges (plot 2) and 
university systems (plot 3). 
 
Figure 10: Bivariate relationships between aggregated lobbying expenditures and Pell 
dependence 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
It appears that across the three sets of data, lobbying expenditures decrease as Pell dependence 
increases. Among all colleges, there is a -0.13 correlation (p<0.001); among standalones, there is 
a -0.15 correlation (p<0.001); among systems, there is -0.28 correlation (p<0.01). The 
approximate median standalone institution (based on Pell dependence), in the second panel was 
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Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania with a lobbying expenditure of $0 and a Pell 
dependence of 4.3%. The approximate median system (based on Pell dependence), in the third 
panel was Long Island University with a lobbying expenditure of $0 and a Pell dependence of 
4.7%. I will need to look at this trend among for-profit institutions to determine support for 
Hypothesis I: I suspect that the relationship will be positive among for-profit colleges due to 
their high dependence shown in Table 15 above. 
It is also apparent in the scatterplots that there is a high number of institutions with low 
lobbying expenditures but high Pell dependence, as seen in the cluster along the y-axis. It would 
be informative to know what are those institutions, especially those with the highest Pell 
dependence hat spent very little on lobbying, as they may be free riders, or may be very efficient 
at securing funding with little internal investment. In the table below, I show the top 10 highest 
Pell dependence institutions, along with lobbying expenditures and sector. 
Table 16:  Top 10 Highest Pell Dependence Institutions 
 










Apex School of Theology 50% 0% $0 Private 
Centura College 51% 0% $0 For-profit 
Be'er Yaakov Talmudic Seminary 53% 0% $0 Private 
Uta Mesivta of Kiryas Joel 55% 0% $0 Private 
Yeshiva of Machzikai Hadas 61% 0% $0 Private 
System 
Carrington College 30% 0% $0 For-profit 
Santa Barbara Business College 31% 0% $0 For-profit 
Vatterott College 33% 0% $0 For-profit 
Jones College 35% 0% $0 Private 
Metropolitan College 38% 0% $0 Private 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
The highest Pell-dependent institutions are standalone institutions, and mostly religious 
institutions. Apex School of Theology is a very small but very rapidly expanding college in 
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North Carolina: in 2004 it had 51 students, in 2014 it had 483. All other institutions on this list, 
even the systems, were very small. For example, Santa Barbara Business College had on average 
about 640 enrolled students 2004-2014. For these institutions running high up the y-axis, it 
seems that low enrollment and few other sources of revenue other than Pell-eligible students, 
which created a high numerator in Pell dependence, is a simpler explanation of these schools’ 
high Pell dependence than a calculated free-riding. 
The next set of scatterplots show the bivariate relationships between aggregated lobbying 
expenditures and federal research and development dependence at all colleges (plot 1), 
standalone colleges (plot 2) and university systems (plot 3). 
 
Figure 11: Bivariate relationships between aggregated lobbying expenditures and 
federal research and development dependence 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
It appears that the relationship is strongly positive: lobbying expenditures increase as federal 
research and development dependence increases. Among all colleges, there is a 0.51 correlation 
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(p < 0.001); among standalones, there is a 0.51 correlation (p < 0.001); among systems, there is a 
0.51 correlation (p < 0.001). The approximate median standalone institution (based on federal 
research and development dependence) in the second panel was Midwestern University, with $0 
in lobbying expenditures and 0% federal research and development dependence. The 
approximate median system (based on federal research and development dependence) in the third 
panel was Widener University, with $39,738 in lobbying expenditures and nearly 0% in federal 
research and development dependence. I will need to look at the connection between lobbying 
and among federal research and development dependence at non-profit institutions specifically to 
determine support for Hypothesis II. 
Several institutions run high up the y-axis, suggesting that they have high federal research 
and development dependence institutions but little-to-no lobbying expenditures.  To get a sense 
of which institutions these are, I show the top 10 highest federal research and development 
dependence institutions along with their lobbying expenditures and sector. 
Table 17: Top 10 highest federal research and development dependence institutions 










New Mexico Institute of Mining and 
Technology 32% 1% $68,791 Public 
Midwest University 30% 1% $0 Private 
University of Arizona 25% 2% $394,962 Public 
S. Dakota School of Mines and Tech 26% 3% $38,127 Public 
University of South Carolina 26% 9% $0 Public 
System 
Oregon State University 23% 3% $158,080 Public 
University of Colorado  24% 1% $756,070 Public 
University of Hawaii  24% 2% $75,411 Public 
Colorado State University 28% 3% $281,525 Public 
University of Pittsburgh 30% 0% $953,765 Public 




In general, the table shows that federal research and development dependence is important to 
non-profit institutions, especially public colleges. Looking more closely, most are medium-to- 
large research-intensive institutions that often net large amounts of research. For example, New 
Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology (New Mexico Tech) enrolls about 1,280 students per 
year, has a $150 million budget, and nets an annual average of about $50 million in federal 
research and development. For three years around the post-Great Recession stimulus (the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, or ARRA), New Mexico Tech landed about 
$90 million in federal research and development; according to its audit statements, most it came 
from the Departments of Defense, Navy, Energy, and Justice 30. The University of Pittsburgh 
(Pitt) is a very research-heavy institution, with an annual budget of close to $2 billion and federal 
research and development receipts at about $600 million. Its federal research and development 
receipts were more stable than that of New Mexico Tech; Pitt’s federal research and 
development dependence fairly stable at around 30%, though it jumped to 61% in 2010, when its 
budget was at its lowest ($1.3 billion) and federal research and development were just about at 
record levels ($694 million); ARRA was responsible for this boost, with most of the funding 
coming from the National Institutes of Health31. 
What about x-axis (expenditure) outliers; that is, institutions that spend the most on 
lobbying? While most institutions cluster around the low end of lobbying expenditures, it 
appears in the scatterplots that a handful of institutions are outliers, spending more than 
$1,000,000 in lobbying. The table below shows these top lobbying spenders, along with their 
aggregated Pell and federal research and development dependence. I include a column for 





percentage of all lobbying to denote the percentage that an institution’s aggregate lobbying 2004-
2014 constituted all institution lobbying.  
Table 18: Top Lobbying Spenders, 2004-2014 
 














Harvard University $1,040,050 1.22% 0.0% 6.9% 
Northwestern University $1,040,657 1.14% 0.2% 15.7% 
Wake Forest University $1,074,202 1.30% 0.1% 15.2% 
University of Southern 
California $1,084,514 1.27% 0.4% 15.5% 
University of Miami $1,109,357 1.29% 0.4% 10.0% 
Boston University $1,210,828 1.49% 0.5% 16.7% 
System 
University of North 
Carolina $1,012,895 1.20% 1.9% 14.8% 
University of Phoenix $1,017,703 1.37% 19.7% 0.0% 
Corinthian Colleges $1,072,807 1.29% 24.8% 0.0% 
University of California $1,109,755 1.36% 1.4% 15.3% 
California State 
University $1,425,035 1.64% 9.5% 3.4% 
State University of New 
York $1,785,736 2.01% 2.8% 9.8% 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
In the case of the two for-profit institutions, the University of Phoenix and Corinthian Colleges, 
very high Pell dependence may be driving these high lobbying expenditures. The remaining 
nonprofit institutions mostly have above-average federal research and development dependence, 
but nothing close to the highest federal research and development dependence institutions listed 
in Table 17. 
 Below I summarize findings from this chapter thus far, which address the first two 







Table 19: Summary of Research Questions and Findings for All Colleges 
Research Questions Findings for all colleges 
1. What are the 
characteristics of American 
colleges that lobby? 
 
37% of colleges ever lobbied (Table 14). The average lobbying 
school spent $123,608 a year doing so. 35% of standalone 
institutions lobbied; 59% of university systems lobbied (Table 
13). 
 
Lobbying colleges were much more likely to be doctoral 
institutions, have a hospital, a medical program, larger 
enrollments and budgets than their non-lobbying counterparts. 
They had higher federal research and development dependence, 
but surprisingly, slightly lower Pell dependence (Table 14). 
 
On average, colleges spent an aggregate of $82 million 
lobbying in a given year; this trend closely followed lobbying 
spending by all industries (Figure 6: College & All Industry 
Lobbying Expenditures, 2004-2014.  
 
On average, 12% of for-profits ever registered to lobby, 
spending a sector total average of $4.4 million across all years 
(Figure 7). The average lobbying for-profit college spent 
$20,485 in a given year.  
 
On average, 44% of public colleges ever registered to lobby, 
spending a total average of $42 million across all years (Figure 
8). The average lobbying public college spent $238,713 in a 
given year. 
 
On average, 21% of private colleges ever registered to lobby, 
spending a total average of $36 million across all years. The 
average lobbying private college spent $160,554 (Figure 9). 
 
Non-lobbying institutions are more Pell dependent (7%) than 
lobbying institutions (5%). Pell matters most to for-profits, 
especially for-profit systems that do not lobby, which have an 
19% Pell dependence, and to for-profit standalones that lobby, 
which have a 14% Pell dependence (Table 14).  
 
Across all colleges, lobbying expenditures decrease as Pell 
dependence increases (Figure 10). The highest Pell-dependent 
institutions are standalone institutions, and mostly religious 
institutions (Table 16). 
 
Federal research and development dependence is highest at 
colleges that lobby, especially lobbying public university 
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systems, which have a 12% federal research and development 
dependence. Other characteristics like being an AAU member, 
a land grant institution, and having a medical program are 
associated with high federal research and development 
dependence. There is slightly higher federal research and 
development dependence at lobbying private standalones and 
lobbying private systems than at their non-lobbying 
counterparts (Table 15). 
 
Across all colleges, lobbying expenditures increase as federal 
research and development dependence increases (Figure 11).  
 
2. How have lobbying 
registration laws and the 
earmark ban affected 
college lobbying in recent 
years? 
 
College expenditure trends slumped continuously after 2010, 
suggesting that like other organizations, colleges ramped down 
their lobbying effort after the earmark ban (Figure 6). 
 
Public college lobbying expenditures increased after 2007, and 
closely followed the availability of federal research and 
development funds rather than changes in lobbying or earmark 
laws (Figure 8). 
 
The connection between private college lobbying and the 
availability of federal research and development funds is not 
very clear. Further, the HLOGA and earmark ban do not seem 
to have affected the way private colleges register to lobby or 
spend on lobbying (Figure 9). 
 
 These descriptive results add new findings to the higher education lobbying literature. 
They are, however, limited in their ability to fully answer the research questions. For example, 
the methods thus far do not let us know how Pell and research and development dependence 
drives lobbying independent of other characteristics, and do not tell us about the independent 
effect of those other characteristics. For example, enrollments might be important in driving 
lobbying since existing research points to the idea that larger organizations lobby more; and 
since Pell is tied to enrollment, enrollment might have a role in increased Pell receipts. Does 
having a doctoral program matter? What about budgets? To get a multivariate sense of what 
predicts lobbying, I next run regressions for all colleges, standalones, and systems. 
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3.4 Hypotheses I & II 
 In this section I describe Hypotheses I and II, how they link to Research Questions 3 and 
4, respectively. I also provide rationales for hypotheses, and describe analytic methods to answer 
the hypotheses.  
Research Question 3 asked “Are for-profit colleges that are more dependent on Pell 
Grants more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so?” It seems likely that for-profit 
colleges, which the results above showed are so heavily dependent on Pell grants, would lobby 
for Pell. The results above showed a trendline suggesting that for-profit lobbying fluctuates with 
the availability of Pell over time. The results also showed that Pell dependence was higher at 
standalone for-profits that that lobbied than those that did not, but lower at for-profit systems that 
lobby compared to those that do not. Running regressions for both types of institutions would 
shed more light on what is happening. Thus, the first hypothesis is Hypothesis I: For-Profit 
Colleges with Higher Pell Grant Dependence Will Lobby More.  
I hypothesize that for-profit colleges with higher Pell Grant dependence will lobby more. 
I ground this hypothesis in two sets of theories. First, resource dependence theory, which implies 
that organizations pursue government resources differently, based on their dependence on those 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003), implies that for-profit colleges organizations lobby for 
student aid dollars. Second, academic capitalism theory (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2002), which 
implies that since universities are already adopting market-seeking behaviors they will use 
lobbying to compete and pursue more funding; this theory seems especially applicable to for-
profit universities, which are owned by corporations. In this section, I hold for-profit college 
lobbying to corporate lobbying metrics: corporate registrations are slightly connected to 
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government spending (Drutman, 2015) and how corporate expenditures increase with 
governmental spending (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Drutman, 2015; Lux, 2011). 
 Initial support for this hypothesis comes from scatterplots. In the figure below, I show the 
bivariate relationship between Pell dependency and lobbying expenditures among all for-profit 
colleges (plot 1), for-profit standalones (plot 2), and for-profit systems (plot 2). 
 
Figure 12: Bivariate relationship between Pell dependency and lobbying expenditures 
among for-profit colleges 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
 
The figure makes clear that there is a slight positive relationship between Pell dependency and 
lobbying expenditures at all types of all for-profit colleges. There were weak correlation 
coefficients: 0.08 for all for-profits; 0.04 for standalone for-profits; 0 for for-profit systems. 
However, no correlations had statistically significant relationships. Thus, there was only initial 
substantive support for Hypothesis I. 
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To more fully answer Hypothesis I, I employ two sets of multivariate analyses. The first 
is a logistic odds ratio regression in which lobbying registrations is dependent variable. The 
second is ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in which lobbying expenditures is the 
dependent variable. In both sets of regressions, Pell dependence and federal research and 
development are the main variables of interest. Public colleges are the baseline college, and I add 
a dummy variable for being a for-profit college (and for being a non-profit private college). This 
analysis should point to the effect of being a for-profit college on lobbying, holding all other 
characteristics constant. The regressions enable me to simultaneously test Hypotheses I and II. I 
simply posit a positive association between for-profit lobbying registrations and expenditures 
and Pell dependence and do not venture to guess if registration is stickier expenditures or vice 
versa.  
 Research Question 4 asked “Are non-profit colleges that are more dependent on research 
and development more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so?” I hypothesize that non-
profit colleges with higher federal research and development dependence will lobby more. The 
results above showed that federal research and development dependence is highest at colleges 
that lobby, especially lobbying public university systems, and that other characteristics like being 
an AAU member, being a land grant institution, and having a medical program are associated 
with higher federal research and development dependence. Also, across all colleges, lobbying 
expenditures increase as federal research and development dependence increases (Figure 11). 
Thus, the second hypothesis is Hypothesis II: Non-Profit Colleges with Higher Federal Research 
and Development Dependence Will Lobby More.  
I ground this hypothesis in three sets of theories. First, resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) suggests that organizations pursue government resources differently 
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due to their dependence on those resources, and implies for this hypothesis that non-profit 
universities will lobby for federal research and development dollars. Second, academic 
capitalism theory (Slaughter & Rhoades, 2002) implies that since universities are already 
adopting market-seeking behaviors to seek resources, they will use lobbying to compete for and 
pursue more funding. Third, memetic isomorphism suggests that organizations facing uncertainty 
adopt the behavior of organizations seen as stable and legitimate (see DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977); here, universities facing uncertain funding streams will lobby for more 
money, and will look to the successful corporate sector to model lobbying behavior. 
 This hypothesis is based on corporate lobbying metrics finding that a) corporate 
registrations are slightly connected to government spending (Drutman, 2015) and that b) 
corporate expenditures rise with governmental spending (Drutman, 2015; Lux, 2011).  
It is based on the finding in the non-profit lobbying literature that non-profit 
organizations that receive governmental funding lobby more than those that do not (Berry, 2003; 
Chaves et al, 2004; Leroux and Goerdel, 2009; Salamon et al, 2008) and that non-profit lobbying 
spending is growing in recent years (Boris and Maronick, 2012). 
It is based on the fact that research and development from federal government are 
essential to non-profit college and university operations; from 2010 to 2014 such funds 
accounted for the majority (56%) of all higher education research and development expenditures 
(Britt, 2015). 
It is also based on the finding in the higher education lobbying literature that non-profit 
colleges spent money on lobbying in pursuit of research and development dollars (see Brackett, 
2016; de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Marsicano, 2019). The literature, however, does little 
to distinguish the lobbying behavior by private non-profit and public institutions on the federal 
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level. This is likely in part because the higher education lobbying research is underdeveloped and 
also because federal funding is sector-agnostic: Pell grants are ported by the student, and public 
and private colleges are treated equally for research funds.  
 Initial support for Hypothesis II comes from scatterplots. In the figure below, I show the 
bivariate relationship between federal research and development dependence and lobbying 
expenditures among all non-profit colleges (plot 1), non-profit standalones (plot 2), and non-
profit systems (plot 3). 
 
Figure 13: Bivariate relationship between federal research and development 
dependence and lobbying expenditures among non-profit colleges 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
The figure makes clear that there is a strong positive relationship between federal research and 
development dependence and lobbying expenditures at all types of all non-profit colleges. There 
was a 0.53 correlation at all non-profits (p < 0.001); 0.51 at standalone non-profits (p < 0.001); 
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0.53 at non-profit systems (p < 0.001)—supporting Hypothesis II. I next explore these 
relationships with a multivariate model. 
3.4.1 Variables in Regression Models 
 In this section I describe each regression variable, rationale for inclusion, and 
expectations of regression outcomes.  
• Pell Grant dependence. This is the independent variable of interest for Hypothesis I. 
Pell Grant dependence is percentage of a college’s aggregated budget comprised of Pell 
Grant dollars. I focus on this variable because research shows that for-profits are highly 
Pell-dependent (Kelchen, 2017) that for-profit colleges lobby for Pell dollars (Mettler, 
2014); my findings above show Pell matters most to for-profits, including at for-profit 
standalones that lobby, which have a 14% Pell dependence. The scatterplots in the 
previous section also showed a weak positive relationship between Pell dependence and 
lobbying expenditures at all types of for-profit colleges. So, I expect the multivariate 
models to show that Pell dependence predicts lobbying at for-profit colleges. 
• Federal research and development dependence. This is the independent variable of 
interest for Hypothesis II. It is the percentage of a college’s budget comprised of federal 
research and development dollars in a given year. I focus on this variable because 
research consistently shows an association between non-profit college lobbying and 
research: top-tier non-profit colleges lobbied to increase the research and development 
“pie” (de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006) and research institutions were more likely to 
file a lobbying report and accounted for ¾ of lobbying expenditures during a similar time 
frame (Marsicano, 2019). My findings above show federal research and development 
dependence is highest at colleges that lobby, especially lobbying public university 
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systems, which have a 12% federal research and development dependence. I also find 
that across all colleges, lobbying expenditures increase as federal research and 
development dependence increases, and that federal research and development 
dependence is important to non-profit institutions, especially public colleges. The 
scatterplots in the previous section also showed a strong positive relationship between 
federal research and development dependence lobbying expenditures at all types of non-
profit colleges. I expect the multivariate models to show that federal research and 
development dependence increases with more lobbying at public colleges, and possibly at 
private colleges. 
• Being a private college. I include this variable to indicate any effect of being a private 
non-profit college, holding all else constant. Existing research tends to group all non-
profit colleges together (Cook, 1998; de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006) or finds that 
public and private colleges register and spend on lobbying at fairly similar rates 
(Marsicano, 2019). My initial findings above show slightly higher federal research and 
development dependence at lobbying private standalones and lobbying private systems 
than at their non-lobbying counterparts. Given these weak findings for private colleges, 
the effect of being a private college may not be substantively or statistically significant.  
• Being a for-profit institution. Existing research shows that for-profits are highly Pell-
dependent (Kelchen, 2017) that for-profit colleges lobby for Pell dollars (Mettler, 2014); 
my findings above show Pell matters most to for-profits, especially for-profit systems 
that do not lobby, which have an 19% Pell dependence, and to for-profit standalones that 
lobby, which have a 14% Pell dependence. The scatterplots above suggest that for-profits 
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with higher Pell dependence lobby more. I expect that being a for-profit will be 
associated with a higher odds of registering to lobby and higher lobbying expenditures. 
• Being a land-grant institution. Existing research shows that land grant institutions were 
among the first ever to band together to lobby (Cook, 1998). Land grants lobby for 
increased NSF and NIH budgets, as well as for earmarked funds (until they were banned 
for non-profit institutions in 2011) (Marsicano, 2019). I find that lobbying land grants 
standalones have a quite high federal research and development dependence of 13% and 
lobbying land grant systems of 14%. I expect that this variable will be positively related 
to lobbying in the multivariate models. 
• Being a Historically Black College or Universities (HBCU) institution. Not much 
existing research looks into lobbying by HBCUs; this could be because outside groups 
like United Negro College Fund lobby for Pell increases for the benefit of students at 
HBCUs (Loss, 2012). I find that Pell grants seem to be an important source of funding for 
HBCUs, comprising 10% of their budgets at non-lobbying HBCU standalones at 15% at 
non-lobbying HBCU systems, but lower at lobbying HBCUs. Federal research and 
development dependence was slightly higher at lobbying HBCUs. Given these mixed 
findings, and the overall sense that Pell dependence might not be a very strong predictor 
of lobbying, I do not think that being an HBCU will be significantly related to lobbying. 
• Being a doctoral doctoral-level institution. De Figueiredo and Silverman (2006) include 
this variable in their study; as a proxy for research-heavy schools, I find that lobbying 
doctoral institutions have higher federal research and development dependence, so I 




• Being a member of the Association of American Universities (AAU). AAU members are 
research intensive institutions and have been found to lobby even after the earmark ban 
(Marsicano, 2019). I find that among all other characteristics, federal research and 
development dependence is highest among colleges that are AAU members, at 16% for 
lobbying AAU members. So, I expect this variable to be associated with more lobbying 
in the multivariate models. 
• Having a hospital. Boris and Maronick (2012) found that “Health, education, and human 
services organizations represent the bulk (73 percent) of reported lobbying expenses;” 
they note that “Non-profit hospitals are on the defensive, making the case for maintaining 
their charitable status and against charges that they are too commercial.” I find that 
lobbying institutions with a hospital have much higher federal research and development 
dependence than non-lobbying institutions with a hospital. These findings together 
suggest that in multivariate models, institutions with hospitals will lobby more.  
• Having a medical program. This variable should closely relate to the hospital variable. 
From 2005 to 2014, higher education institutions with a medical program were more 
likely to file a lobbying report (Marsicano, 2019). I find that lobbying institutions with a 
medical program have much high federal research and development dependence than 
those that do not lobby and so expect this variable to be positively associated with 
lobbying. 
• Estimated full-time equivalent (FTE) undergraduate enrollment. This variable represents 
size of an institution: schools with higher enrollments should have larger budgets and 
more capacity to lobby. Existing research shows that enrollments at for-profit colleges 
increased over the past decades (Deming et al 2012), and among non-profit colleges, a 
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strong connection between increasing enrollments and increased likelihood of lobbying 
(Marsicano, 2019). In the multivariate models, I expect enrollment to be positively 
associated with lobbying registrations and expenditures. 
• Total institutional budget. I include this variable because it seems like larger colleges 
will lobby more. I base this on research showing that companies with higher levels of 
government sales and contracts had higher levels of lobbying expenditures (Lux, 2011), 
and showing that larger companies tend to lobby more (Drutman, 2015). As is probably 
the case with enrollment, schools with higher budgets likely have capacity to afford a 
lobbyist. In the multivariate models, I expect enrollment to be positively associated with 
lobbying.   
• Lobbying registrations. This is the first of two dependent variables. I examine this 
variable—whether or not a college filed lobbying report in a given year—because it is a 
good indicator of whether a college cares to lobby in a given year, and because much 
lobbying research uses this metric (e.g., Baumgartner et al, 2009; LaPira, 2015; Leech et. 
al., 2005; Marsicano, 2019) or the similar metric of number of lobbyists (Drutman, 2015). 
I expect that a positive association between Pell dependence and registrations would 
support Possibility 3 because it will show that for-profit colleges care enough about Pell 
grants to register to lobby, implying that like corporations, for-profit colleges dependent 
on government funding lobby.  
• Lobbying expenditures. This is the second of two dependent variables. This variable 
represents “how much” a college cares to lobby. Much lobbying research focuses on 
expenditures (e.g., Baumgartner & Leech, 2001 de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; 
Drutman, 2015; LaPira, 2015; Leech et. al., 2005; Marsicano, 2019). I expect that a 
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positive association between Pell dependence and expenditures, implying that like 
corporations, colleges dependent on government funding lobby in response to the 
availability of Pell Grants and federal research and development dependence.  
 
In the multivariate models I expect a positive association between non-profit colleges’ 
overall lobbying registrations/expenditures32 and federal research and development grants, and 
do not make any claims about differences between public versus private colleges. I will, 
however, add a controlling variable for private colleges to determine their independent effect 
from public colleges, which are the baseline group. 
3.4.2 Logistic Odds Ratio Models 
 This set of models shows which factors predict the decision to lobby among all colleges 
(Model IA), standalone institutions (Model IB), and university systems (Model IC) using logistic 
odds ratio models. 
Models IA, IB, IC 
Table 20: Logistic Odds Ratio Models Predicting Registration to Lobby  
 IA All IB Standalone IC System 
 b/se b/se b/se 
Registered to lobby    
R&D $/budget 192.69** 196.61** 0.00 
 (358.24) (368.83) (0.01) 
Pell $/budget 0.04** 0.03** 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) 
Private College 1.85*** 1.91*** 0.29 
 (0.34) (0.37) (0.37) 
For-Profit College 0.60 0.36** 1.11 
 (0.18) (0.14) (1.52) 
                                                 
32 I do not venture to guess whether registrations or expenditures are “stickier.” Drutman (2015) discusses 
“stickiness” as companies that register to lobby tend to stay registered. Lux's (2011) findings imply that companies 
may adjust their lobbying expenditures may adjust based on the availability of public funds. 
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Land Grant college 0.96 0.79 3.18 
 (0.40) (0.37) (11.76) 
HBCU 3.72*** 4.25*** 0.47 
 (0.99) (1.17) (1.10) 
Doctoral institution 2.17** 1.68 5.59 
 (0.64) (0.52) (7.33) 
AAU member 4.02 4.59 1.00 
 (6.14) (8.19) (.) 
Hospital 2.53* 2.25* 0.47 
 (0.93) (0.88) (1.58) 
Medical program 1.22 1.10 1.00 
 (0.45) (0.41) (.) 
Enrollment/1,000 1.31*** 1.30*** 2.48* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (1.01) 
Budget/$100m 1.08 1.10 0.84 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.66) 
Constant 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.39 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.61) 
r2_p 0.24 0.22 0.48 
N 1956 1826 94 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
 
 Across all three models, there were statistically significant relationships between the 
decision to register to lobby and the independent variables of interest (federal research and 
development dependence and Pell dependence) at all colleges (Model IA), at standalone colleges 
(Model IB), but not at university systems (Model IC). I next describe relationships that predict 
the decision to lobby within each model.  
 Model IA suggests that among all colleges, a 10% increase in federal research and 
development dependence is associated with a 9.3% increase in the odds of registering to lobby (p 
< 0.01); a 10% increase in Pell dependence is associated with a 0.096% decrease in the odds of 
registering to lobby (p < 0.01). The odds of registering to lobby increase by 85% if a college is 
private as compared to a public college (p < 0.001); increase by 372% if a college is a HBCU (p 
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< 0.05); increase by 217% if a college is a doctoral institution (p < 0.01); increase by 253% if a 
college has a hospital (p < 0.05); increase by 31% with each 1,000 student increase in enrollment 
(p < 0.001). 
 When we look at standalone colleges in Model IB, the odds of registering to lobby are 
roughly similar as for all colleges, in the previous model. This is likely due to the fact that 
standalone colleges constitute 93% of all colleges. Specifically, among standalone colleges, 
holding all else constant, a 10% increase in federal research and development dependence is 
associated with a 9.7% increase in the odds of registering to lobby (p < 0.01); a 10% increase in 
Pell dependence is associated with a 0.097% decrease in the odds of registering to lobby (p < 
0.01). The odds of registering to lobby increase by 91% if a college is private as compared to a 
public college (p < 0.001); decrease by 84% if a college is for-profit as compared to a public 
college (p < 0.01); increase by 425% if a college is a HBCU (p < 0.001); increase by 225% if a 
college has a hospital (p < 0.05); increase by 30% with each 1,000 student increase in enrollment 
(p < 0.001). Being a doctoral institution is no longer significant, while being a for-profit college 
is now significant.  
 Model IC suggests that among university systems, all variables except enrollment drop 
out. Holding all else constant, the odds of registering to lobby are 248% more likely with each 
1,000 student increase in enrollment (p < 0.05), which is nearly double the odds of the previous 
two models, underscoring the political importance of large enrollments at university systems.  
3.4.3 OLS Models 
 While the logistic models revealed factors that predict the decision to lobby, the next set 




Models IIA, IIB, IIC 





















 IIA All IIB Standalone IIC System  
 b/se b/se b/se  
     
R&D $/budget 242629*** 293595*** -132166  
 (61104) (44900) (550966)  
Pell $/budget 24817 -1218 -6442  
 (34258) (25540) (291043)  
Private College 2678 21067*** -169002*  
 (6613) (4832) (69492)  
For-Profit College 16392 16335* -47546  
 (9289) (7021) (79886)  
Land Grant college -2785 -21841* -105669  
 (12361) (10160) (71709)  
HBCU -5465 6986 -60199  
 (11019) (8012) (115988)  
Doctoral institution 81298*** 40002*** 206690*  
 (10424) (7862) (86881)  
AAU member 250712*** 78301*** 434034***  
 (18957) (17572) (95700)  
Hospital 53817*** -1663 -11221  
 (12287) (9980) (86049)  
Medical program 49788*** 38311*** 35946  
 (11918) (8928) (89659)  
Enrollment/1,000 3716*** 4175*** 3747  
 (716) (530) (6629)  
Budget/$100m 3415*** 9213*** -9742  
 (726) (604) (7606)  
Constant -3173 -20711*** 177944*  
 (7244) (5297) (85940)  
r2 0.54 0.61 0.51  
N 1956 1826 130  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001   
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Models IIA and IIB show that lobbying expenditures increase as research and 
development dependence increases, but Pell dependence is no longer significant. More 
specifically, Model IIA suggests that across all 1,956 colleges, holding all else constant, 
lobbying expenditures increase $242,629 as with every percentage point increase in federal 
research and development dependence (p < 0.001); increase $81,298 if a college is a doctoral 
institution (p < 0.001); increase $250,712 if a college is an AAU member (p < 0.001); increase 
$53,817 if a college has a hospital (p < 0.001); increase $49,788 if a college has a medical 
program (p < 0.001); increase by $3,716 with each 1,000 student increase in enrollment (p < 
0.001); increase by $3,415 with each $100 million increase in budget (p < 0.001). 
 Model IIB suggests that among standalone colleges, which constitute 93% of all colleges, 
things are quite different. Holding all else constant, lobbying expenditures increase $293,595 
with every percentage point increase in federal research and development dependence (p < 
0.001), a small increase compared to all colleges; increase $21,067 if a college is a private 
institution (p < 0.001), a new variable of significance; increase $16,355 if a college is a for-profit 
institution (p < 0.05), a new variable of significance; decrease $21,841 if a college is a land grant 
institution (p < 0.05), a new variable of significance; increase $40,002 if a college is a doctoral 
institution (p < 0.001), a decrease of almost half compared to the all-college model; increase 
$78,301 if a college is an AAU member (p < 0.001), a huge decrease compared to the all-college 
model; increase $38,311 if a college has a medical program (p < 0.001) a slight decrease 
compared to the all-college model; increase by $4,175 with each 1,000 student increase in 
enrollment (p < 0.001), a slight increase compared to the all-college model; increase by $9,213 
with each $100 million increase in budget (p < 0.001), a big increase compared to the all-college 
model. Having a hospital was no longer a significant predictor of lobbying expenditures. 
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 Model IIC suggests that among university systems, holding all else constant, lobbying 
expenditures greatly increased for three variables that were significant in the previous model. As 
with the odds ratio models for university systems, many variables drop out. Lobbying 
expenditures decrease $169,002 if a college is a private institution (p < 0.05), a huge decrease 
compared to the standalone college model; increase $206,690 if a college is a doctoral institution 
(p < 0.05), a huge increase compared to the standalone college model; increase $434,034 if a 
college is an AAU member (p < 0.001) a huge increase compared to the standalone college 
model. Notably, none of the other variables were significant in predicting lobbying expenditures 
at university systems. I was surprised that research and development dependence was no longer a 
predictor of lobbying expenditures, although being a doctoral institution and being an AAU 
member were more important drivers of lobbying and likely are proxies for research-dependent 
institutions. 
 In conclusion, across all six sets of models, a few variables stood out as important in 
predicting lobbying. Being a doctoral institution and being an AAU member were important 
factors in predicting whether a college lobbied and how much it did so. I was surprised that the 
budget variable was not consistently a predictor of lobbying registrations and expenditures, since 
budget (per $100 million) should be an indicator of institutional capacity to lobby. However, 
enrollment was a consistent predictor in nearly every model. Enrollment is closely correlated to 
budget, and its predictive ability supports my contention that lobbying may be in part driven not 
just by capacity or dollar-seeking, but by the human factor: the presence of large numbers of 
students on campus presents a range of issues and interests that intersect with government, 
especially at the local level. This hints at a more complex story, in which local governmental 
lobbying may spiral up and connect to federal lobbying. Additionally, the fact that private 
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colleges were more likely to lobby and spent more doing so than public colleges—despite private 
colleges’ lower research and development dependence—further suggests that colleges lobby for 
more reasons than securing federal funding. Together, these models provide some basis for 
further explorations via qualitative methods in the next chapter.  
Table 22: Summary of Findings for Research Questions 3 and 4 
Research 
Questions 
Findings and Support for Hypothesis 
3. Are for-profit colleges 
that are more dependent 
on Pell Grants more likely 
to lobby and spend more 
money doing so? 
Hypothesis I: For-Profit Colleges with Higher Pell Grant 
Dependence Will Lobby More.  
 
Pell’s importance to for-profits depends on type of institution: Pell 
matters most for-profit systems that do not lobby, which have an 
19% Pell dependence, and to for-profit standalones that lobby, 
which have a 14% Pell dependence (Table 15). 
 
When grouping together all types of for-profits, there were weak, 
statistically insignificant correlations between Pell dependency 
and lobbying expenditures at all types of all for-profit colleges 
(Figure 10). 
 
Among all colleges, holding all else constant, a 10% increase in 
Pell dependence is associated with a 0.096% decrease in the odds 
of registering to lobby (p < 0.01) (Table 20). 
 
Among standalone colleges, holding all else constant, lobbying 
expenditures increase $16,355 if a college is a for-profit 
institution (p < 0.05) (Table 21). 
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4. Are non-profit colleges 
that are more dependent 
on research and 
development more likely 
to lobby and spend more 
money doing so? 
Hypothesis II: Non-Profit Colleges with Higher Federal Research 
and Development Dependence Will Lobby More 
 
Federal research and development dependence is highest at 
colleges that lobby, especially lobbying public university systems, 
which have a 12% federal research and development dependence 
(Table 15). 
 
There were strong, positive correlations between federal research 
and development dependence and lobbying expenditures at all 
types of all non-profit colleges (Figure 13). 
 
Among all colleges, holding all else constant, the odds of 
registering to lobby increase by 85% if a college is private as 
compared to a public college (p < 0.001) (Table 20). 
 
Among standalone colleges, holding all else constant, the odds of 
registering to lobby increase by 91% if a college is private as 
compared to a public college (p < 0.001) (Table 20). 
 
Among standalone colleges, holding all else constant, lobbying 
expenditures increase $21,067 if a college is a private institution 
(p < 0.001) (Table 21). 
 
However, among systems, holding all else constant, lobbying 
expenditures decrease $169,002 if a college is a private institution 
(p < 0.05) (Table 21). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Overall, my findings align with the corporate lobbying literature finding that lobbying 
expenditures rise with more governmental spending (Drutman, 2015; Lux, 2011). They also 
align with the non-profit lobbying literature finding that non-profit organizations that receive 
governmental funding lobby more than those that do not (Berry, 2003; Chaves et al, 2004; 
Leroux and Goerdel, 2009; Salamon et al, 2008). Together, the results support Hypotheses I and 
II, with important qualifications.  
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I would not say that there is much direct support for Hypothesis I, let alone strong 
support. This is because of mixed findings: Pell matters most to for-profit systems that do not 
lobby, which have an 19% Pell dependence, and to for-profit standalones that lobby, which have 
a 14% Pell dependence. The regression models showed that among standalones, the odds of 
registering decrease if a college is for-profit, but lobbying expenditures increase if a college is 
for-profit.  
I would say that there is stronger support for Hypothesis II. Although the regression 
models group together for-profit and non-profit colleges (with dummy variables for for-profit 
and private colleges), non-profit colleges comprise 91% of all colleges in the database, and 
comprise 97% of all colleges that lobby (see Table 12), so the regression findings are very 
applicable to non-profit institutions. My findings align with the higher education lobbying 
literature in that I find that federal research and development funding predicts lobbying, as was 
found by Marsicano (2019). I found interesting results regarding private colleges: they tend to 
lobby more and spend more on lobbying than their public counterparts, despite lower federal 
research and development dependence, suggesting that additional factors drive private college 
lobbying. 
There are additional results of note: land grant standalones spend more on lobbying than 
non-land grant standalones. HBCUs generally register to lobby more than non-HBCUs. Doctoral 
institutions register more and spend more than non-doctoral institutions. AAU members spent 
much more than non-AAU members. Institutions with hospitals generally registered more and 
spent more than institutions without hospitals. Schools with medical programs generally spent 
more than those without medical programs. Schools with higher enrollments and budgets 
generally registered and spent more than those with lower enrollments and budgets--aligning 
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with the non-profit literature finding that larger non-profits lobby more than smaller non-profits 
(DeVita et al, 2014).  
In Chapter 2, I raised additional questions that this chapter was not able to answer. 
Specifically, how colleges lobby for the “pie, then the slice”—how funding is accessed at 
increasingly specific stages of the policy process. That process includes not only big “let’s boost 
the size of the NIH budget” lobbying, but also more campus-specific requests such as earmarks 
(funding tailored for a specific project on campus) and agency lobbying (when a college lobbies 
an agency for renewal of funding for a project on campus). Collective action dilemmas like free 
riding may be inherent in this process. Indeed, the mixed results regarding Pell among for-profits 
may be because Pell is collective good that benefits all students and all colleges equally. It seems 
possible that for-profit colleges would not expend much effort lobbying for Pell even if they 
heavily depend upon it. In its federal-only focus, this chapter may miss out on more local level 
lobbying, and lobbying for/in response to other reasons besides federal dollars. 
The results of this chapter make new contributions regarding the quantitative connection 
between lobbying and ostensible outcomes, but we will have to turn to the next chapter to 
understand how that lobbying effort is distributed along the policy process, and if there are 









Chapter 4: An Inside Look at the Process of Higher Education 
Lobbying: Timing, Topics, and Tactics 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In Chapter 3, I provided a quantitative look on how American colleges and universities 
lobby at the federal level, and the ways that lobbying resembles the lobbying of corporate and 
non-profit organizations. I found weak evidence suggesting that for-profits lobby more as Pell 
dependence increases, and strong evidence suggesting that non-profit colleges lobby more as 
federal research and development dependence increases. The results, however, did not address 
the remaining four research questions, and in fact raised a new question about what is driving the 
connections in the quantitative data. 
Specifically, the data alone could not provide an understanding of how colleges make 
lobbying decisions—what drove that annual decision to lobby? Why did a college spend more in 
one year versus another? In this chapter, therefore, I turn to qualitative methods to reveal more 
about those concerns and address the assumption that funding is connected to lobbying. To do 
so, I rely on interviews, a news analysis, my own experience as a lobbyist to investigate the 
crucial role of timing and to investigate topics besides funding that may motivate colleges to 
lobby and the tactics that they use to lobby. The goal of this chapter is to contextualize and give a 
more nuanced interpretation of Chapter 3 data. My hope is that the results will yield a picture of 
the process, in addition to the product, of lobbying. Throughout this chapter, I gather evidence to 
test the two exploratory hypotheses: Hypothesis III states that all sector spending and registration 
is positively correlated with media coverage of accountability regulations; Hypothesis IV states 
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that public, private, and for profits employ similar lobbying tactics, with for-profits relying more 
on direct tactics. 
4.2 Unanswered Questions  
 In this section I address five questions: one new question arising from Chapter 3, and the 
four remaining research questions that Chapter 3 did not address. In attempting to answer them, I 
generate new findings and collect evidence to explore Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
 The first question is new, and is about funding. In Chapter 3, I found some evidence 
supporting the connection between for-profit lobbying and Pell dependence while controlling for 
student enrollment and for budget. Theoretically, it seems like for-profit colleges could receive 
Pell grants by boosting enrollments, and that lobbying might not be necessary. Why would a for-
profit college lobby for Pell grants if the grants are allocated to students—not the institution? If 
there is no way to differentially secure funding, why would formula-driven funding like Pell 
prompt more lobbying? In the same vein, is there anything special about federal research and 
development funding to non-profit colleges? If all non-profit colleges are equally eligible for 
federal research and development funds, why would this funding motivate a college to do more 
lobbying? In other words, why would colleges lobby for something that they seem to get from 
government in a pro forma way? 
 The second question is about free riding and is one of the original research questions. In 
Chapter 3 I found overall evidence that colleges more dependent on Pell grants and federal 
research and development are more likely to lobby, and spend more doing so, and found some 
evidence that larger and wealthier colleges lobby more. But what about colleges that do not 
spend as much, but still receive funding? Does lobbying by bigger spenders increase the size of 
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the federal funding pie, allowing lower spenders to free ride? In other words, Research Question 
5 asks, why would an individual college lobby if others are taking action?  
 The third question is about topics besides funding that drive lobbying, concerns one of 
the original research questions. In Chapter 2, the literature on cultural tides moving against 
higher education led me to surmise that colleges are on the defensive, and might lobby to 
preserve their stakes. Colleges might specifically lobby against accountability measures that raise 
the cost of doing business, especially high-profile measures mentioned in the media. Indeed, for-
profits like ITT Technical Institute were shut down by the federal government for defrauding 
students, which was widely covered in the press. In Chapter 2 I also mentioned that 
organizations may band together to lobby for reasons beyond material goods: solidary or 
purposeful motivations may also drive lobbying. Is this tendency common in higher education? 
Clearly, there are many dynamics besides seeking Pell and federal research and development 
funding during this 11-year time frame that might drive lobbying behavior. This leads me to 
wonder, as Research Question 6 asks, how do external pressures like media attention affect 
lobbying? Exploring this question will help answer Hypothesis III, which states that all sector 
spending and registration is positively correlated with media coverage of accountability 
regulations. 
 The fourth question, also a research question posed earlier, is about the tactics that 
lobbyists use. In Chapter 2, research indicated that corporations tended to use direct tactics, and 
that colleges lobby use direct and indirect tactics and hired in-house lobbyists (Cook, 1998; 
Ferrin, 2005). If colleges are lobbying more like corporations in terms of their lobbying 
registrations and spending, what can qualitative methods tell us about the more recent tactics that 
they use? Do they align with corporate tactics? More research is needed to answer what Research 
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Question 7 asks: Which tactics do colleges use to lobby? Exploring this question will help test 
Hypothesis IV, which states that public, private, and for profits employ similar lobbying tactics, 
with for-profits relying more on direct tactics. 
 The final remaining question is the question central to this study: do colleges lobby like 
corporations?  The proceeding chapters provide indicators and sub-questions to get at this 
central question, but there might be value in asking lobbying professionals and government 
officials this question straightforwardly. That is the value of interviews—to understand the 
human decisions that underlie the numbers. The additional methods of this chapter—interviews 
and news analysis—contribute to answering that larger question. I detail those methods next. 
4.3 Methods 
 
 In this section I describe two qualitative data sources: interviews and a news analysis. I 
detail how I harnessed these data, and provide an overview of how these data are organized. 
Together, the qualitative data sources contribute to an “inside look” at higher education 
lobbying. 
4.4. Data Sources 
 
4.4.1 Data Source 1: Qualitative Interviews 
 
In 2017 and 2020, I conducted a total of 20 in-depth, semi-structured interviews of New 
York state-based lobbyists for public, private, and for-profit colleges and of legislators and 
legislative staff members with experience interacting with colleges.33 College lobbyists 
                                                 
33 In-depth interviews are used when a researcher seeks “rich and detailed information. . . examples, experiences, for 
narratives and stories,” and questions are open ended and not fixed (Rubin, 2012:29).  In semistructured interviews, 
“the researcher has a specific topic to learn about, prepares a limited number of questions in advance, and plans to 
ask follow-up questions” (Rubin, 2012: 31). I began by purposefully targeting lobbyists within my professional 
network. Purposeful sampling is a nonrandom sampling method “in which particular settings, persons, or activities 
are selected deliberately in order to provide information that can’t be gotten as well from other choices” (Maxwell, 




implement day-to-day lobbying activities and adjust resources and tactics of their colleges. In 
other words, they should know how and why their colleges lobby. Interviewees hail from all 
three sectors, and include “for-hire” contract lobbyists who represent multiple colleges and other 
clients. The college lobbyists are from the State University of New York (SUNY) system, the 
City University of New York (CUNY), private colleges, and for-profit colleges. Although 
lobbyists are bounded within New York State, the interviews reveal that most handle a mix of 
city, state, and federal lobbying. This sheds light on the interplay of federal and state funding, 
which gets increasingly specific through the policy process. Legislators and their staff offer the 
mirror-image perspective, because they are the recipients of lobbying efforts. I specifically 
targeted state legislators and staff members who are on education and higher education 
committees, in positions of leadership, or have a diversity of higher education institutions in their 
district, for a total of three legislators and two staff members. I use interviews primarily to 
extract the substance behind the numbers via quotations and stories, and occasionally summarize 
coded data to observe initial descriptive numerical patterns. The table below shows the 
breakdown of interviewee characteristics.  







(n=5)  (n=15) 
Years of professional 
experience (mean; range) 13; 1-29 16; 5-37 
Gender female  60% 60% 
Sector   
Public 5 (33%) N/A 
Private 5 (33%) N/A 
For-profit 5 (33%) N/A 
                                                 
fellow lobbyist facilitated. Then, I added additional interviewees via a snowball sample. A snowball sample grows 
the interviewee sample by identifying “cases of interest from people who know people who know what cases are 
information-rich” (Creswell, 2007, p. 127). 
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% of time state-focused 70% N/A 
% of time federally-focused 30% N/A 
Legislator N/A 3 
Legislative staff N/A 2 
 
 See Appendix B for a template invitation email, interview questions, and IRB-approved 
informed consent form. Interviewees are anonymous but below I make general reference to their 
positions to give a sense of their role (e.g. “a lobbyist for a large private college”) and provide 
their anonymous code. I took hand-written notes, but all but two interviews were also recorded 
and transcribed, per the wishes of interviewees. All interviews were coded by me in Excel to 
consistently track lobbying tactics, rationales, and responses to other questions. I created tables 
with headers to account for interviewee characteristics, sector of college, level of government, 
and lobbying rationales and tactics, presented in the findings section.  
Interviews were coded using the “constant comparative method” (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), which allows for analysis of data as it is collected and comparison to new data as it is 
collected (Creswell, 2007; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). I transcribed interviews and created a coding 
regimen based on patterns observed in the literature and added new codes informed by my 
experience as a lobbyist. Tactics in the results section are flagged as “direct” or “indirect” tactics 
established in the literature (see Kollman, 1998). For example, tactics were coded as “direct” if 
they were in the vein of personal contact with a member of the legislature regarding a specific 
piece of legislation. Tactics were coded as “indirect” if they were broader appeals to the public to 
influence policy, such as working with the press or doing letter-writing campaigns.  
Interviews are a powerful tool because they allow us to get to the thinking behind the 
lobbying. The approximately 45-minute interviews included multiple questions and probes to get 
at the same topics. My questions were informed by my role as an insider in the bounded world of 
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New York college lobbying, contrasting with previous literature, which mostly lacks the 
practitioner perspective. The interviews promise to reveal more about the process, not just the 
outcomes, of lobbying.  
4.4.2 Data Source 2: News Reports 
 
I read and digested approximately 200 randomly-selected news articles on higher 
education lobbying dated 2004-2014 to track higher education lobbying rationales and tactics 
across the 50 states—providing more detail on how and why colleges lobby. I gathered articles 
on higher education lobbying electronically via the Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe U.S. 
Newspapers database. A total of 4,461 articles resulted from a search of the terms ’“higher 
education ’and ‘lobbying’”, generating a mean of 405 and a median of 419 per year. The annual 
number of articles as a result of this search are shown below: 
Table 24: Overview of 200 Randomly Selected News Articles About College Lobbying 
Universe Search terms Selection process Total number of 
articles per year 
U.S. Newspapers as 
retrieved from 
LexisNexus Academic  
“higher education” and 
“lobbying" and 
geographic(united states) 
20 articles per year. 















Many articles were not news per se (e.g., were editorials or press releases) so I re-ran the number 
generator until I could find 20 relevant articles per each of the 11 years. I then coded news 
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reports to track name of institution, sector, lobbying rationale, and lobbying tactic. This analysis 
provides valuable data on college lobbying across time and geography, complementing my other 
two data sources. 
 Most news coverage related to lobbying at the state level. Twenty six percent of coverage 
(news mentions, which may occur more than once in an article) related to federal-level lobbying. 
Within that, 24% regarded public, 7% private, 14% for-profit, 55% all sectors. The state 
mentions were much more about public colleges (81%); the coverage split is shown in the figure 
below.  
 
Figure 14: News Mentions of Higher Education by Federal and State Government 
News reports were also coded using the “constant comparative method” (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). I created a coding regimen based on patterns observed in literature (e.g., types of 
governmental threats and opportunities), and added new codes using open coding. My coding 
strategy was the following: after reading an article, I generated a one sentence, familiar language 
summary of the tactic. I then reduced that sentence to a one-word term to generate a list of 
consistently coded tactics and rationales. These coded terms are my own, informed by my 
experience as a lobbyist, and often align with the existing lobbying literature.   
All tactics are further refined into direct or indirect tactics as established in the literature 
(see Kollman, 1998). Some tactics, like “Coalition” and “Media” align with the “tried and true” 
tactics in Table 2 of Chapter 2. Some are unique to higher education and are flagged as direct or 
 
127 
indirect tactics. For example, the direct lobbying code “President” was distilled from a one-
sentence summary like “UF president travels state lobbying legislators” while the code “Student 
advocacy” was distilled from a sentence like “student advocacy campaign - hashtag and 
meetings with legislators.” The indirect code “Affiliate” was distilled from a sentence like 
“Council on Postsecondary Education passed a resolution urging the Assembly to find more 
funding.” These sentences are themselves distillations of the actual news article. 
The news analysis’s main strength is breadth. It covers a significant amount of time (11 
years) and a broad geography (the 50 states). This longitudinal news analysis allows me to detect 
any peaks or valleys in rationales and tactics, and to look at commonalities despite different state 
lobbying idiosyncrasies.  
4.5 Results 
 
4.5.1 Lobbying Through the Stages of the Policy Process 
 
In Chapter 3, I primarily focused on an ostensible product of lobbying: funding, which 
was assumed to drive lobbying and underlie the first two hypotheses. In this section, I aim to 
provide an inside look at the process of higher education lobbying, drawing from interviews, my 
own experience, and the news analysis. Next, I address the new questions arising from Chapter 
3. 
Why would colleges lobby for something that they seem to get from government in a pro forma 
way? 
Although Pell grants are enrollment-based and there seems to be no way for one college 
to differentially receive more than another (besides expanding enrollment), I think it is important 
to consider Pell and federal research and development funds in the context of other funding 
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streams—from the point of the of the campus-based lobbyist who lobbies in large coalitions in 
the hopes of receiving funding to their campus. From my experience as a lobbyist, almost any 
funding is good funding. This may also explain why non-profit colleges may lobby for federal 
research and development dollars, which seem “pro forma” because all such colleges are all 
equally eligible. Although I quantitatively explored and provided results to answer research 
questions 3 and 4 (“Are for-profit colleges that are more dependent on Pell Grants more likely to 
lobby and spend more money doing so?” and “Are non-profit colleges that are more dependent 
on research and development more likely to lobby and spend more money doing so?”, 
respectively), this new question gets at an underlying assumption that there is something special 
or unique about Pell and federal research and development dollars.  
 In this section, interviews with those who do my job at other colleges reveal how they 
view governmental resources as a portfolio to help balance their institution’s budget. Rather than 
solely lobbying for Pell grants, a college will spend its lobbying dollars and political capital 
advocating for interdependent resources from finite federal, state, and local budgets. Lobbying 
helps maintain a campus’s budgetary equilibrium. Not only do college officials view public 
funding from this portfolio perspective, but government policymakers setting budgets deal with a 
finite amount of money, and must adjust spending in different categories to maintain budgetary 
equilibrium. Interdependence means that resources that are not isolated from each other, from the 
policymaker’s point of view and the college’s point of view. College lobbyists have a multi-year 
perspective: interdependence means that colleges will lobby in support of one funding stream 
even when it might not hit their ledgers in a particular year, diminishing the notion of free-riding. 
 Also, I think that it is important consider funding streams in the context of time. The 
federal and state budget process means that funding buckets get more and more specific over 
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time. This prompts colleges to take action in increasingly specific coalitions. They first lobby in 
large coalitions for funding that would benefit their sector (e.g., formula funding like Pell or 
sector-based funding like research and development), and then in smaller groups in the hopes 
that funding will make its way to campus. I have certainly experienced this process as a lobbyist 
for a stand-alone, financially independent, private graduate school of education. Teachers 
College, Columbia University is supportive of (just about any) large funding programs for 
education, but those applicable to our type of institution and student are pretty specific. Lastly, 
the interviews show that lobbying infrastructure (on-campus lobbyists and associations) 
incentivize colleges to lobby for interdependent resources along the federal and state budget 
process, at least until a funding stream is no longer applicable to an individual campus.  
 I now apply these notions to the New York lobbying context. A college lobbyist, just like 
a college budget officer, does not look at funding streams in isolation. A college depends on 
many sources of funding and lobbies to maintain budgetary equilibrium. At the federal level, this 
includes Pell grants and student loan programs. State programs are also crucial. In New York, 
state aid programs include TAP (Tuition Assistance Program, which is like Pell for New 
Yorkers), Higher Education Opportunity Program (HEOP, tuition aid for disadvantaged 
students), Excelsior (free tuition for middle-income students at public institutions), and Bundy 
Aid (direct aid to independent colleges). If a state threatens to cut an aid program, a college will 
not only lobby to preserve it, but will also lobby to preserve or increase other sources, like Pell, 
to maintain its bottom line. In 20 interviews, college lobbyists and legislators cited budget-
related topics as important reasons colleges lobby. The table below shows the number and 




Table 25: Higher Education Lobbying Rationales Mentioned by New York State-Based 
Lobbyists and Legislative Personnel 
 
  Lobbying rationale 
Total 
Mentions 





(n=5)   Public Private FP 
    N % N N N N 
Budget 
related 
Student aid 18 34% 4 5 6 3 
Tax code 2 4% 0 2 0 0 
Research 6 11% 1 4 1 0 
Capital 5 9% 2 0 0 3 
Budget 4 8% 2 1 0 1 
Subtotal 35 66% 9 12 7 7 
Non-
budget 
Program approval 9 17% 2 2 5 0 
Sexual assault 4 8% 1 1 1 1 
Gainful employment regs 4 8% 0 0 4 0 
Entrepreneurship 1 2% 0 1 0 0 
Subtotal 18 34% 3 4 10 1 
  Grand Total 53 100% 21 28 24 8 
 
This table shows that budget-related topics totaled 35 of 53, or 66% of all lobbying rationales. 
See Appendix A for detail on rationale codes. 
The news data shows that budget-related items accounted for the majority of reasons that 
newspapers across the 50 states say colleges lobbied. The table below shows frequency and 
distribution of higher education rationales mentioned in the news.  






    Mentions by sector 
  
Total 





Budget 64 29% 54 2 0 8 
Tuition 35 16% 22 0 0 13 
Capital 21 10% 16 2 0 3 
Research  7 3% 4 2 0 1 
Subtotal 127 55% 96 6 0 25 
Non-
budget 
Governance  17 8% 18 0 0 2 
Gainful 8 4% 0 0 7 1 
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Expansion  7 3% 6 0 1 0 
Textbooks  6 3% 4 0 0 2 
Guns  5 2% 6 0 0 0 
Other 49 22% 16 1 1 31 
Subtotal 92 42% 50 1 9 36 
  Grand Total 219 100% 146 7 9 61 
 
Budget-related rationales account for 55% of all rationales. The fact that both sources of data 
converge on budget represents the important strand connecting government and higher 
education—a strand for which universities lobby. It is likely that the lower rate of budget focus 
in the news is due to the wider breath of topical focus and wider range of issues covered by 
reporters in the 50 states. For example, guns on campus are not a common issue in New York. 
 These budget-related items are lobbied for en masse. A lobbyist (C4) for a large private 
institution discussed how her institution lobbies for multiple funding streams during a single 
meeting, and 
. . .[went to] the individual congressional offices and said, ‘hey this is how the budget, the 
cuts that [President Trump] is proposing for financial aid, could affect us in this way, this 
many students at [our college] receive Pell grants or the various other kinds of loans and if 
the budget goes through as proposed, this is how it would affect our students directly. You’re 
looking to make cuts in basic research, in these agencies; well we get this much in awards 
from these agencies and it will curtail the research that we are doing here at universities. ’
(C4). 
 
Also, if a state legislature cuts higher education funding, federal aid programs like Pell and 
student loans will be that much more important. State legislatures across the United States have 




Figure 15: Federal and state revenues to higher education, 2000-2012 
Source: Pew Charitable Trusts, 2015 
 
Notably, the federal-state switch happened in right in the midst of this study’s time frame, in 
2010. The federal-state dynamic is important, as lobbyists explain below, and prompts colleges 
to simultaneously lobby at the federal and state levels. 
Importantly, a college lobbies for its portfolio of funding streams at different stages in the 
budget process, in coalitions of descending size as funding programs get more prescriptive. This 
is something that I have seen as a lobbyist, and may explain some of the variation in year-to-year 
expenditures we saw in Chapter 3. For simplicity’s sake, I consider three buckets of decreasing 
size: the overall budget, funding designed for specific sectors, and funding allotted to an 
individual campus. The executive budget is the first and biggest bucket. All industries—from 
agriculture to real estate—lobby to increase the federal and state programs they care about. 
Higher education needs to first band together to keep or increase the size of programs like Pell 
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that benefit all sectors. Then, sector-specific aid programs fall into the second bucket, for which 
colleges band together in smaller groups. For example, in New York, Excelsior is just for public 
colleges, while Bundy Aid is just for privates. For-profits often lobby for inclusion in these 
programs. Lastly, the third, smallest bucket is funding to individual campuses. The first two 
buckets are two major lobbying points before funding hits a campus. This encourages banding 
together to lobby for formula funding. But how long does the impulse to band together last? 
I found evidence that colleges lobby together for funding in the first, largest bucket in the 
process. Interviewee C4 described going to Washington, D.C. in early 2017 after President 
Trump proposed funding cuts:  
A great example is when President Trump just released his new budget. . .our job 
is to be real and manage expectations and we tell people that ‘don’t panic, this is 
just the way the budget process works, the federal government budget process, 
what the President proposes is his wishlist; Congress by no means is going to 
deliver that hook, line, and sinker,’ if you will. So, recently. . my director [of 
government affairs] was in DC and he set up meetings and was accompanied by 
some of our colleagues from NYU and Columbia, we were in town because we all 
belong to the Science Coalition. 
 
Colleges also band together to lobby for this first bucket in Albany. A contract lobbyist who 
has worked for all three sectors of higher education in New York, including the for-profit 
sector for 15 years, said how all sectors collaborate for the biggest bucket of student aid: 
The primary focus has always been student financial aid. . .The priority has always been 
about ‘how do you make sure students can enroll have opportunity be successful and 
complete a degree with the least amount of debt? ’which has really aligned us to be able to 
work with the other sectors. And so if you think about advocacy or lobbying for student 
financial aid, for TAP, that has always been an area that all four sectors have worked on 
collaboratively. They may have different viewpoints on it, or we may have different 
impacts, but we have for the most part, always been aligned and working together from an 
advocacy perspective (C15). 
 
This is a clear example of first bucket, cross-sector lobbying for student financial aid, a funding 
source that government distributes in a “pro forma” way. 
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I found evidence of lobbying for the second-largest bucket, which is funding for specific 
types of colleges: for example, a lobbyist (C8) for state public institutions discussed those 
smaller buckets, saying “There are a few issues that transcend public/private interests, like TAP, 
some things we can all be in agreement on, and others where we need to part company—
Excelsior, the STEM scholarships, are only for publics, and the privates were trying to move in 
on those.”  More recently, private colleges banded together in early 2017 to oppose Governor 
Cuomo’s Excelsior “free tuition” program for students at public colleges. “That was a very 
intense time,” a lobbyist for a small private college said, elaborating: 
We worked with CICU [the Council for Independent Colleges and Universities, New York’s 
independent college association]. They had a social media campaign. They were really, 
especially trying to advocate against Excelsior, so a lot of it was trying to ensure that the 
College was very much a part of that (C9). 
 
An in-house lobbyist for a major private research institution described how their institution 
bands together to lobby with other peer institutions: 
It’s always about money. Money is the common thread. . . Sometimes we team up with our 
Washington people, if we’re going for a really big federal research center. And I talk to 
people like [the head of research at a major research university in New York]. So we work 
together. We’re going for a big research center and it's competitive, so we’ll put in the best 
academic thing. I compare notes with [the aforementioned head of research], maybe a 
couple of other schools. . .And then what I do is I go to the state and I get a commitment of 
money and help us with the proposal (C12). 
 
This example not only highlights how non-profit colleges work together to ensure that research 
funding is attainable by their sector, but also shows the interplay between state and federal funds. 
I also found evidence of lobbying for the third bucket, the campus level, where there 
appeared to be sibling rivalry among “sister” public colleges. Group cohesion broke down. The 
next interviewee described how they lobbied at the campus-level even after a statewide, 
enrollment-based bucket of funding was approved: 
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Interviewer: What are some of the things you lobby for? 
 
C5: For community colleges, our FTE [full-time-equivalent student] operating budget 
comes from the state based on enrollment, and the rest of our operating comes from the city, 
and our capital is a city and state match. It’s is like, we’re children, and they’re our parents 
and they take care of us. 
 
Interviewer: Let me play devil’s advocate for a second. If it’s a formula, isn’t it automatic?  
 
C5: But the formula can increase or decrease. There are various years when there were 
tremendous cuts, from 2000-something, maybe during Pataki, there were consecutive years 
of cuts, where the per-head amount wasn’t even back to where it was at that time, so you’re 
always trying to inch back and get more if possible. That affects everything from how long 
you can leave your library open and additional advisors you can hire, things like that. 
 
When there’s a finite amount of dollars and you’re competing against the sister institutions 
against [the university central office] itself, against independents, against everybody else, 
and all politicians are going to support all of them to an extent, many of them have publics 
and privates in their districts, you have to be sensitive of that and ask for what you ask for 
and hope to get it.  
 
This lobbyist had to be “at the table” or their college might be “on the menu.” Another lobbyist 
also described the competition within the public and private sector campuses for finite resources; 
almost like an arms race: 
In the SUNYs or CUNYs or independents, all of a sudden someone hires an individual 
lobbyist, and then sister organizations is like, ‘Well, wait, they may get something I may 
not get so I want to hire that person too.’ So there’s a lot more competition. If you look at 
the SUNYs, especially the larger ones, let’s say UB [University at Buffalo, a SUNY school] 
hires its own lobbyist. Stony Brook [another SUNY school] usually hires a lobbyist right 
behind it, right, because they know there’s only limited dollars, and they both want 
something. You can see the same thing that occurs in the independent sector, that if there’s 
research money or something that’s available, one institution may hire a lobbyist and then 
a similar institution will hire a lobbyist because they want access to that same resource 
(C15). 
 
A contract lobbyist added “I think it’s a ‘me too ’mentality: if they’re doing it then we’ve got to 
do it. . .I’ve seen it in the SUNYs that hire lobbyists now because they can’t get through to 
central administration” (C6). This intra-system competition may help explain the overall growth 
of higher education lobbying in recent years. 
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 Lobbyist C6 elaborated on how the campus-level bucket works in New York. The 
lobbyist observed that the shift away from New York state-level earmarks (“member items”) and 
toward gubernatorially-controlled Regional Economic Development Centers led more colleges to 
lobby at the campus level: 
My reading. . .is that the devotion to individual lobbying campaigns, especially in the area 
of higher ed has increased: we’ve seen individual colleges not using their trade associations 
as much because they have individual needs; they might have a capital project that they 
want to do on their campus, and they think they can go in and get some money for it. 
Sometimes that can be successful. . . I have seen an increase in these efforts, particularly 
around. . .the governor’s regional economic development councils and pots of money get 
distributed. It used to be member items, now they’re member items that get distributed by 
the governor. There are some colleges, mostly upstate, that basically hire a lobbyist to work 
to get a portion of money for a program or a building or something within that context. 
 
 The examples in this section underscore the interdependence of funding, and how 
campus-based lobbyist must consider all revenue streams—to maintain equilibrium. A campus-
based lobbyist must also know when to join in with other colleges, when mutual interests are at 
stake. This is the case at the first stage of funding, when colleges lobby in large coalitions for 
formula funding that would benefit most, if not all coalition members. The impulse to band 
together dissipates as funding gets closer to home. Even when banding together at the first stage, 
I would argue that a campus-based lobbyist must never miss the opportunity to highlight the 
specific impact on a campus34.  
 Infrastructure underlies these efforts. The notion that “lobbying begets more lobbying” 
implies that a college lobbyist will use their lobbying infrastructure to go for state funding and 
also lobby for Pell. For example, lobbyist C5 did city, state, and federal lobbying for a 
community college, something I can relate to. Although I represent a very specific type of 
                                                 
34 These interviews with college lobbyists also underscore how colleges are responsive to governmental funding: 
President Trump’s threats to cut research and financial aid prompted interviewee C6 to join with other colleges. 




institution of higher education, like lobbyist C5 and several other interviewees, I am responsible 
for city, state, and federal government relations.  
Why would an individual college lobby if others are taking action? 
If one college is dependent on one type of funding and lobbies for it, what is stopping 
others from free riding for things like student aid and research funding? What can an inside look 
at higher education in New York tell us about the way colleges come to gather to lobby for 
collective goods? In this section, interviews show that enterprising colleges drive coalitional 
agendas, allowing others to follow. I also find that there is in-group pressure to speak with one 
voice, which builds the heat and energy of a coalition. This implies that colleges will lobby for 
public goods, even if they do not differentially receive them at the campus level. Lastly, I 
observe that although battles may be picked and chosen, coalitional infrastructure provides the 
pathway for groups to coalesce.  
Although an individual campus may not lobby one year versus another (or might spend 
less on those efforts), the existence of the associations offers longstanding infrastructure. For 
example, associations have longstanding relationships with policymakers and easy access to 
them, provide information and intelligence on issues, and offer templates for sign on letters. 
Associational lobbying thus facilitates, or begets more lobbying by individual campuses. And 
although there may be an overall shift towards in-house lobbying, I do not think that it means 
that colleges have stopped paying their association dues. Do associations encourage free riding? I 
next delve into that question. 
Interviews and newspaper analysis show the prevalence of relying on associations as a 
lobbying tactic. The table below shows the number and distribution of tactics mentioned by 
lobbyists and legislators/staff. 
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Table 27: Higher Education Lobbying Tactics Mentioned by New York State-Based 
Lobbyists and Legislators 
 
Lobbying tactic Total mentions 




and staff  
      Public Private FP (n=5) 
  N % N N N N 
Relationships 15 18% 8 4 2 1 
Associations 9 11% 3 5 0 1 
Coalitions 7 8% 3 2 2 0 
Meetings 8 10% 1 3 0 4 
Contributions 3 4% 0 2 1 0 
Blocking 2 2% 0 0 2 0 
Testify 1 1% 0 0 1 0 
Direct subtotal 45 54% 15 16 8 6 
Expertise 8 10% 2 4 1 1 
Student lobby day 6 7% 2 0 2 2 
Invite to campus 6 7% 4 2 0 0 
Media 5 6% 2 3 0 0 
Economic impact 1 1% 0 0 1 0 
Reputation 3 4% 1 2 0 0 
Alumni/grassroots 8 10% 7 0 0 1 
Join committee 2 2% 0 0 2 0 
Indirect subtotal 39 46% 18 11 6 4 
Grand Total 84 100% 33 27 14 10 
 
Associations were the second-most frequently-mentioned lobbying tactic by lobbyists and 
legislators/staff; from my perspective, associations are indeed an essential way to lobby, 
especially among less wealthy institutions that cannot afford an in-house or contract lobbyist. 
 With regard to Hypothesis IV, the table above shows that direct and indirect tactics were 
split 45/39. I coded tactics as “direct” if they were in the vein of personal contact with a member 
of the legislature regarding a specific piece of legislation. Tactics were coded as “indirect” if 
they were broader appeals to the public to influence policy, such as working with the press or 
holding rallies. The almost even split suggests that colleges rely on multiple methods of 
 
139 
lobbying. Within the sectors for-profit colleges used direct tactics eight times and indirect tactics 
six times, supporting Hypothesis IV.  
 A national news perspective shows that direct tactics are more prevalent across sectors. 
Table 28: Higher Education Lobbying Tactics Mentioned in U.S. Newspapers, 2004-
2014 
Lobbying tactic Total mentions Mentions by College Sector 
      Public Private FP All 
  N % N N N N 
Other 46 30% 34 1 3 8 
Coalition 28 18% 15 0 0 13 
President 25 16% 23 1 0 1 
Association 22 14% 2 3 1 16 
Affiliate 15 10% 11 0 0 4 
Backoff 10 7% 8 0 0 2 
Legislative 
champion 6 4% 4 1 0 0 
Direct subtotal 152 71% 97 6 4 44 
Student protest 26 41% 20 0 0 6 
Media 18 29% 11 0 4 3 
Other 12 19% 6 1 1 4 
Student lobbying 7 11% 6 0 0 1 
Indirect subtotal 63 29% 43 1 5 14 
Grand total 215 100% 140 7 9 58 
 
Across all sectors, colleges relied on direct tactics 152 out of 215 instances, or 71% of the time. 
The for-profit sector used direct tactics four out of nine times (44%). This is a very low sample 
size, however, so it would require more research to draw any definitive conclusions about 
Hypothesis IV. 
 I tried to assess what was happening within the higher education lobby, especially if and 
how free riding took place, via interviews. I asked college lobbyists the question “Are there 
instances where you didn’t want to, or find the need to lobby?” but no one would admit to free 
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riding. Rather, lobbyists C4, C6, and C9 answered by alluding to picking one’s battles 
(suggesting that others do the battling), and lobbyists C5 and C6 said they remained contentedly 
silent as governors wrought them financial windfalls--meaning, they could essentially free ride. 
In addition, I believe that free riding happens as leading institutions drive coalitional agendas, 
described next: interviewees were often proud of leading the way on coalitional efforts. Below I 
highlight three ways in which this happens.  
A lobbyist (C1) for a large for-profit college told a story how his presence at a meeting 
softened resistance by a legislator, to the benefit of other for-profit colleges that did not 
contribute to the legislator’s campaign. The otherwise unfriendly Congressional committee chair 
greeted this lobbyist with open arms, benefiting the group of for-profit colleges, including those 
who did not contribute to the member’s fundraiser.  
 Next, while facing an unprecedented threat due to Governor Cuomo’s Excelsior “free 
tuition” program at public colleges and universities, a lobbyist (C9) for a small private college 
described how their college wanted to be front-and-center of a lobbying campaign set up by 
CICU: 
I think this year [2017] has been extraordinary, the amount of time, the communication, it’s 
a paradigm shift. . .When the governor dropped ‘well we’re gonna do free tuition ’on 
January 3rd it was like ‘woah. ’. . We worked with CICU. They had a social media 
campaign. Especially trying to advocate against Excelsior. That was a very intense time. 
We tried to ensure that the College was very much a part of that. We were very early on. 
We had a phone conversation with [CICU leadership] on day three that said the College 
wants to be a leader in this effort. And we held a summit in the capital region. We were the 
first college to coordinate all the colleges in the capital region. I coordinated all of that. . 
.We wanted to be right in there in that effort. 
 
Although CICU may have been a ready-made association to respond to the Excelsior threat, it is 
clear that this particular college played a leading role that other colleges could follow. 
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 Lastly, a lobbyist for a larger private college drove the CICU agenda in a “bottom-up” 
way. This lobbyist, from a New York City-based institution, described a “love/hate” relationship 
with CICU, and so works with a sub-group of private institutions to address New York City-
specific issues (which bleed into state—and federal—issues). Interviewee C4 said this group is 
where “I think we all get our best practices” and elaborated:  
I think everyone can agree that so much has changed with the face of government relations 
and in particular lobbying and a united front is so important. And with this [New York City-
specific] group, we do that, we have sent joint letters to members, we have had folks coming 
in address us, John D’Agati, the Deputy Secretary of Education, our meeting next week 
Deborah Glick [Assembly Higher Education committee chair] is speaking again, we have 
had Brook Gesser, Senator Gillibrand’s senior higher education staffer. So this has been. . 
.really an amazing experience for all of us. . .We strategically come up with lobbying plans 
that have gone down that path. and we fought for things collectively which gives us a much 
more stronger voice. So just by normally doing that, we can look at things. . . I think it 
makes us stronger and again, it’s good thing and I am very happy about that.  
 
This same enterprising lobbyist had op/eds published and held press conferences in response to 
Excelsior. It seems that these examples of individual colleges shaping a group’s agenda allows 
other, less vocal association members to follow suit or free ride.  
 Although free riding likely happens among New York colleges and universities, the 
previous quote above touches on another, possibly countervailing point: there are pressures not 
to free ride.  One reason is that the higher education lobby values speaking with one voice. To 
get at peer-to-peer influence, I asked the question: “Is your school influenced by other schools’ 
choice to lobby?” In response, a lobbyist (C2) for a large private university said: 
I would say it’s influenced in that you wanna speak as a sector. Strength in numbers, right? 
We do work with a lot of associations, we’re close with our colleagues at peer institutions 
or other research universities, other universities in New York City, whatever that 
commonality is for that issue. And so you do wanna be in the same boat. 
 
A lobbyist for another large private university echoed that sentiment: “There’s a desire to sort of 
all be on the same page. There is, because you know your voice is usually stronger when it’s 
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unified rather than when it’s divided” (C7). I posit that the desire to “be in the same boat” is a 
solidary incentive that puts pressure on colleges to lobby for the larger, earlier funding buckets 
like research and development and Pell, even if campuses do not necessarily differentially 
receive funding. But what is the mechanism by which colleges speak with one voice? 
Within the higher education lobby, the sign-on letter is an important way for colleges to 
nudge each other to speak with one voice. A typical sign-on letter can be circulated on 
association letterhead, and asks a group of legislators (like an education appropriations 
committee) to preserve or increase program funding. Before signing the letter, a college must 
make several decisions. It may do an internal calculation, weighing the costs of benefits of sign-
on. It may look to peers and ask why they signed on. It may want to use the letter for “cover” to 
not be out in front of an issue. A lobbyist for a large private university described this process in 
great detail: 
At a sort of operational level in terms of doing your day to day business, there’s a lot of 
looking at what others are doing. There’s a lot of peer pressure, or lack thereof, there’s a lot 
of not wanting to be out in front on an issue by name without sufficient cover from other 
institutions. . .I think sign-on letters are good example. . . There’s a political and a PR 
calculation on many of these issues. So let’s say there is a sign-on letter being circulated by 
some association asking for an additional $5 million at NIH, whatever it is. . . Sure that’s a 
great idea.  
 
We’d love them [Congress] to fund the NIH but, you know you also have to evaluate that . 
. .and frequently . . . ask the question ‘who else is signing on to this?’ If it’s every Ivy League 
school and, and what we call the Ivy Plus schools which include you know like Stanford 
and Chicago and Duke and Vanderbilt and Wash U, basically the Ivy Plus schools, the 
wealthy, elite private universities, private research universities. If they’re all on the letter, 
yeah, we probably get on the letter. But if none of them are on yet, we’ll wanna find out 
why and, and do some sort of diligence about . . . ‘how are you guys thinking about this, et 
cetera.’ So there’s peer pressure at that level (C7). 
 
So, peer pressure, in the form of information gathering, seems to be a form of nudging to get 
everyone in the same boat. Interviewee C2 described how college lobbyists share information, 
which may lead to more signatures on a letter: 
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Are other New York schools signing on this letter or are other major research universities 
signing on this letter? There is some kind of confirmation and dialogue between all of those 
schools. That’s not to say on a particular issue we might not have a different opinion of 
another school, but generally if you’re speaking with one voice as a common sector you’re 
going to be stronger anyway, so let’s work together on it. So I think that there is some 
influence. I think what also happens sometimes is that you know your colleagues at other 
schools very well and they’re able to highlight issues for you that maybe you’ve missed. . . 
So if your colleague from Ohio State has called and asked ‘hey have you looked in to this? ’
So I can say that it can be influenced, but not in a negative way. 
 
Thus, peer pressure does not have to be negative. This lobbyist’s example suggests that positive, 
collegial highlighting of issues is an effective way of garnering signatures on a sign-on letter. 
This rings true from my experience.  
In conclusion, this section on lobbying through the policy process addressed two 
questions: why would colleges lobby for something that they seem to get from government in a 
pro forma way? and why would an individual college lobby if others are taking action? Both 
questions address the assumption that funding is connected to lobbying underlying the first two 
hypotheses: H1. For-profit colleges with higher Pell Grant dependence will lobby more and H2. 
Non-profit colleges with higher federal research and development dependence will lobby more. 
I find that although issues change year to year (or even day to day), the very existence—
the infrastructure—of associations is important and provides an easy way to help colleges lobby 
for collective goods. Associations monitor legislation, have relationships with government 
officials, circulate letters, and give deadlines (another form of nudging). Although the 
association almost by nature allows for free riding, these interviews suggest that the higher 
education community values speaking with one voice, and member colleges check in with one 
another to gauge whether similar institution signing on, or what is stopping them from doing so. 
This seems to be a good way to build higher education interest group cohesion along the first two 
stages of the budget process. That is, colleges will lobby for public goods, even if they do not 
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differentially receive them at the campus level. Together, the interdependence of funding, and 
these intra-interest group dynamics along the policy process shed light on why a college would 
lobby for collective goods even when funding appears to be automatically granted. This helps 
answer the two questions posed above and addresses the underlying assumption of the first two 
hypotheses that funding is connected to lobbying. 
4.5.2 Topics That Drive Lobbying 
 
 Higher education lobbying is not just about student aid or research dollars; in fact, it is 
not always about money. My interviews help answer what Chapter 3 could not: the additional 
rationales for lobbying, particularly those that do not fit the regular, annual budget cycle. The 
interviews also add new lobbying rationales not covered in the news analysis of this chapter. 
This section sheds more light on the why’s of lobbying and helps answer one of the remaining 
research questions: how do external pressures like media attention affect lobbying?  
In Hypothesis III I posit that accountability measures, especially high-profile measures, 
trigger a lobbying response. This contention rests on a few legs. First, in my experience as a U.S. 
Senate staff member and as a university lobbyist I noticed how much policy is driven by what is 
in the news—or, at least, much time and energy is spent responding to high-profile topics that 
make the front page. And certainly, most colleges do not want to make the front page unless it 
concerns good news. Second, politicians from both sides of the aisle make news and respond to 
it, target colleges and universities by posing accountability measures to respond to constituent 
concerns like the rising cost of tuition and sexual assault, possibly perpetuating the populist tide 
against higher education. Third, as mentioned in Chapter 2, since corporations lobby against 
restricting regulations, colleges may too; colleges, like any organization, are sensitive to negative 
press coverage, and, as I will show below, the accountability measures mentioned are often 
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attention-getting. In this section I unpack the accountability-lobbying connection by noting data 
and examples from the news, interviews, and my experience.  
 From a broad perspective, the news analysis shows that accountability-related topics, like 
gainful employment and the federal Postsecondary Institution Ratings System (PIRS) together 
constituted 20 of 219 (9%) rationales for colleges to lobby, making accountability the fifth-most 
frequently-mentioned lobbying rationale in newspapers. Table 27 breaks down these 20 
mentions. 
Table 29: Accountability discussions in the randomly-selected news coverage about 
college lobbying and registration percentages, 2004-2014 
Year Accountability measures Number of mentions 
2004 N/A 0 
2005 N/A 0 
2006 New rules for Academic Competitiveness Grant; student “unit record” database. 2 
2007 Privacy law to reporting requirement; Student learning measures in IPEDs. 2 
2008 Increased regulations; Stimulus money; state budgets; disclosure 
requirements 4 
2009 N/A 0 
2010 Rules on credit hour definition; gainful employment; for-profit 
marketing. 4 
2011 Gainful employment. 4 
2012 Gainful employment; other regulations. 2 
2013 College rating system; tax law. 2 
2014 N/A 0 
Total   20 
 
 
Accountability measures were disproportionally mentioned in relation to for-profit colleges: 
eight or 40% of accountability mentions were related to for-profits—this is notable considering 
that during the study period, for-profits constituted a mean of 19% of colleges (and 8% of 
enrollments). Meanwhile, other measures, like PIRS or regulatory burden, concerned all sectors. 
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Bringing together data from the database, there is some evidence suggesting a rough 
connection between lobbying and accountability measures mentioned in the news, supporting 
Hypothesis III. In chapter 3, the database shows that public college lobbying swelled in 2008, 
during a media accountability coverage bump; for-profits spent the most on lobbying in 2010 and 
2011, the years when the news indicated the most accountability activity.  
 In interviews, accountability rationales constituted eight of 53, or 15% of lobbying 
rationales mentioned by New York lobbyists and legislators/staff, together making accountability 
measures the third-most frequently mentioned lobbying rationale, supporting Hypothesis III. I 
next explore specific accountability topics in depth, and how college lobbyists said they lobbied 
in response. 
Sexual assault  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Obama administration from 2011 through 2016 aimed to 
hold colleges accountable for sexual assault complaints, ramping up civil rights investigations 
(Lipka, 2015). In New York, Governor Cuomo in 2015 released “Enough is Enough” rules for 
colleges to comply with sexual assault reporting. A lobbyist for private colleges explained how 
this came on the heels of the high-profile, national movement, and the difficult but necessary 
way colleges needed to respond: 
As you have seen, Matt, in the last couple of years, even though there is this general hands 
off approach because you’re private, there has been a reaching-in a little bit more by the 
federal or state government starting to meddle into what the private colleges and 
universities required to do. While they [the colleges] don’t oppose these things outright, 
they certainly want to make sure that whatever is being put on them from a regulatory 
perspective isn’t an increased cost that the college has to bear without any state funding. 
It’s a mandate.  
 
Sexual assault for example, which has been sort of an issue around the country, well, it 
came to New York—it’s political—the governor here wanted to impose certain 
requirements, on how the reporting occurs and how the college has to treat the victim or 
nonvictim during the process, and so if you’re a college administrator—adding in those 
requirements, while you don’t oppose them, and obviously you want to do the best for your 




Another lobbyist was a bit blunter, and explained the forceful way the governor released the 
accountability regulations, the burden it put on the college, and the college’s compliance: 
C3: The governor put out a program called Enough is Enough, which applies to all sectors 
and that required a fair amount of work done into college level. Whatever the Monday was 
before the 4th of July, the day before the 4th, they mailed a letter saying they wanted a 
response by Friday from these colleges, on a whole series of questions. Sort of an audit. So 
we got involved, going to them, the governor’s office, and saying ‘this is like Trump 
putting up the wall, ok? This is a crazy way, you mail something on a Monday, you want 
it on a Friday, there’s a holiday in the middle of it.’ So part of our life is to make sure that 
their goal is accomplished, they get done what they want. . . (C3) 
 
Interviewer: So that happens periodically? 
 
C3: It happens more than you think. 
 
As documented in Table 23, sexual assault was mentioned as a rationale to lobby four times, 
once each by public, private, for-profit lobbyists, and by a legislator. 
College endowments 
Politicians on both sides of the aisle have long targeted wealthy colleges to disclose 
financial data and pay a tax on endowments. Although this topic did not appear in the randomly-
selected news articles, it appeared in the news, as mentioned in Chapter 1; it came up in 
interviews, and traces back to the beginning of my career as a higher education lobbyist. It is also 
significant as a populist issue. I saw this issue permeate locally. For example, a big motivation 
for Princeton University to create my position as state legislative assistant in 2006 was because a 
Democratic state legislator introduced, and had approved, language in the state budget to 
withhold state aid to private institutions “with endowments above $1 billion.” At the time, 
Princeton was the only university with an endowment above $1 billion, and lost about $500,000 
in state aid in 2006. 
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Republican Senator Charles Grassley spearheaded the endowment tax idea at the federal 
level, along with other accountability measures to ask colleges to publicly reveal detail about 
their finances. In early 2008, it was reported that Senator Grassley   
has kept college officials busy over the last two years with a slew of inquiries and requests 
for information about a range of topics, including college governance, presidential pay, 
research entanglements with corporations and, most recently, whether they should be 
spending more from their endowments to bolster access to college for needy students 
(Lederman, 2008).  
 
The calls for fiscal accountability resembled an audit, and in focusing first on the wealthiest 
institutions, I think were populist-driven, and demanded a college lobbyist response. Becky 
Timmons, assistant vice president for government relations at the American Council on 
Education said that Senator Grassley and his colleagues “have chosen to collect information 
from a relatively narrow set of extremely wealthy (and in many ways unrepresentative) 
institutions – ‘136 out of 4,300’ colleges –with the idea of using their situations to make policy 
for all of higher education” (Lederman, 2008). In 2017, House Republicans proposed a tax on 
graduate student stipends, a cap on their student loans, and a tax on college endowments. The 
endowment tax passed into law in 2017. 
Gainful employment  
Gainful employment accountability measures are another example of a high-profile 
measure against which colleges—for-profits in particular—lobby. These measures are specific 
standards relating to student debt and income35 and are related to the “90:10” rule that limits for-
profits from using more than 90 percent of federal Title IV dollars for their revenues. As 
                                                 
35 For example, in 2014, colleges could not allow graduates ’student loan debt payments to exceed 12% of their 
income and 30% of their discretionary income. Further, programs whose graduates exceed these levels will have to 
warn students and risk becoming ineligible for aid (Field, 2014).  
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mentioned in Chapter 2, the rules were implemented largely in response to dramatic accounts of 
students being scammed by for-profit colleges.  
I find a connection between gainful employment regulations and lobbying. As indicated 
in Table 27 above, gainful employment was mentioned as a reason to lobby six times in the news 
analysis, making it the most commonly mentioned lobbying rationale. Among New York 
lobbyists, gainful employment was mentioned four times, exclusively by for-profit lobbyists, as 
indicated in Table 23 above. For instance, for-profit lobbyist C15 said that the for-profit sector in 
New York drew from gainful employment lessons learned at the federal level when Governor 
Cuomo in 2019 announced for-profit accountability legislation. The governor’s high profile 
proposal targeted for-profit colleges broadly, so this for-profit lobbyist made sure to differentiate 
their clients from non-degree granting for-profits which attracted negative media attention:  
Strategically, from a regulatory standpoint as well as a legislative standpoint, we 
differentiated ourselves from the non-degree—the beauty schools, the truck driver schools, 
the coding schools. They have a completely different regulatory structure. And so we have 
always made sure to say ‘that's not our area to be involved in, that's theirs, but they should 
also have strict regulation’ because a lot of things that have occurred that have been 
negative or sometimes get negative press in New York. 
 
In New York, she pointed out, there no longer any publicly-traded for-profits like the 
University of Phoenix and DeVry University, at which students have high income-to-debt 
ratios. Governor Cuomo in 2019 proposed the For-Profit Accountability Act as a 
response to U.S. Education Secretary Betsy DeVos’s for-profit deregulation of Obama 
administration rules; the New York measure was defeated in the legislature (Toure and 
Gronewold, 2019). 
Cost of college  
The rising cost of college was a consistent topic of debate during this study’s time frame. 
Of the 214 articles I reviewed, 76 concerned tuition and budget, (e.g., a state university lobbied a 
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legislature to keep a tuition assistance program). Twenty-four of these articles noted attention-
getting advocacy tactics like college students launching hunger strikes and sending marching 
bands to state capitol buildings. This media attention, I posit, is connected to bipartisan 
politicians’ critiques of colleges for the ever-rising cost of tuition.  
In Chapter 2 I mentioned the Obama administration’s Postsecondary Institutional Ratings 
System (PIRS) college cost proposal of 2013. The proposal, I think, was in direct response to 
Americans’ persistent complaints about the ever-rising cost of tuition. PIRS would have rated 
colleges based on affordability metrics, a measure the media reported that colleges from every 
sector lobbied against (Stratford, 2014). The proposal took years to develop, and eventually 
ended up with an online College Scorecard, (Kreighbaum, 2017), a measure made less toothy in 
part due to higher education’s pushback. 
In 2014, the Obama administration extended this accountability thinking to graduate 
education school funding, and proposed that federal graduate education school funding would be 
based on test scores of teacher college graduates’ students’ test scores (Sawchuk, 2014). As a 
lobbyist for Teachers College, I spent much time tracking, analyzing, and responding to the 
PIRS, and this graduate education school proposed regulation—individually and with 
associations. 
College accountability measures played out locally as well. This was during a time when 
standardized testing and test-centric charter schools gained national momentum, and in New 
York City, Chancellor Joel Klein proposed a “value-add” regression model to link teacher salary 
to student test scores—another proposal we pushed back against, from a “good public policy” 
and self-interested perspective. Even more locally, from my experience at Princeton and 
Columbia, I have noticed politicians even in these very liberal local districts gain political points 
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with constituents by attempting to rein in expansion plans of these wealthy universities, with 
rhetoric in community meetings and in the press, and by activating local land use regulations. 
The apparent wealth of some universities generates resentment easily capitalized by politicians.  
In New York in 2016, Governor Cuomo directed a college cost accountability measure at 
private colleges and universities. He proposed to tie state aid to the cost of tuition. One lobbyist 
thought this proposal was facilitated by non-profit higher educations’ inability to donate to 
political campaigns: 
If [we] could, through our own institutional resources, create a PAC along with other 
private institutions in New York, in the way that other industries do, sure, you could argue 
we get more done, or that we wouldn’t always been in the cross-hairs of the executive 
branch for issues. If universities funded Cuomo’s campaign account in the way that 
developers do, there’s no planet in which he’d try to tie Bundy Aid and TAP for private 
institutions our tuition price. That’s crazy, never in a million years he’d do that. But he 
could do that because we don’t have that sort of power in the way that the private, the non-
tax exempt sector does to throw our money around (C7). 
 
This inability to make campaign contributions may not only open the door to accountability 
measures but also seems to differentiate college lobbying from corporate lobbying, suggesting 
that colleges do not lobby like corporations because they cannot. 
4.5.3 Do Colleges Lobby Like Corporations? Insider Voice 
 
Looking more closely into the “inside look” of higher education lobbying, I now share 
the thoughts of those closest to the topic, higher education lobbyists. One straightforward way to 
find out if colleges lobby like corporations is simply to ask lobbyists that question. In this final 
section, I synopsize interviewee’s response (in italics) to the question of whether colleges 
emulate corporate lobbying. The answers, which I categorize below, were surprising because 
most said no. 
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Yes. A legislative staffer on the state Assembly higher education committee was one of 
the rare people who did not think higher ed lobbied differently from other groups: 
I don't see a dramatic difference between what college and university does or any other 
specific group. (L5). 
 
The only college lobbyist who said yes was a for-profit college lobbyist: 
 
Yes, industry has a lot to do with what we do and don’t do. We look at some other schools 
as well, you have to look at what others are doing to measure yourself, that plays into what 
you’re doing. The answer is yes. (C1). 
 
No, because they do not have enough funding. Three college lobbyists said that they 
would like to adopt corporate lobbying tactics but could not due to funding constraints: 
If I was like the NRA, I’d be putting ads on TV every week about ‘students needed choice, 
why should they just have to go to a SUNY or CUNY school? ’When our graduation rates 
are better, and this is better and that’s better. So if you look at the successful organizations 
who have a robust budget, yes, we would have a much easy time getting our word out. –A  
lobbyist for a large private university (C4). 
 
If you walk around Albany, everyone has their one-pager leave-behind, they have their key 
stats, they have their pretty graphics, and that’s something I think that—I don’t know if it’s 
just us or if it’s our sector overall, you know we may have been a little bit late to the game 
of the data, the numbers, the visual elements, ‘here’s your packet of leave behind 
professional looking materials. ’Sometimes that’s hard to do because internally we don’t 
have the resources to put that all together but when I think that when you look at a private 
company or other industry groups they have probably done a better job at that. –A lobbyist 
for a large private university (C2). 
 
No. We don't have the money, per se, to do any kind of large scale. A lot of our work is 
grassroots, person to person. I'm sure industry and others are able to spend a lot more 
money on lobbying. Like, we don't hire a high profile lobbying firm in DC to represent our 
interests. – A lobbyist for a large public university (C11). 
 
No, because of campaign contributions. Additional college lobbyists pointed to the legal 
prohibition for non-profit institutions to make campaign contributions, and did not necessarily 
think that was a bad thing.  
What sort of separates our industry from other lobbying industries. . . is fundraising. We 
are prohibited by law to make those contributions to candidates or PACs.—A lobbyist for 




Contributions are a restriction on a college that might not be a restriction on some other 
industries—and honestly I think you benefit from the fact that the law does prevent this 
because the reality is you don’t want to get into that game. Once you start it never ends, 
and if none of the colleges can do it, you’re not that worse off. But through CICU, you 
could certainly have a what's called a political action committee. – A contract lobbyist for 
private institutions (C6).  
 
No, because of other characteristics unique to colleges. A member of the Assembly 
higher education committee said that colleges do not have an obvious opposition:  
Unlike most industries that are looking for certain advantages, we are likely to hear from 
consumers opposed to that. In most instances, the students and the institutions are kind of 
on the same page except when it comes to tuition increases. . .As opposed to insurance 
industry. There are very few people coming and saying ‘we don’t want the colleges to 
succeed’ (L1). 
 
One college lobbyist and two legislators highlighted the less tangible factors that affect 
higher education lobbying, like mystique, ethical support, and self-righteousness: 
 
I used to think—why does someone want to be chair of the higher education committee for 
30 years? Think about that for a minute. Higher ed has a certain prestige and mystique to 
it. When you go to commencement and you’re not an academic, and they put you on stage 
the cap and gown, you get to feel like you’re part of the club. That’s a pretty cool thing for 
a politician in a lot of ways. – A lobbyist for a public university system. (C8). 
 
Some of the other differences between the higher education generally and most everybody 
else is who comes to lobby is that almost all of higher education in New York state, public 
or private, is not for profit, and that certainly gives them, to most legislators, a higher ethical 
claim or support, the product they produce is highly valued by almost everyone in the 
legislature. You know you can get through life without an SUV but you know having a 
college education is pretty important. So I think that I think those two factors, the fact that 
there are there's no profit being paid out to stockholders in almost all of higher ed, and the 
fact that the product is very specially regarded, are probably the biggest differences. –A 
member of the Assembly higher education committee (L3). 
 
Other industries who come to you to say ‘we employ 250 people ’and that’s 250 people 
who pay taxes and whatever else. With the higher education folks—you get that along with 
their self-righteousness. About the fact that they educate people. . .So other purer zones of 
work rely on their economic justification. Higher ed also relies on their self righteousness-
- 'if you don’t help us build this science building, the person who will cure cancer won’t 
get it.' That’s nice, isn’t it? . . . There’s some of that in all of higher ed. Self righteousness. 
The only ones who are more self-righteous are the religious institutions. –A member of the 




No, because of connections to the local community. The remainder of responses rounded 
out why higher education lobbying is different from corporate lobbying. A legislator staffer and 
three college lobbyists mentioned students, alumni, and economic contributions.  
An industry can fly in their AVP [associate vice president] and tell you about a plant in 
Battavia. . .versus there are 100 schools in a district; SUNY and community colleges have 
a more active role. – A state Senate education committee staffer (L4). 
 
‘[Our university] is important; in some of these senate districts, you’ve got 30,000 alumni 
living there, or there’s 1,000 employees depending on the geography. That resonates with 
the elected officials.—A public university system lobbyist (C8) 
 
It’s different because you’re talking about students. You get much more leeway to, I’m not 
gonna say act crazy, but to bring issues to the attention of people. Because every school is 
an economic driver in the region, they're employing people. They’re servicing people, 
providing continuing education to the community and again that’s one of the things that 
we stress, not only the success of our students getting jobs, paying back their debts but we 
talked about the economic driver of the institution particularly upstate where there are more 
small communities, they're huge employers. –A for-profit college lobbyist (C3).  
 
We are totally in a different world. So these other industries, their big threats are to say to 
New York State ‘Sorry. We're going to pack up and leave. ’We can't do that. –A lobbyist 
for a large private university (C12) 
 
 These responses were eye-opening, and somewhat surprising to me. I thought that more 
people would consider college lobbying in alignment with corporate lobbying, given the broad 
national trends to tailor spending decisions to available governmental funds, emulate corporate 
tactics, and hire in-house lobbyists, and simply, because corporations know how to “get their 
way.” Indeed, the pattern of hiring college lobbyists from the corporate sector became more 
common over the three-year span of interviews: in 2020, two lobbyists, one from a public 
college and one from a private college, mentioned that their newly-hired boss (associate vice 
president for government affairs-level positions) was from the corporate sector. This may be a 
coincidence, or it may be a trend.  
 The anecdotes in this chapter reveal the unique characteristics of New York higher 
education: a disproportionately powerful governorship (and governor), a stable for-profit sector 
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that no longer includes publicly-traded organizations, major private research universities, large 
city and state-wide public systems, and competition across and within sectors. So, to do an 
“apples-to-apples” comparison with national trends, future research could also compare New 
York lobbying registration and expenditure data, and could include interviews with lobbyists in 
other states. 
 All said, the insiders raise convincing points—from the practical to the mystical—on why 
college lobbying does not resemble corporate lobbying. Their views should be considered along 
with other data when painting a complete picture of the college lobbying landscape. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I leveraged qualitative methods to focus on the process of lobbying, in 
addition to its product. Interviews revealed the intricate stages of the policy process in which 
lobbyists do their work, the tactics they rely on, and the topics about which they lobby. Together, 
this exploration helped address the remaining research questions of this study, and the questions 
arising from the quantitative exploration.  
At the outset of the chapter, I aimed to address several research questions. A new 
question arising from Chapter 3, why would colleges lobby for something that they seem to get 
from government in a pro forma way? concerned an underlying assumption about the nature of 
governmental funding. In this chapter, I argue the nature of this funding—from the college’s 
perspective—is interdependent. I argue that public funding to colleges should be understood as 
an interdependent portfolio that is pursued at increasingly specific stages of the budget process. 
A campus-based lobbyist must consider all revenue streams—to maintain budgetary 
equilibrium—and will lobby in large groups, like associations, for first-stage public goods that 
do not necessarily hit their campus’s ledgers. But there is more competition as funding gets more 
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specific: interviews showed clear examples intra-group competition, leading to more lobbying, 
and even among “sister” institutions within a system.  
Research Question 5 asked Why would an individual college lobby if others are taking 
action? and concerned free riding. In this chapter, I argue that associations provide lobbying 
infrastructure, are an important lobbying tactic, and contribute to free riding. I find that free 
riding also happens as entrepreneurial institutions drive coalitional agendas, allowing others to 
follow. Free riding does not continue in perpetuity: interviews demonstrated in-group pressure to 
speak with one voice. Such solidary motives suggest that even if a school does not differentially 
receive funding at the campus level, it will lobby for earlier funding buckets like research and 
development and Pell. I also find that college lobbyists nudge each other in subtle, positive ways 
to build coalitions and sign on letters.  
Research Question 6 asked How do external pressures like media attention affect 
lobbying? while Hypothesis III stated that all sector spending and registration is positively 
correlated with media coverage of accountability regulations. In this chapter, I argue that 
lobbyists do not only lobby for money: they lobby against measures that might raises costs and 
burdens to colleges. High profile topics not captured by the database include sexual assault 
accountability measures directed at colleges in New York by a strong governor. Federal 
legislators targeted colleges on topics like college endowments, gainful employment, and the 
cost of college, all of which demanded a college lobbying response. This response fed into the 
lobbying expenditures described in Chapter 3. But how did colleges respond? Did they lobby 
like corporations? 
Not exactly. Research Question 7 asked which tactics do colleges use to lobby? While 
Hypothesis IV states that public, private, and for profits employ similar lobbying tactics, with 
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for-profits relying more on direct tactics. In this chapter, I news reports showed that colleges 
relied on direct tactics 71% of the time, with the for-profit sector relying on direct tactics more 
often than indirect tactics. However, interviews revealed that colleges relied on direct tactics 
only slightly more than indirect tactics. Together, these findings provide some initial support for 
this exploratory hypothesis. 
In response to the last and main research question, do colleges lobby like corporations? I 
find that interviews with college lobbyists and legislators and staff strongly suggest that colleges 
lobby differently than corporations, due to colleges’ (mostly) tax-exempt status, their unique role 
in society as education providers, and their commitment to local communities. This set of 
findings add nuance to my main research question. It also underscores that colleges may retain 
elements of the government-higher education “parastate” observed by Loss (2012) and have a 
frayed-but-still-connected relationship observed by Brint (2019). In the next and final chapter, I 
tie together conclusions and lay out implications for the fields of political science, higher 
education, and lobbying.  
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Chapter 5: Implications 
5.1 Review of Study 
 
In this beginning of this study we met Aaron Kraus, Ashok Kumar, and Suri Kempe, 
three college students who sacrificed their health during hunger strikes to protest insufficient 
governmental tuition aid to students. Aaron, Ashok, and Suri’s situation vividly illustrates 
contemporary higher education-government relations—the “frayed” era. The challenges were not 
always so dire; before the protest movement of the 1960’s, government and higher education 
enjoyed a much friendlier relationship, with college presidents like Columbia’s Nicholas Murray 
Butler offering “the entire resources of” Columbia to Woodrow Wilson’s war effort (Barrow, 
1980: 126), and colleges receiving an “unexpected windfall” in G.I. Bill funding after World 
War II (Thelin, 1994).  
When I tell friends from places like Germany or China about my job—that I get paid to 
help a college get funding from government—they usually respond “Why do you need to do 
that?” From an outsider perspective, it might seem strange that American federal and state 
government does not sufficiently fund the country’s colleges and students, that there is over a 
trillion dollars of student debt, and that my position is even necessary. What happened between 
the higher education-government “parastate” of the 20th century and today? Put simply, why 
does higher education lobby? 
At the beginning of this study, I posited that colleges lobby like corporations. I first based 
this on existing research that pointed in this direction. As reviewed in Chapter 2, the joint forces 
of racism, populism, anti-intellectualism, privatization were the visible, frayed strands in the 
higher education-government relationship. This put colleges on the defense, so colleges might 
have emulated corporations, which successfully parlayed regulatory threats in the 1960’s and 
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early 1970s. As the corporate ethic permeated society and government, bipartisan officials 
demanded corporate-like returns on investment of educational institutions. Higher education not 
only used lobbying to play defense, but also to play offense. Higher education hired more 
lobbyists and spent lobbying dollars in pursuit of federal Pell and research and development 
funds (Cook, 1998; de Figueiredo and Silverman, 2006; Marsicano, 2019; Mettler, 2014). 
However, colleges lobby for other reasons besides securing funding. Although colleges 
may band together to lobby for increased federal funding pots, they break off for a “slice” of 
funding and choose not to free ride due to solidary or purposeful motivations. Additionally, all 
types of colleges have been the target of government accountability regulations. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that colleges lobby in response to high-profile accountability measures—for-
profit colleges in particular seem to respond to gainful employment regulations (Mettler, 2014). 
Lastly, it seems that colleges rely on direct tactics and indirect tactics, but the dearth of research 
means that it is unclear which set of tactics are more important to colleges.  
I posited that colleges lobby like corporations not only based on hints provided in the 
research reviewed above, but also on three sets of theories—academic capitalism, resource 
dependence, and memetic isomorphism—that together imply that colleges reflect the corporate 
environment and retool their internal behavior to become more corporate. To address the larger 
possibility that colleges lobby like corporations, I posed research questions:  
1. What are the characteristics of American colleges that lobby? 
2. How have lobbying registration laws and the earmark ban affected college lobbying in 
recent years? 
3. Are for-profit colleges that are more dependent on Pell Grants more likely to lobby and 
spend more money doing so? 
4. Are non-profit colleges that are more dependent on research and development more 
likely to lobby and spend more money doing so? 
5. Why would an individual college lobby if others are taking action? 
6. How do external pressures like media attention affect lobbying? 
7. Which tactics do colleges use to lobby? 
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Over the course of Chapters 3 and 4, I attempted to answer these questions. I next summarize 
those findings.  
5.1 Summary of Findings 
 
 The story of higher education lobbying is more complex than a model in which colleges 
are rational actors that simply spend money to make money. I started by exploring this model in 
Chapter 3, where I attempted to answer the first three research questions by analyzing data 
generated from a new database on American higher education lobbying. I put focus on two 
dependent variables: lobbying registrations, which measure whether a college lobbies in a given 
year, and lobbying expenditures, which measure how much a college lobbies. Descriptive results 
included an overview of the number and characteristics of colleges in the database, summary 
statistics on the characteristics of colleges that lobby, and the connection between Pell and 
federal research and development dependence and lobbying. Chapter 3 results indicate a clear 
connection between lobbying and federal research and development dependence, and a less clear 
connection between lobbying and Pell dependence. Results are summarized below. 
Table 30: Summary of Findings for Research Questions 1-4 
Research Questions Findings for all colleges 
1. What are the 
characteristics of American 
colleges that lobby? 
 
37% of colleges ever lobbied (Table 14). The average lobbying 
school spent $123,608 a year doing so. 35% of standalone 
institutions lobbied; 59% of university systems lobbied (Table 
13). 
 
Lobbying colleges were much more likely to be doctoral 
institutions, have a hospital, a medical program, larger 
enrollments and budgets than their non-lobbying counterparts. 
They had higher federal research and development dependence, 
but surprisingly, slightly lower Pell dependence (Table 14). 
 
On average, colleges spent an aggregate of $82 million 
lobbying in a given year; this trend closely followed lobbying 
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spending by all industries (Figure 6: College & All Industry 
Lobbying Expenditures, 2004-2014.  
 
On average, 12% of for-profits ever registered to lobby, 
spending a sector total average of $4.4 million across all years 
(Figure 7). The average lobbying for-profit college spent 
$20,485 in a given year.  
 
On average, 44% of public colleges ever registered to lobby, 
spending a total average of $42 million across all years (Figure 
8). The average lobbying public college spent $238,713 in a 
given year. 
 
On average, 21% of private colleges ever registered to lobby, 
spending a total average of $36 million across all years. The 
average lobbying private college spent $160,554 (Figure 9). 
 
Non-lobbying institutions are more Pell dependent (7%) than 
lobbying institutions (5%). Pell matters most to for-profits, 
especially for-profit systems that do not lobby, which have an 
19% Pell dependence, and to for-profit standalones that lobby, 
which have a 14% Pell dependence (Table 14).  
 
Across all colleges, lobbying expenditures decrease as Pell 
dependence increases (Figure 10). The highest Pell-dependent 
institutions are standalone institutions, and mostly religious 
institutions (Table 16). 
 
Federal research and development dependence is highest at 
colleges that lobby, especially lobbying public university 
systems, which have a 12% federal research and development 
dependence. Other characteristics like being an AAU member, 
a land grant institution, and having a medical program are 
associated with high federal research and development 
dependence. There is slightly higher federal research and 
development dependence at lobbying private standalones and 
lobbying private systems than at their non-lobbying 
counterparts (Table 15). 
 
Across all colleges, lobbying expenditures increase as federal 
research and development dependence increases (Figure 11).  
 
2. How have lobbying 
registration laws and the 
earmark ban affected 
College expenditure trends slumped continuously after 2010, 
suggesting that like other organizations, colleges ramped down 




college lobbying in recent 
years? 
 
Public college lobbying expenditures increased after 2007, and 
closely followed the availability of federal research and 
development funds rather than changes in lobbying or earmark 
laws (Figure 8). 
 
The connection between private college lobbying and the 
availability of federal research and development funds is not 
very clear. Further, the HLOGA and earmark ban do not seem 
to have affected the way private colleges register to lobby or 
spend on lobbying (Figure 9). 
 
3. Are for-profit 
colleges that are 
more dependent on 
Pell Grants more 
likely to lobby and 
spend more money 
doing so? 
Hypothesis I: For-Profit Colleges with Higher Pell Grant 
Dependence Will Lobby More.  
 
Pell’s importance to for-profits depends on type of institution: 
Pell matters most for-profit systems that do not lobby, which have 
an 19% Pell dependence, and to for-profit standalones that lobby, 
which have a 14% Pell dependence (Table 15). 
 
When grouping together all types of for-profits, there were weak, 
statistically insignificant correlations between Pell dependency 
and lobbying expenditures at all types of all for-profit colleges 
(Figure 10). 
 
Among all colleges, holding all else constant, a 10% increase in 
Pell dependence is associated with a 0.096% decrease in the odds 
of registering to lobby (p < 0.01) (Table 20). 
 
Among standalone colleges, holding all else constant, lobbying 
expenditures increase $16,355 if a college is a for-profit 
institution (p < 0.05) (Table 21). 
 
4. Are non-profit 
colleges that are 
more dependent on 
research and 
development more 
likely to lobby and 
spend more money 
doing so? 
Hypothesis II: Non-Profit Colleges with Higher Federal Research 
and Development Dependence Will Lobby More 
 
Federal research and development dependence is highest at 
colleges that lobby, especially lobbying public university 
systems, which have a 12% federal research and development 
dependence (Table 15). 
 
There were strong, positive correlations between federal research 
and development dependence and lobbying expenditures at all 




Among all colleges, holding all else constant, the odds of 
registering to lobby increase by 85% if a college is private as 
compared to a public college (p < 0.001) (Table 20). 
 
Among standalone colleges, holding all else constant, the odds of 
registering to lobby increase by 91% if a college is private as 
compared to a public college (p < 0.001) (Table 20). 
 
Among standalone colleges, holding all else constant, lobbying 
expenditures increase $21,067 if a college is a private institution 
(p < 0.001) (Table 21). 
 
However, among systems, holding all else constant, lobbying 
expenditures decrease $169,002 if a college is a private institution 
(p < 0.05) (Table 21). 
 
It is clear that the odds of registering increase and lobbying expenditures increase federal 
research and development dependence. This aligns with findings in the corporate lobbying 
literature that suggest that lobbying rises with governmental spending (Drutman, 2015; Lux, 
2011). My findings align with the higher education lobbying literature in that I find that federal 
research and development funding predicts lobbying, as was found by Marsicano (2019). 
Schools with higher enrollments and budgets generally registered and spent more than those with 
lower enrollments and budgets--aligning with the non-profit literature finding that larger non-
profits lobby more than smaller non-profits (DeVita et al, 2014). The connection between 
lobbying and Pell dependence is less clear, but there are initial results for future researchers to 
build upon. Chapter 3 also showed that enrollment predicts lobbying, and that private colleges 
lobby more, results went beyond my expectations of lobbying simply for Pell and research and 
development, and provided rationale for asking lobbying insiders why else they might lobby. 
  In Chapter 4 I provided an insider’s look at lobbying, which began to expand our scope 
of understanding why and how colleges lobbying, beyond the pursuit of federal funds. I 
addressed the assumption lobbying is merely connected to lobbying, and explored how colleges 
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lobby for the “pie, then the slice”—how funding is accessed at increasingly specific stages of the 
policy process. That process includes not only big agency budget lobbying, but also more 
campus-specific asks like as earmarks, lettermarks, capital, and programmatic funding. 
Collective action dilemmas like free riding may be inherent in this process. I argued that college 
officials view public funding from a portfolio perspective, as do government policymakers who 
set budgets with a finite amount of money, and adjust spending in different categories to 
maintain budgetary equilibrium. 
In Chapter 4, I leveraged qualitative methods to focus on the process of lobbying, in 
addition to its product. Interviews revealed the intricate stages of the policy process in which 
lobbyists do their work, the tactics they rely on, and the topics about which they lobby. The news 
analysis provided a national, longitudinal view about college lobbying topics and tactics. This 
qualitative exploration helped address the remaining research questions of this study, and the 
questions arising from the quantitative exploration.  
 I argued that public funding to colleges should be understood as an interdependent 
portfolio that is pursued at increasingly specific stages of the budget process. A campus-based 
lobbyist must consider all revenue streams and will lobby in large groups for first “bucket” 
public goods that do not necessarily hit campus coffers. But as funding gets more specific, 
competition rises: interviews showed clear examples of intra-group competition, leading to more 
lobbying, and even among “sister” institutions within a system. 
Associations provide lobbying infrastructure, are an important lobbying tactic, and 
contribute to free riding. I find that free riding occurs as entrepreneurial institutions drive 
coalitional agendas, allowing others to follow. Free riding does not continue forever, however. 
Interviews made clear that there is in-group pressure to be “in the same boat.” Such solidary 
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motives mean that even if a school does not differentially receive funding at the campus level, it 
will lobby for earlier funding buckets like research and development and Pell. I also find that 
college lobbyists nudge each other in sometimes positive ways to build coalitions and join sign-
on letters.  
Higher education lobbyists also push back against measures that might make boost costs 
and burdens. High profile topics not captured by Chapter 3’s quantitative analysis include sexual 
assault accountability measures directed at colleges in New York by a strong governor. Federal 
legislators made news by targeting colleges regarding endowments, gainful employment, and the 
cost of college, all of which demanded a college lobbying response, and contribute to day-to-day 
lobbying expenses. But how did colleges respond? Did they lobby like corporations? 
 There answer is not a clear “yes.” Although news reports and interviews show a 
predilection towards corporate style direct lobbying tactics, interviews with college lobbyists and 
legislators and staff strongly suggest that colleges lobby differently, due to their tax-exempt 
status, their unique role in society as education providers, and their longstanding support to local 
communities.  
A summary of Chapter 4 findings, which address Research Questions 5 through 8, is in 








Table 31: Summary of Findings for Research Questions 5-8 
Research Questions Findings  
5. Why would colleges 
lobby for something that 
they seem to get from 
government in a pro forma 
way? 
A college will spend its lobbying dollars and political capital 
advocating for interdependent resources from finite federal, 
state, and local budgets. 
 
The federal and state budget process means that funding buckets 
get more and more specific over time. This prompts colleges to 
take action in increasingly specific coalitions. 
Interviews show that lobbying infrastructure (on-campus 
lobbyists and associations) incentivize colleges to lobby for 
interdependent resources along the federal and state budget 
process, at least until a funding stream is no longer relevant to 
an individual campus 
6. Why would an individual 
college lobby if others are 
taking action? 
Hypothesis III: All sector spending and registration is positively 
correlated with media coverage of accountability regulations 
 
Enterprising colleges drive coalitional agendas, allowing others 
to follow. I also find that there is in-group pressure to speak 
with one voice, which builds the heat and energy of a coalition. 
This implies that colleges will lobby for public goods, even if 
they do not differentially receive them at the campus level. 
Lastly, I observe that although battles may be picked and 
chosen, coalitional infrastructure provides the pathway for 
groups to coalesce. 
7. How do external pressures 
like media attention affect 
lobbying? 
Hypothesis IV: Public, private, and for profits employ similar 
lobbying tactics, with for-profits relying more on direct tactics 
 
News analysis showed that accountability the third-most 
frequently-mentioned lobbying rationale (Table 26). 
Interviewees stressed the importance of high profile 
accountability regulations as a motive to lobby. 
8. Which tactics do colleges 
use to lobby? 
In interviews, the almost even split between direct and indirect 
tactics suggests that colleges rely on multiple methods of 
lobbying (Table 27). In the news, colleges relied on direct 
tactics 121 out of 216 instances, or 68% of the time; the for-
profit sector used direct tactics five out of nine times (Table 28). 
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I think that taken as a whole, these results suggest that the answer to the question of “do 
colleges lobby like corporations” is somewhere between Possibility 2 and Possibility 3: colleges 
in some ways lobby in their own distinct way, but lobby like corporations in other ways.  
5.2  Implications For Scholars Who Study Institutions of Higher Education 
 
5.2.1 An Updated Literature  
 
 My findings expand upon the literature on college lobbying by addressing a relatively 
long time frame, by including of all three sectors, drawing upon a large sampling of institutions, 
leveraging mixed methods, and discussing topics besides funding. This study leaves no doubt 
that colleges do in fact lobby, and gives scholars a better sense of why. 
We now know basic characteristics of lobbying colleges, and have evidence that their 
lobbying increases with federal research and development dependence. This finding supports 
Pfeffer and Salancik’s (2003) theory of resource dependence. We now know much more about 
non-profit college lobbying. We know that much more than five percent of non-profit colleges 
lobby as observed by Cook (1998), and we can differentiate from schools that lobby none and all 
of the time. We now know that lobbying is not limited to the top-tier non-profit institutions 
lobbying for earmarks and federal research and development funding as found by de Figueiredo 
and Silverman in 2006. Rather, I find that lobbying expenditures increase with federal research 
and development dependence, being a doctoral institution, being an AAU member, having a 
medical program, enrollment, and budget across non-profit colleges in the database. My study 
comports with Marsicano’s contemporary (2019), finding that private college lobbying is not that 
different from public college lobbying. 
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Furthermore, my exploration of topics towards which colleges responsively lobby lays a 
foundation for future research by scholars of higher education. I detail several high profile topics 
that real lobbyists say they respond to. Colleges are sensitive to public relations, and their 
response takes time and money; in that way, colleges have enhanced their managerial function to 
avoid threats, like corporations, as theorized by Slaughter & Rhoades (2004) and aligning with 
the theory of memetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
 I offer a detailed exploration of coalitional dynamics, in and around higher education 
associations. Cook’s (1998) foundational study mostly focused on how associations advocated; 
my study adds an inside look at associations from the college lobbyist point of view, finding that 
associations are an important lobbying tactic, provide an infrastructure to lobby, and might 
encourage free riding. Within the association, colleges help set agendas, use sign-ons to nudge 
one another, and coalesce to speak with one voice. It is possible that some of these complexities 
inherent to higher education lobbying may be inherent to corporate lobbying. 
Lastly, this may be the first study to compare higher education lobbying to non-higher 
education lobbying. Studies on non-profit lobbying intentionally exclude higher education (see 
Berry, 2003, Boris and Maronick, 2012; DeVita et. al., 2014). The present study compares higher 
education to other non-profits and updates that literature. I argue that non-profit colleges lobby to 
have a seat at the table, and do so to secure resources and parlay threats. By directly comparing 
higher education lobbying to that by other organizations including corporations, I was able to 
draw conclusions about the importance of lobbying laws like the HLOGA and the earmark ban, 





5.2.2 The Importance of Interdependence 
 
 This study’s emphasis on interdependence offers another set of implications for scholars 
who study institutions of higher education. This study revealed how funding is interdependent 
from a college’s perspective. As indicated in interviews and my own experience, a college 
lobbies for large pots of federal funds and will not miss the opportunity to advocate for any and 
all pots that feed into a college’s budgetary portfolio. Also, colleges rely on state and federal 
funds, which fluctuate from year to year, and in fact swapped in relative importance in 2010, 
when federal revenues outpaced state revenues. Again, a college lobbyist will not solely focus on 
one source of funds, and would be remiss to only lobby for an increasing federal source as state 
sources diminish. 
 Federal-state issue transference is another type of interdependence. That is, in multiple 
interviews, lobbyists and legislators noted how state and local governments would adopt a 
federal accountability measure (e.g. New York state level sexual assault guidelines)—or issue 
regulations to reverse federal policies (e.g., New York’s for-profit accountability proposal).  
 The final type of interdependence concerns coalitions. Colleges look to each other and 
check in with one another to make decisions and form coalitions. Solidary and purposeful ties are 
important type of interdependence—the story of higher education lobbying is bigger than 
competition between campuses.  
5.2.3 A Frayed Relationship 
 
 This study also makes a contribution in recognizing the frayed relationship between 
government and higher education. Higher education is no longer a “parastate” situated “between 
citizens and the state” as described by Loss (2012); there must be a new way to describe this 
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“post-parastate” era. I offer the metaphor of a frayed rope. This study began with a discussion of 
racism’s historic role in government and higher education’s pulling apart. I think that although 
important—and less visible—monetary strands connect government to higher education as 
described by Brint (2019), racism, populism, and xenophobia continue to fray more visible 
strands connecting the institutions of elected government and higher education.  
The frayed relationship continues today, due to a cycle explorable with future research: 
state government funding to institutions of higher education shrinks, colleges enroll more 
international students to balance their budgets, and the Trump administration issues populist and 
xenophobic polices, against which colleges lobby. As mentioned in the introduction, in July of 
2020, the administration demanded that international university students leave the country unless 
they enroll in in-person classes, as colleges shifted online due to the COVID-19 pandemic—an 
intentional dilemma to stoke populist resentments against immigrants and colleges. Mr. Trump, 
who had an election four months from that measure, has a base that is low in immigrants and low 
in college degrees: non-college graduates constitute 63% of the electorate; 50% in 2016 voted for 
Trump, 43% for Clinton; among whites without a college degree, 64% voted for Trump and 28% 
voted for Clinton (Pew, 2018). 
Whatever dissolution between higher education and government may have occurred in 
decades prior, the Trump administration’s racist and xenophobic actions since 2017 have 
fractured American society, and the administration’s higher education policies act as a match 
underneath the frayed rope. Although the administration certainly does not speak for all of 
government—the legislatures, the state governments, the town councils across the 50 states—
colleges have been playing a much more pronounced form of defense since January of 2017 than 
any year in this study, and today have been rudely awakened into action more than any example 
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given in this study. I think that the current state of higher education-government relations would 
not have been possible but for the already strained relationship described in Chapters 2 and 4. 
This study provides a “mile marker” for those who want to measure the thinning ties between 
government and higher education. 
5.3 Crossover Lessons for Political Science 
 
5.3.1 Resource Dependence  
 
 This study has crossover implications for political science. My findings align with the 
theory of resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003): colleges lobby for the resources on 
which they depend. My findings align with the corporate lobbying literature finding that 
lobbying expenditures rise with more governmental spending (Drutman, 2015; Lux, 2011). My 
findings on how colleges lobby for funding buckets of decreasing size aligns with regulatory 
lobbying case studies; Godwin et. al. (2013) found that “Private goods become increasing 
important as a proposed alternative moves through the policy process.” 
Further, I think this study has implications for the less-discussed notion of resource 
interdependence. As mentioned in the previous section, colleges, and surely many other entities, 
depend on federal, state, and other sources of revenue. When one goes down, a college must find 
a way to plug the hole. Perhaps future research can take a snapshot of the funding elements that 
comprise a college’s budget, and see how those sources fluctuate over time; perhaps a study can 
compare how higher education and corporate entities lobby for the same source of external 





5.3.2 Non-Profit Lobbying 
 
 This study aligns with non-profit lobbying literature and fills some of its gaps. I find that 
like other non-profits, higher education non-profits that receive governmental funding lobby 
more than those that do not, aligning with the non-profit lobbying literature (see Berry, 2003; 
Chaves et al, 2004; Leroux and Goerdel, 2009; Salamon et al, 2008). Notably, however, much of 
the non-profit literature intentionally excludes higher education (Berry, 2003, Boris and 
Maronick, 2012; DeVita et. al., 2014). My findings show an increase in lobbying expenditures as 
enrollment and budget increase and therefore align with the non-profit literature finding that 
larger non-profits lobby more than smaller non-profits (DeVita et al, 2014). The present study 
plugs higher education into the non-profit lobbying literature and dispels the notion that all non-
profits have their silence paid for. 
5.3.3 Shadow Lobbying 
 
La Pira (2015) makes a convincing case that American organizations systematically 
underreported their lobbying after HLOGA; although I found that HLOGA corresponded with a 
lower rate of public college lobbying registrations, this was not the case for private and for-profit 
colleges. This does not mean that shadow lobbying does not happen, but it may indicate that 
colleges lobby differently than other organizations. It also shows the importance of 
differentiating sectors of colleges when studying lobbying. 
5.3.4 Collective Action 
 
 This study has implications for those studying collection action dilemmas as posed by 
Olson (1965). In examining higher education coalition-building, I find that certain enterprising 
members can drive coalitional agendas, as can sub-groups that drive agendas from the bottom up. 
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I also note that free riding is discouraged as members nudge each other into action and/or might 
join a coalition due to solidary purposes; these observations do not necessarily unravel or negate 
Olson’s free-riding notion that a member will not join a group because the cost of doing so is not 
worth the benefit, but do help us understand the process of how a coalition works in real life.  
 Another implication for political science is this study’s focus on the process of 
lobbying—not just the product. Leech (2010) notes that interest group scholars would be well 
served to examine multiple stages of the policy process, and not just canonical outcomes like roll 
call votes. As a lobbyist, I could not agree more. My findings that colleges lobby in  
increasingly small coalitions along the policy process could be informative for interest group 
scholars studying other organizations, especially corporations.  
Drutman (2015) found a shift from associational to organizational level lobbying; my 
findings on the prevalence of campus-level lobbying, and that colleges nested within a system 
lobby more, seem to align with this. Drutman also noted that lobbying begets more lobbying; my 
interviews strongly suggested this pattern, as sister institutions within a system hired more 
lobbyists to compete over finite state resources.  
5.4 Future Research Possibilities: Stronger Data and Designs 
 
This study is limited in many ways. It does not capture myriad elements of what goes into 
the lobbying process. It is relatively narrow in scope of topics and size of samples. In this final 
section, I recommend two main ways to address these limitations and then chart future research 





5.4.1 Larger Samples to Expand Breadth and Depth 
 
This study intentionally focuses on colleges and universities as institutions, primarily to 
build upon existing research. A limitation is that this study only covers B.A.-granting 
institutions. Adding community college and for-profit two-year programs, which often compete 
for students, would contribute to a more complete picture of the higher education lobbying 
landscape.   
 This study’s quantitative data only looks at lobbying and funding at the federal level. A 
state-by-state analysis would yield an important level of analysis. 
The study includes 20 interviewees; it is likely that more interviews would offer a wider 
range of perspectives and possibly allow for statistical analyses. The study’s qualitative 
component is limited to New York; conducting interviews of lobbyists and legislators from other 
states could provide a broader scope and a fuller set of tactics and topics. Including interviews 
from associations might help unravel some of the free-riding dynamics inherent in coalitions. I 
sampled 200 news articles, but more could be gathered with additional, related search terms 
regarding higher education lobbying. The study covers 11 years; it should be possible to get 
consistent federal data for more years, beyond 2014, bringing the study up to date. 
5.4.2 Adding Different Variables to Capture Different Elements of the Lobbying 
Process 
 
 The quantitative component of this study focuses on two dependent variables and two 
independent variables of interest. What if lobbying registrations and expenditures are not the 
only ways to represent college lobbying? And what if there are different “inputs” that drive 
lobbying, like campaign contributions by board members, having an influential member of 
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Congress as a representative, or trading faculty subject matter expertise? And could there be 
different “outputs”? That is, maybe things like Pell dependence and federal research and 
development dependence are only part of the story, and colleges lobby for outputs like state 
appropriations, regulatory changes, lettermarks, or public statements of support. There also may 
be mediating or moderating variables that would explain how variables like being land grant, 
HBCU, or a private college are linked together. Next, I fold these and other new variables into 
research designs that are largely based on conversations I have had with scholars of higher 
education and politics in my eight years of doctoral study. 
5.5 Charting New Avenues for Research 
 
Future research would build from this dissertation and improve upon its shortcomings. I 
outline several studies with different foci and new research questions. 
5.5.1 Local Focus 
 
In a locally-focused study, a research question could be: Do public and private non-profit 
colleges in New York with higher state appropriations lobby more? This would be a New York 
state version of Chapter 3 of this dissertation. This study would ask which factors predict 
lobbying by New York’s non-profit colleges and universities. The dependent variable would be 
lobbying expenditures as reported to New York’s lobbying database. The independent variable of 
interest would be state appropriations (formula funding to SUNY and CUNY schools, and Bundy 
Aid to private colleges); other controlling variables would include: whether or not a college hires 
an in-house lobbyist, a contract lobbyist, or lobbies through an association; college 






In this study, the research question would be: Do colleges lobby for lettermarks after the 
2011 non-profit earmark ban? Emerging evidence suggests a shift from lobbying for earmarks to 
lobbying agencies. I find initial evidence suggesting that the non-profit earmark ban 
corresponded with a drop in public college lobbying expenditures. But Marsicano (2019) finds 
no evidence that lobbying expenditures decreased after the earmark ban among AAU members 
2007-2014 and suspects that colleges lobby through the process of “lettermarking,” in “which 
legislators send letters to federal agencies to which they have appropriated funds in an attempt to 
send agency funding to projects in their districts,” (Marsicano, 2019). Indeed, You (2017) finds 
that 40% of congressional lobbying activity took place after a bill was signed into law. Ritchie 
(2020) “found an uptick in grant request-related contacts from members of Congress to agencies 
following the earmark ban” not including the U.S. Department of Education.36 I think that 
college lettermark lobbying is a research topic ripe for exploration. As a lobbyist, I have 
successfully requested that our elected representatives nudge agencies, and when earmarks were 
banned in 2011, without missing a beat, the president of my colleges said “go to the agencies,” 
and we did.  
 This study would build from the work of Ritchie and You (2019) who found that 
legislator lettermarks on behalf of constituents from 2005-2012 resulted in positive outcomes 
from the Department of Labor. Here, legislator support of local constituents was key, even if 
legislators were not on powerful committees. I find that university’s local connection is key, 
revealed in interviews at the end of Chapter 4. In this possible study, the dependent variable 
would be higher education lobbying expenditures; another dependent variable could be whether 
                                                 
36 Thank you to Molly Ritchie and Hye You for exploring this idea with me. 
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lobbying reports mentions agency lobbying (pre- or post-legislation implementation). The 
independent variable of interest would be whether or not a college received a lettermark; controls 
would include federal research and development dollars, member of Congress leadership rank, 
and other college characteristics in this dissertation. 
5.5.3 Influence of Higher Education Affiliates 
 
In this study, the research question would be: How does the presence of higher education 
affiliates in a state influence state student aid appropriations? As noted in Chapter 2, outside 
organizations advocated for federal student aid: the United Negro College Fund lobbied for Pell 
increases for the benefit of students at Historically Black College or Universities (HBCUs) 
(Loss, 2012) and the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America helped pass G.I. bill benefits 
(Mettler, 2014). In my news analysis, I find that affiliated organizations like state council on 
postsecondary education lobbied state governments for higher education budgetary support. This 
echoes Dougherty et. al.’s (2016) finding that state higher education coordination boards drove 
the adoption of performance funding in six states, helping secure state funds for higher 
education.  
 The dependent variable would be higher education lobbying expenditures. The 
independent variable of interest would be state student aid appropriations. Additional controls 
would include the presence of affiliates like a state higher education coordinating board, a state-
wide veterans advocacy group, or a statewide higher education association. 
5.5.4 Media and Lobbying 
 
In one study, the research question would be: Does higher education lobbying increase 
with more high-profile accountability regulations? A systematic study could build upon my 
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initial evidence that higher education lobbies in response to high profile measures regarding 
sexual assault, college endowments, gainful employment, and the cost of college. For example, a 
dependent variable could be whether or not a college filed a quarterly lobbying report 
mentioning a high-profile accountability regulation. This could include any of the immigration 
proposals put forth by the Trump administration from 2017 onward. Independent variables 
would include news mentions of the regulation, sector of college, association memberships, and 
other characteristics in my dissertation. 
 Another research question would be: Do colleges lobby for statements of public support? 
This study draws from an experimental study I am working on37. As a lobbyist, I value feedback 
from elected officials, especially public statements of support. Such statements include press 
releases, floor statements, non-binding resolutions, or social media posts (Showalter and 
Rhoades, 2016). These statements build momentum for an issue and decrease the likelihood that 
legislators will renege. Public statements of support are an interim outcome—a “mini win”—and 
part of the lobbying process. Further study of public statements in the media might also be 
valuable for the study of corporate lobbying.  
Social media postings are a new and important type of public statement of support. 
Recently, social media has become a vital tool for political communication and political 
advocacy: in the 112th and 113th Congresses, constituents sent approximately 76,000 tweets to 
Members of Congress; the plurality was requests to support or oppose legislation (Hemphill and 
Roback, 2014). Twitter is also used by industries to contact government agencies, and by 
politicians to broadcast, interact with constituents, mobilize activists, or bypass traditional media 
(Parmelee and Bichard 2012). Twitter has become a potent tool in the hands of political 
                                                 
37 Thank you to Michael Schwam-Baird and Adam Zelizer for collaborating on this idea. 
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candidates, with former President Trump use of it as a bully pulpit (Parlapiano and Buchanan 
2017). Social media, and Twitter in particular, is also an important place for experimental 
political research; however, experimental studies of Twitter thus far have focused mostly on its 
use in the mass public, rather than among politicians or other political elites (Coppock, Guess, 
and Ternovski 2016; Munger 2016). 
Interest groups also gain traction by “subsidizing” the work of legislators. Hall and 
Deardorff (2006) argue a legislative subsidy is a “matching grant of policy information, political 
intelligence, and legislative labor to the enterprises of strategically selected legislators.” Interest 
group provision of such information is a day-to-day task funded by lobbying expenditures, and is 
likely an important tool to achieve a public statement of support. For example, subsidizing 
information can lead to an interest group being called to testify, having research cited, a sign-on 
letter, or another statement of public support. 
In this study, the dependent variable would be whether or not a local legislator expressed 
a statement of support, e.g., a tweet, retweet, or “like” on Twitter in support of a statewide higher 
education advocacy campaign, e.g., around Bundy Aid in New York during budget season. 
Independent variables would include quarterly lobbying expenditures by colleges (lobbying); 
whether or not a college provided subsidizing information (e.g., a fact sheet about the importance 
and uses of Bundy Aid); and college characteristics in this dissertation. I would expect that 
colleges that provide a fact sheet receive more social media statements of support. 
5.5.5 Comparison to Corporate Lobbying 
 
It is possible that many of the complexities in higher education lobbying also are found in 
corporate lobbying. In one study, the research question would be: How do colleges lobby vis a 
vis corporations? This study would directly compare corporate lobbying to higher education 
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lobbying. Drawing on my database plus Center for Responsive Politics data, I would compare 
how colleges and corporations lobby for the same pots of money--for example for NIH, 
Homeland Security, Small Business Services, or Department of Defense funding. The dependent 
variable would be funding from an agency. Independent variables would be lobbying 
expenditures by organizations, and whether or not a registered lobbyist was 1) college-only 2) 
contract lobbyist with college and corporate clients 3) corporate-only. Other independent 
variables would include corporate campaign contributions, and the college characteristic 
variables in this dissertation. I would expect that all else equal, corporations are more effective at 
securing public funds, and that colleges with lobbyists who also represent corporate clients to get 
more federal funding. 
 Another study would ask: How does higher education leadership’s connections to 
corporate America influence lobbying?38 As mentioned in Chapter 4, I noticed instances of 
higher education lobbyists coming directly from private industry. College presidents also 
sometimes come from industry, likely bringing corporate operating principles, funding streams, 
and staff, perhaps contributing to the corporatization of higher education. To know more, a study 
could map out university president backgrounds to observe those individuals’ recent employers. 
This study would draw upon the “revolving door” methodology of LaPira and Thomas (2014) 
who mapped out employment histories of lobbyists who came from Capitol Hill. An independent 
variable could be whether or not a college president came from the corporate sector (as opposed 
to academia or the public sector). This can be found by examining a sample (e.g. 10 percent) of 
college presidents in this database. Additional independent variables would be those in this 
dissertation. Dependent variable would be lobbying expenditures. I would expect colleges with 
                                                 
38 Thanks to Heath Brown for this study idea. 
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presidents from corporate backgrounds to lobby more given those president’s likely familiarity 
with the importance of lobbying. 
5.5.6 Students and Lobbying 
 
Students are at the heart of higher education. Their presence, activism, and changing 
demographics tie to how higher education intersects with governmental policies. I end this 
dissertation where I started it: acknowledging the role of students. I offer two ideas for future 
research regarding students. The first research question would be: Do colleges with high 
proportions of minority students lobby more?39 Although the IPEDs dataset and my database do 
not code minority-serving institutions (MSIs), such schools get funding from discrete federal 
programs, and expend resources to lobby; knowing more about MSIs would give scholars a more 
complete picture of the higher education lobbying landscape, and our understanding of how race 
factors into the balance of power in higher education lobbying. To compare MSI lobbying to that 
of other universities, the dependent variable in this study would be lobbying expenditures as a 
percentage of budget. I would create a dummy independent variable indicating whether or not a 
college is an MSI. I would use existing independent variables of this dissertation as controls to 
get a sense of how MSI lobbying relates to the Pell and research and development dependence. 
A final research question would be: Do colleges with more international students lobby 
more?40 This question would get at the cycle I mentioned in Chapter 1: as U.S. state 
governments lower their higher education funding, colleges boost their international student 
enrollment; as international students face threats by the Trump administration, colleges with high 
                                                 
39 Thank you to Denisa Gandara for exploring this idea with me. 




international student enrollments lobby in response41. The dependent variable in this study would 
be lobbying expenditures. Independent variables would be international student enrollment; 
annual state higher education funding; the interaction of international student enrollment and 
state higher education funding; the proportion of Congressional district-level voters that voted 
for Donald Trump in 2016; whether or not a district has a college; proportion of non-white voters 
in the district; and whether or not a college is a member of the Association of International 
Educators (NAFSA), which advocates for international students. I would expect that colleges 




 This study makes contributions to the growing higher education lobbying literature and 
opens up new lines of inquiry. My descriptive and multivariate quantitative analyses show that 
colleges have not only robustly entered the world of lobbying, but often do so in the corporate 
image. My quantitative results show that college lobbying rises with federal research and 
development dependence and less so with Pell grant dependence. However, the story of higher 
education lobbying is more complex than a corporate model in which lobbying effort is primarily 
focused on fundraising. Colleges with higher enrollments lobby more, and private colleges—
which actually have lower federal research and development dependence than public colleges—
often lobby more than their public counterparts. My qualitative findings in Chapter 4 provided 
further nuance. Colleges lobbied for interdependent portfolio of federal and state funds and 
response to measures outside the predictable budgetary process, such as high profile topics like 
                                                 
41 E.g., Prof. Hannah Wohl (2020) found that universities with the highest percentage of international students were 
the first to file lawsuits against the ICE ruling that would have banned international students unless they enrolled in 
in-person classes.  
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sexual assault accountability measures, endowments, gainful employment, and the cost of 
college, all of which demanded a college lobbying response, and contribute to day-to-day 
lobbying expenditures. Lobbying often happened in coalitions, sometimes even when public 
goods were distributed on a formula basis. Coalitional lobbying, even with some free riding, was 
motivated by a desire to band together, underscoring the undercurrent of interdependence in 
higher education lobbying.  
 Together, these findings suggest that colleges lobby like corporations in important ways, 
but reserve some distinctive methods, strategies, and characteristics that make their lobbying 
distinctive. The study has implications for scholars who study higher education and political 
science—it fills important gaps and explores new territory. Coming full circle, it seems possible 
that some of the lessons learned about higher education lobbying can be used to further probe 
corporate lobbying, and tell a more complex story. Although the study has limitations in terms of 
size, scope, and time frame, I build from this study’s findings and limitations to propose new 
courses of study to know more about how and why colleges lobby, which could help bring the 
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Table A1 Breakdown of Institutions in 2004 (highlighted sectors are excluded in the 
American Higher Education Lobbying Database) 
Value Label Code Value Frequency Percentage 
Administrative unit 0 83 1.20% 
Public, 4-year or above 1 662 9.57% 
Private not-for-profit, 4-year or above 2 1,672 24.18% 
Private for-profit, 4-year or above 3 383 5.54% 
Public, 2-year 4 1,172 16.95% 
Private not-for-profit, 2-year 5 244 3.53% 
Private for-profit, 2-year 6 828 11.97% 
Public, less-than 2-year 7 282 4.08% 
Private not-for-profit, less-than 2-year 8 137 1.98% 
Private for-profit, less-than 2-year 9 1,448 20.94% 
Sector unknown (not active) 99 5 0.07% 
Totals   6,916 100.00% 
 
Source: IPEDS Institutional Characteristics Survey, 2004. 
 
Characteristic changers  
 
A small number of colleges had characteristics that changed during their database lifespan. 
 
Table A2: Number and percentage of database colleges that change characteristics 
Characteristic Freq. Percent 
Sector 33 1.25% 
Doctoral 0 0.00% 
HBCU 1 0.04% 
Hospital 61 2.32% 
Medical 27 1.03% 
AAU 6 0.19% 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 









ID College Name Doctoral Hospital Medical 
2004 161457 University of New England 0 0 1 
2005 161457 University of New England 0 0 1 
2006 161457 University of New England 0 0 1 
2007 161457 University of New England 0 0 1 
2008 161457 University of New England 0 0 1 
2009 161457 University of New England 0 1 1 
2010 161457 University of New England 0 1 1 
2011 161457 University of New England 0 1 1 
2012 161457 University of New England 0 1 1 
2013 161457 University of New England 0 1 1 
2014 161457 University of New England 0 1 1 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
Of the 33 Sector changers, 17 colleges went from for-profit to private; 12 of those took 
place in 2013. The plurality were 7 College America campuses. An internet search confirmed 
that College America in 2012 filed with the IRS to change its status. Another 15 sector changers 
went from private to for-profit; though they were a variety of colleges, 5 (the plurality) took 
place in 2010, a year before for-profits peaked in their enrollment relative to other sectors. They 
were from a variety of (formerly) for-profits like the Waldorf College, Bob Jones University, and 
Cogswell College. Lastly, one college went from public to private. I do not think that these 
coding changes were erroneous.  
Of the 61 hospital changers, 26 looked like straightforward instances of colleges adding 
hospitals: a college would report no hospital for the first several years, then consistently report 
one thereafter. In 25 instances, however, there seemed to be a consistent pattern of reporting a 
hospital in 2004 but in none of the other years. I went back to the IPEDS code book and noticed 
that in 2004, the IPEDS survey asked colleges simply to report whether or not they had a 
hospital. In 2005 and beyond, however, the hospital variable was derived indirectly, using 
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finance data. The 2005 codebooks says “an institution was determined to have a hospital” if the 
“institution reported either revenues from Sales and services of hospitals. . . hospital revenues. . 
.or expenses for hospital services. . ..”  This seems to clarify the discrepancy for those 27 
instances. To be consistent, I recode these 26 instances in 2004 from reporting a hospital to not 
reporting a hospital. 
Of the 27 medical changers, the database shows that 22 institutions added (created) 
medical programs. In these instances, a school would report no medical program for the first 
several years, then consistently report one thereafter. About two-thirds were public, and they 
seemed to be almost evenly distributed across years. Together, these findings do not make me 
think that medical school reporting status was erroneous, so I leave this variable as is. 
Across all types of characteristics that changed (sector, doctoral, HBCU, hospital, 
medical, and AAU), I found 17 observations that looked like erroneous reporting. These 17 
observations (not institutions) represent an institutional record in a given year (e.g. University of 
North Carolina School of the Arts, which in 2012 reported a hospital but did not in any other 
year). 15 of the errors were of hospital status; 5 were in 2004 and the remainder where about 
evenly spread out over the other years. Because of the questionable nature, rather than dropping 
the observation I set it as null (value =99) 
Colleges that appear and disappear 
Prior to aggregating the database, I noticed that some colleges appear and 
disappear within the 11-year database time frame. Within the 1-10 year lifespan, I find 
that some colleges suddenly appeared (were “born”) and continued to exist; some 
disappeared (“died”) and never reappeared, and some appeared and re-appeared (were 
“helter-skelter”). The table below shows characteristics of these three types of colleges, 
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along with those with an 11-year lifespan.  
 
Table A4: Mean college characteristics by database appearance 2004-2014 
 
 
1-10 Year Lifespan 11 Year Lifespan 
 Born Died 
Helter- 
Skelter  
N 413 330 84 1675 
Public 4% 7% 7% 32% 
Private 22% 47% 61% 58% 
For-Profit 74% 46% 31% 10% 
Land grant 1% 0% 2% 5% 
HBCU 0% 1% 2% 5% 
Doctoral 0% 2% 2% 15% 
AAU 0% 0% 1% 3% 
Hospital 0% 5% 2% 3% 
Medical 0% 7% 1% 7% 
Campus in system 65% 46% 42% 34% 
Enrollment (mean) 1,150 1,120 1,409 4,360 
Budget (mean in $ millions) $22 $54 $56 $231 
Pell dependence 19% 10% 8% 6% 
R&D dependence 0% 1% 1% 3% 
Registered to lobby 45% 36% 23% 39% 
Lobbying expenditures (mean)    $11,066 $9,840 $15,153 $46,423 
Source: American Higher Education Lobbying Database 
 
The second row of this table is interpreted as “of colleges that were born, 4% were public; of 
colleges that died, 7% were public.” Overall, colleges that were born stand out as an interesting 
group. Seventy-five percent of the 413 borns were for-profit; borns had lower budgets ($22 
million mean), more Pell dependence (19%) and register to lobby more frequently (45%). An 
example of a median college, based on enrollment, that was born during this time frame is 
CollegeAmerica-Flagstaff, which was “born” in 2009 as a for-profit became a private non-profit 
in 2013. CollegeAmerica is owned by the company the Center for Excellence in Higher 
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Education, which the U.S. Department of Education in 2016 moved to reclassify as a for-profit 
due to its high receipt of Title IV dollars, which include Pell grants (Kreighbaum, 2016). 
In contrast, the dieds look different. They were more likely to be private, less likely to be 
for-profit, and had larger budgets. 47% of the 330 dieds were private, 46% for-profit, 7% public, 
1,120 mean enrollment, $54 million budget. An example college that “died” during this time 
frame is Sheldon Jackson College, a tiny college in Alaska (enrollment: 127) founded in 1878, 
known for educating Alaska Natives, but closed in 200741F42.  
 Helter-skelter schools were also more likely to be private or for-profit as compared to the 
11-year lifespan college: 31% were for-profit, 61% private, 7% public, and in most other ways 
were roughly similar to schools that died. Helter-skelter schools tended to be smaller, specialized 
colleges of optometry or chiropractic, branches of the Christian Concordia University system, or 
branches the for-profit ITT system, the latter of which opened and closed campuses due to its 
many legal challenges in this era (ITT ultimately shut down in 2016). Helter-skelter schools thus 
do not appear to be erroneously reported.  
Table A5: Detail on rationale codes 
 
  
  Lobbying rationale Detail 
Budget 
related  
Student aid Student aid includes references to lobbying for student financial aid programs like TAP  
Tax code Tax code includes endowment tax proposals and charitable giving regulations 
Research Research includes lobbying to boost budgets of federal agencies that sponsor research 
Capital 
Capital includes lobbying to boost and continue funding 
for state programs that benefit public and private 
colleges. 
Budget Budget includes lobbying for a more favorable city/state match. 







Program approval includes lobbying state agencies to 
approve new and existing higher education degree 
programs. 
Sexual assault 
Sexual assault includes lobbying executive and 
legislative branches to ease reporting and other 
requirements for institutions of higher education. 
Gainful employment 
Gainful employment includes college lobbying executive 
and legislative branches to ease debt-to-earnings ratio 
requirements for college graduates. 
Entrepreneurship 
Entrepreneurship includes lobbying for funding for a 
college to become an business incubator or a regional 





























I'm a PhD student at Columbia University studying politics & education and would like to 
interview Assembly Member ___, who has extensive experience in higher education and 
government.  
 
I'm writing a dissertation on how and why colleges lobby. Central to research will be a case 
study on New York colleges, so I'm interviewing college officials and the legislators they lobby. 
Assemblymember ____ seems like an ideal person to interview for this research. 
 
Does __ have about 45 minutes in the coming weeks? I can meet ____  in ____  NYC office or 
travel to Albany, depending on availability. 
 






Interview Protocol 1: for college lobbyists 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
 
● Introduction to the study; review and secure consent. 
● Interviewee background: What does your job entail? How many years have you been 
here? 
 
II. Questions regarding how colleges lobby 
 
● What lobbying tactics do you find helpful on a day-to-day basis? 
● Do you use different tactics at the legislative versus regulatory level? 
● At the state versus federal level? 
● Have lobbying laws affected the way you lobby? 
 
III. Questions regarding why colleges lobby 
 
● Why does your school lobby?  
● What are the topics your college cares about/lobbies about?  
o Probe: Are there governmental opportunities you seek via lobbying? 
o Probe: Do you have examples of things you might lobby against? 
o Probe: What is the distribution of federal and state effort? 
● Is your school influenced by other schools ’choice to lobby? 
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● Are there tactics that you see other industries doing that colleges emulate or avoid? 
● Are there instances where you didn’t want to, or find the need to lobby? 
 
Interview Protocol 2: for state legislators & staff 
 
I. Introduction and Background 
 
● Introduction to the study; review and secure consent. 
● Interviewee background: What does your job entail? How many years have you been 
here? 
 
II. Questions regarding lobbying in general 
 
● What lobbying tactics do you see on a day-to-day basis? 
● What lobbying tactics are especially helpful in getting your attention? 
 
III. Questions regarding how and why colleges lobby 
 
● Shifting gears to colleges, on which topics do colleges lobby?   
● Are there ways in which colleges lobby differently from other industries? 
● Which colleges lobby the most? 
● Which colleges do not lobby? Why not? 
● If there was one suggestion you had for college lobbyists, what would it be? 
 
 
Interview Consent Form 
 
Protocol Title: FROM HALLOWED HALLS TO CAPITOL HILLS: A PORTRAIT OF 
HIGHER EDUCATION LOBBYING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
 





You are being invited to participate in this research study called “From Hallowed Halls to 
Capitol Hills: A Portrait of Higher Education Lobbying in the 21st Century.” You may qualify to 
take part in this research study because you are a lobbyist for a New York College/a New York 
state legislator/staff. Approximately 20 people will participate in this study and it will take 1 
hour of your time to complete. 
 
WHY IS THIS STUDY BEING DONE? 
 
This study is being done to determine how and why New York colleges lobby state government. 
 




If you decide to participate, you will be interviewed by the principal investigator. During the 
interview you will be asked to discuss your government relations/government experience. This 
interview will be audio-recorded. After the audio-recording is written down (transcribed) the 
audio-recording will be deleted. The recording may be transcribed by a professional 
transcriptionist, who will be required to agree to a non-disclosure agreement. If you do not wish 
to be audio-recorded, you will be able to participate. The interview will take approximately 1 
hour. You will be given a de-identified code in order to keep your identity confidential. 
 
 
WHAT POSSIBLE RISKS OR DISCOMFORTS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN 
THIS STUDY? 
 
This is a minimal risk study, which means the harms or discomforts that you may experience are 
not greater than you would ordinarily encounter in daily life while discussing your work. and the 
possibility that – despite the researcher’s best efforts to maintain confidentiality – someone 
reviewing research findings might somehow ascertain your identity. 
The principal investigator is taking precautions to keep your information confidential and 
prevent anyone from discovering or guessing your identity, using a de-identified numerical code 
instead of your name and keeping all information on a password protected computer. 
 
You are not required to participate in this study, and you may choose to withdraw your consent 
to participate at any point during the interview. If there are any questions that you do not want to 
answer, you are not required to answer them. If there are any questions that you would like to 
answer “off the record,” inform the researcher that you would like to answer those questions “off 
the record,” and such responses will not be included in the researcher’s final reports. 
 
WHAT POSSIBLE BENEFITS CAN I EXPECT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY? 
 
There is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. Participation may benefit the field 




WILL I BE PAID FOR BEING IN THIS STUDY? 
 
You will not be paid to participate. There are no costs to you for taking part in this study. 
 
WHEN IS THE STUDY OVER? CAN I LEAVE THE STUDY BEFORE IT ENDS? 
 
The study is over when you have completed the interview. However, you can leave the 
study at any time even if you haven’t finished. 
 




Any electronic or digital information (including audio recordings) will be stored on a computer 
that is password protected. There will be no record matching your real name with your de-
identified; the master list identifying subjects will be kept separate from the list of codes. 
Regulations require that research data be kept for at least three years. 
 
HOW WILL THE RESULTS BE USED? 
 
The results of this study will be published in journals and presented at academic conferences. 
Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published. This study is being 
conducted as part of the dissertation of the principal investigator. 
 
CONSENT FOR AUDIO AND OR VIDEO RECORDING 
 
Audio recording is part of this research study. You can choose whether to give permission 
to be recorded. If you decide that you don’t wish to be recorded, you will still be able to 
participate in this study. 
 
 _ I give my consent to be recorded  _  
Signature 
 





WHO MAY VIEW MY PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY 
 
 
 _ I consent to allow written, video and/or audio taped materials viewed at an educational 




 _ I do not consent to allow written, video and/or audio taped materials viewed outside of 





OPTIONAL CONSENT FOR FUTURE CONTACT 
 
 
The investigator may wish to contact you in the future. Please initial the appropriate statements 
to indicate whether or not you give permission for future contact. 
 




Yes  _  
 





I give permission to be contacted in the future for information relating to this study: 
 
Yes  _  
 






WHO CAN ANSWER MY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS STUDY? 
 
If you have any questions about taking part in this research study, you should contact the 
principal investigator, Matthew Camp, at 212-678-3427 or at camp@tc.edu 
 
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) (the human research ethics committee) at 212-678-4105 or 
email  IRB@tc.edu. Or you can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 525 
W. 120th Street, New York, NY 1002.  The IRB is the committee that oversees human research 
protection for Teachers College, Columbia University. 
 
 PARTICIPANT ’S RIGHTS  
 
 
∙ I have read and discussed the informed consent with the researcher. I have had ample 
opportunity to ask questions about the purposes, procedures, risks and benefits regarding this 
research study. 
∙ I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw 
participation at any time without penalty. 
∙ The researcher may withdraw me from the research at his or her professional discretion. 
∙ If, during the course of the study, significant new information that has been developed 
becomes available which may relate to my willingness to continue my participation, the 
investigator will provide this information to me. 
∙ Any information derived from the research study that personally identifies me will not be 
voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required by 
law. 




My signature means that I agree to participate in this study 
 
 
Print name:  _ Date:  _  
 
 
Signature:  _  
